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THE UNDIRECTED FUNCTION IN THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM¹

A Question put to Physiology by Psychology

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Many authors have voiced the opinion that the psychical function of the central nervous system may extend beyond the excitation of centres and the conducting of centripetal, centrifugal and inter-central excitation. Research workers who stress the whole rather than individual acts have implicitly presupposed undirected co-operation. The field psychologists, the Gestalt psychologists as well as the 'complex' psychologists have done so; so have, on the other hand, the Vitalists and von Monakow in his *Syneidesis*. Many of them may almost be regarded as modern animists. But to my knowledge there is only one worker who has propounded a theory, based on experiments, for the co-operation of unconnected parts, namely Paul Weiss of Chicago. I do not use his term 'resonance', a term used previously by Ziehen and J. v. Kriess, because Weiss' conclusions, which originated in connection with the innervation of muscles, were not extended to the cerebral function in general. Besides, the question that interests me here is less the mere co-ordination of the excitable elements as the phenomenon of waking out of the partial sleep which constitutes our waking life. My work is concerned with the wakening of previous ego conditions and continues my research on the ego.

My supposition is not so far-fetched as might be supposed if one

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started from the well-worn conceptions of cerebral paths. The authority for these derives from the overwhelming impression of the cartography of the brain. Their exclusiveness was greatly supported by the work by Pavlov's pupils on directed functions and inhibitions which demonstrates infallibly conditioned reflexes ; so far we should not imagine them otherwise but directed. Ischlondski, for instance, says that new communications between two areas of the cerebral cortex are established when there is a new conditioned reflex. Diametrically opposed to this consistent reflexology and to the allied behaviourism are the Vitalists and in contra-distinction to both Gestalt psychology. These schools of thought repudiate all mechanistic explanations and their supposition, the isolating of certain physiological or psychological elemental happenings. They presuppose localization only for a disturbance of the functions, but not for the functions themselves. But the question by what path the local, temporal and material connections are established they have to answer in the same way as association psychology or the Behaviourists. The difference between the schools lies only in that some ascribe less importance to the connecting links. Anatomical and physiological problems arise for us here, transgressing the frame of a Psycho-Analytical Congress, and, strictly speaking, of our competency.

All psychological schools of thought ought to work together to prevent the imposing building of psychology going the way of the Tower of Babel.² Comprehensively enough it is our concern with the ego that creates the desire for co-operation with other schools. The ego is an interest in common with other schools, whereas the first sphere of psycho-analysis, the Unconscious, is denied or neglected by the others or relegated to psycho-analysts.

It is the daily concern of psycho-analysts to watch how a psychical (mental) connection is established or broken. Otto Gross brought forward the brilliant hypothesis of the secondary function. Psycho-analytical theory and practice has to come back over and over again to the basic questions of free association, the becoming conscious and the appearing of memories ; most clearly of all workers Freud has expressed this in his metapsychological papers, when he discusses the question of single or double impression and gives the preliminary answer that it depends on the lack, the presence or the psycho-analytical

² Bühler : *Die Krise der Psychologie*.

re-cathexis of connecting links whether unconscious material becomes conscious. Continuing here, my thesis holds that in psycho-analysis neither the end nor the connecting links need be joined by associations immediately connected, not even by those remaining preconscious or unconscious. The end and middle links of connections appear without any communication; they are called forth by a topical conscious content, they are *awakened*.

Their cathexis remaining in repression, too, conditions their readiness for being awakened; the overcoming of resistances sets this readiness free. If put this way our problem remains, irrespective of the question whether we suppose direction or non-direction. If I have chosen this theoretical problem for my paper I have done so, not in a spirit of ambitious imperialism that sets out to conquer vast territories, but because it embraces several smaller problems and might succeed in elucidating them. It is clear that direct observation is impossible; we shall have to be satisfied with probabilities.

Our starting point is that every idea, every association is determined, which excludes chance; one psychical element bears a stronger cathexis than another because it has been singled out for a good reason. My thesis maintains that conscious contents exercise a directly selective function even without preconscious or unconscious links. The question is: do only connected associations exist or disconnected and distant ones as well? This question connects with the problem Freud raised in regard to dream work: whether the associations evoked by analysis follow the paths the dream work had to go or not. Freud's answer is that they may do so, but that the thoughts and associations in analysis might also use collateral paths. I may add that especially during sleep, when cathexes are withdrawn, the mental apparatus has become actually more permeable, to use a word Koffka applies in a different sense. This permeability ceases when we are awake as soon as the co-ordinating factors and co-ordinated connections regain their cathexes and with them also their cathectic readiness to co-operate in associations; in waking life there are needed, therefore, as Freud demonstrated, many determined connecting links to find the communications created by dream work, also where the dream work has used many superficial and deep sound associations and symbols as a sign-post for distant elements in the manifest dream content. My explanation does not affect the determining power and significance of the associations found in dream analysis; these associations elucidate the choice made by the dream work, since they explain

why there is more cathexis and therefore also more readiness for re-cathexis in the single elements.

According to Freud, too, it is probable that the dream work goes on unconsciously all the time, not only on awakening or during the period of sleep preceding the dream, but also beforehand and during the day, and especially after the appearance of the thoughts exciting the dream and of the residue from the last day's waking life. Many dreams or parts of dreams have taught me that the degree to which the ego awakens from sleep determines from which layers the dream material for a dream scene is chosen ; the strictness of the censorship, the degree and the form of the distortion, depend likewise on the state of development of the ego wakened for a dream. The new term *Orthriogenesis*³ means that, according to the phylogenesis and ontogenesis, every awakening calls for the development of the ego from the degree of cathexis of the unborn infant up to the ego as it was at the time of going to sleep. While dreaming the ego remains temporarily in a state of twilight, the depth of which is determined ; it sinks back or wakes fully. My present thesis aims at shewing that from these previous states of the ego in sleep it is wakened by psychical stimuli proceeding from the results of dream work or through bodily stimuli, because these waking stimuli rouse permanently important or for determined reasons more 'wakeable' special parts of a previous ego content immediately, without any connecting path, therefore in an 'undirected' fashion.

Just as in sleep a previous ego content is wakened from the quiet state of being without cathexis, the same can happen in waking life ; in this case we say that the ego regresses, mostly only partially, to its previous state and content. How this happens an example may shew. It is a simple process and I am only adding shades I observed on myself to its everyday, well-known occurrence. I travelled in a train with many compartments and many windows. At the third window sat a woman who looked at me as if she knew me and was pleased to see me. However, I did not recognize her. Only after a few minutes my impression of strangeness gave room to one of acquaintance. I searched for the lost remembrance. While doing so I did not look at the woman, but let this impression work inside me undisturbed ; I was removed from the present, attuned to welcome the returning

³ ''*Orthriov* means the morning as beginning of a day's life, while *ἑως* means the celestial phenomena of the morning.

memory. It did actually return. More than twenty years ago I had met her. Her face was changed by age, only the shape of face had remained and something above all that struck me as well-known, her expression of a capable and benevolent character. And this physiognomic impression helped me more than the visual picture. It brought back my *own* situation when I respected and admired her as the tender younger sister of an unbearable, organically ill and neurotic patient. She used for some years to come for my advice even when the patient had left Vienna. No gradual psycho-analytic way had been necessary for the emergence of this memory ; there were no connecting links between then and now. What came first was the former representative of the object ; with this went the feeling that I had seen her before ; the content of this representative image was at first only the physiognomic and visual picture, and had no other qualities. I could not at all remember the name. From this vague representative of the object my own ego situation returned first, not any other or more detailed traits of the object. At first the ego situation was even in conflict with another one, through which I had lived much later with another woman ; this situation was likewise awakened by the features of my travelling companion and became stronger when I stopped looking into myself and looked at the woman instead. I had to push that disturbing likeness away in order to remain with the correctly awakened ego situation ; thence proceeded the memory of our mutual feelings, her personality, her address, her residence, her position and her situation.

The awakening of the former ego situation was therefore essential for a re-cathexis of an old event with its many details. This came back in spite of the fading of a memory, which had blotted out her name, and of the innumerable interests and happenings that had intervened ; what brought it back was the directing of libido outwards in response to the friendly look she gave me. The representative of the object and the boundary of the ego were here kept distinct. When remembering is difficult we can observe distinctly how the still weakly cathected recollection—the thing we call the representative of the object—approaches one's former ego, awakens it feebly—and this gives instantly our present ego, too, the feeling of familiarity—and then object and ego situation zigzag about, growing and strengthening, until they return vividly and in detail. The re-awakened representative of the object establishes connection not only with my former ego but with my present one, too ; either I transport myself back into the

past or I relive the past in the present. In the former case I am able to lose partially or even completely the psychical ego feeling which such a short time ago was cathected to the present ego. In the second case my previous past state of ego has become only an object of interest for my present ego boundary which is absorbed in the past.

Following the doctrine of conditioned reflexes I can picture an organization which can re-evoke each of the innumerable states of ego previously lived through, by means of existing directed connections, when a similar present impression occurs. But out of the number of intervening impressions, following each other according to identity, similarity or connected content, an analytical chain of connecting links would have to appear, such as Freud has shewn occurring parapraxis to elicit an amnesia. In my example nothing of this sort happens. But this way of remembering is frequent, almost regular. To associate connecting links is therefore necessary only when the normal mechanism of 'awakening *par distance*' fails because the former representative of the object or the previous state of ego refuses its function for affective reasons. I have shewn in my paper on 'Das Ichgefühl bei den Fehlleistungen' that the adhering to a previous state of ego is always necessary to produce parapraxis. We cannot be satisfied with the explanation that connecting links which have remained unconscious have awakened the previous state of ego. Against this is the fact that even in normal forgetting and remembering, as well as after an analysis of abnormal forgetting, some of these connecting links should have returned. But this does not happen. What we actually observe in the dynamics of such a difficult recollection is only a change in the general economy of cathexis. At first the cathexis of the actual impression is strengthened as much as possible, we exclude our ego as much as we can—that is to say, the cathexis of the current ego boundaries, and with it that of the present, decreases. As soon, however, as we discover something like the looked-for trait in the unrecognized features we accept it and notice that we lose ourselves in our past. We strengthen into uncertainty the cathexes of past states of ego at the cost of present ego boundaries and the external present. When at last the correct former ego-cathexis awakens, then the recollection of the ancient object, which had awakened the former ego, is at first still outside the former state of ego. The ego is a unity of connected cathexis, as I have always stressed, one continuous in its core, but changing in all of its periphery. The awakening of a former state of ego signifies that other affective mental contents—previously topical—

have been seized by this unitary cathexis. This implies that other contents lie outside this unitary cathexis. The looked-for memory, too, i.e. the psychical representative of the previously known object, is—at the moment it re-emerges—outside the ancient area of ego which comes into consciousness before it. Nevertheless I experience the feeling of familiarity even before I could remember the old situation of the ego and helped by this could recollect the person. As I could observe, it was the libidinal cathexis adhering to the representative of the object that was the condition of my feeling of familiarity even before I recognized the person in question. Because the representative of the object had been affectively united with the previous ego that ego could, from this starting point, be awakened on the corresponding ego boundary, and now the whole previous experience could become conscious in a to and fro movement between the ego and the objects.

An inimical affective connection is also capable of awakening in most people this feeling of being familiar. The reason may be that the capacity to recognize by smell applied to the sexual object as well as to the enemy and the prey.

It depends on the quality of our memory how slight the libidinal cathexis need be to evoke this feeling of being acquainted when we meet a person again. It is possible that people with specially adhesive engrams, which following Semon's nomenclature is readily susceptible to ecphoria, do not need any such help; perhaps, however, this ecphoric capacity itself depends on the degree of the libidinal cathexis. Probably everybody, but especially people with a good memory, can help the recovery of normally forgotten things by a cathexis of the will. In forgetting as parapraxis, on the other hand, voluntary, as is well known, effort disturbs recollection by free associations. In my case, too, the recollection started voluntarily, as attention directed towards the unrecognized object. This intentional strengthening of the impression and the search for the past in the present object has nothing in common with the bestowing of libido on past states of ego which I could observe in myself. This difference remains even in the remembrance. I noticed clearly that the image did not emerge at the same time with and inclusive in the re-emerging state of ego, but that the present object together with the feeling of being acquainted awakened the state of ego and only the latter aroused the past image of the object. The detail that before this the present ego becomes as free of cathexis as possible seems important to me; it corresponds to the ego being freed of cathexis by sleep which renders orthriogenesis possible.

Such details can be more readily observed when recollection of unimportant happenings is hampered ; something important we have forgotten emerges—if at all—mostly all at once and completely.

From this topic of past states of ego, the separation of the recollection of the object and the ego, a clinically interesting fact leads us to schizophrenic processes of thought. Research workers explain in different ways why cured or improved schizophrenics are never willing to remember past periods of mental disorder spontaneously and only very reluctantly when they are questioned. This reluctance is comprehensible if—as we have shewn above—a reliving of the former state of ego is necessary. For the schizophrenic such a reliving must at least subjectively signify the return to the pathological state of ego and the danger of fresh disorder ; perhaps he is often right with his caution and the inquiring person wrong. The amnesia which goes with shock treatment is an additional reason for its favourable effect ; it wrenches the patient from his pathological state of ego and renders him accessible to other influences.

All workers and the patients themselves stress the fact that schizophrenia is accompanied by most serious disturbances of the ego. From the subjective complaints one gathers that the ego boundaries—which become noticeable in normal states only when we deliberately observe them—are rendered abnormal and conspicuous through the illness. That the illness proper is preceded by states of alienation many workers have mentioned as a detail in their case histories and explained in different ways. It was the study of the various states of alienation that first drew my attention to the importance of the ego boundaries. Alienation is always a sign that the respective ego boundary is abnormal and has a smaller cathexis of libido. It is not the perceptions, thoughts or actions as such that have much to do with the feeling of alienation, but the quality of cathexis of the ego boundary on which such a perception, thought or act impinges.

Alienation signifies that the cathexis of the ego is already weakened on this boundary ; soon the progressive schizophrenic illness of the ego produces another much more serious consequence, one well known, though I do not know of anyone's having associated it with the state of the ego boundaries. The schizophrenic has always an imperfect perception of reality ; one may say, in fact, that his illness consists in this. He can no longer distinguish between ' in myself ' and ' outside myself '. Thoughts become realities. But this means simply that what previously went on in the ego now takes place *outside the ego boundaries*.

One has always described this as a change in conduct. Only a few writers have regarded the ego disturbance as the primary factor; they have treated ego and consciousness together, as Berze does, who talks of the hypotony of consciousness as a primary disturbance. But once one has grasped the existence of the ego boundaries and the ego itself, and recognized the ego to be constituted by the fact itself of the personality and not, as most workers do, as only the recording of facts in the personality, then one has to understand the disturbance of the ego as a surrender of the former ego boundaries, as an impossibility any longer of the processes which formerly went on in the ego being comprised in the functional unity of the ego. Based on this consideration the simple schizophrenic insanity enables us to distinguish—even without reactive or compensatory, irrational, delusional thinking—whether a psychical or organic somatic process lies inside the ego boundary or reaches it from outside. What is experienced in thought happens *inside*, the real life experience takes place *outside* the cathexis of the ego.

Jaspers has rightly distinguished between the feeling of reality and the testing of reality. Freud has separated the testing of reality as a separate function from the start of ego development, and this function decides whether a thing is real or unreal. I agree with Jaspers that reality is recognized primarily without any scrutiny—or rather it is felt. A proof for this is the dreams where the dream content retains its own reality although that characteristic is contradicted by logic and by the test of waking reality. It is the dream that teaches us again and again that not only an image with an intensity of an hallucination is taken as real, but also what we have experienced in the dream simply as something known. The explanation is that the dreamer's ego wakes into the events created by the dream work (orthriogenesis) so that the dream—though it is but thought—nevertheless meets the dreamer's ego from outside. We venture to formulate the law: as the outside world is outside because it meets the ego boundaries of the body, especially the sense organs, from outside, so in the world of thought everything that enters the ego from outside is felt to be real and outside the ego; it is by no means displaced or projected outwards.

Although the clinical psychiatrist pays attention to the details of symptomatology in the beginning of a case—thanks to psychological research which is everywhere practised—only the psycho-analytically trained worker gets to know completely their beginnings and remissions. The reproach levelled against psycho-analysts that neurosis changes

into schizophrenia during analysis gives us an opportunity for observation, not to speak of the help and cure if the right and suitable technique is used. Some patients I have followed psychologically through many years. They were considered to be in complete remission and some of them worked in their professions. Only the two of us, doctor and patient, knew what nobody else noticed: they dissimulated the remnants of their incorrect demarcation of reality because they recognized them as a residue of their disturbance and not suited to expression. In the more or less of the thoughts that were in a delusory way felt to be reality the deterioration or improvement was shewn. The same can be found in prepsychosis if the illness or its recrudescence does not set in violently. Then it is found not that the thoughts vary, but only in the same thoughts their psychological connection to the ego boundary.

An affect without content in the normal—that is to say, an affect whose content has to be inquired into or analytically elucidated—is accompanied in the neurosis by original or substituting thoughts in the form of temptation, anxiety, compulsion or wish; but they are without exception subjective thoughts, a non-outside world, from which the outside world is perceived separately in correct demarcation. Only in the psychotic patient do these same thoughts—possibly without any change of content—contain the full character of reality so that they belong to the outer world as an immediate, indubitable reality. As the psychotic state decreases this change in one and the same content of thought and feeling occurs in the opposite direction or swings to and fro like a pendulum according to the widening or narrowing of the ego boundaries. For example, a neurotic might avoid phobically certain streets. When psychotic he hears people talking—or knows that they do—about him in these streets (later on in the whole district); he hears their words spontaneously or—because of the well-known phenomenon of fusion—in the screeching of the tramway, etc. What they say becomes later again the unchanged content of thoughts; that they are talking becomes the subject of an uneasy suspicion. When he gets well all this is only an undercurrent accompanying, unconsciously at times, a shyness and discomfort among strangers. The same applies to the gossip of relatives, denunciations by former friends, persecution by the police or sexual seduction by people he meets. Or he is afraid in his psychotic state of a certain person because he knows him to be a cannibal; before the psychosis he merely called that man, symbolically, a 'devouring personality'.

Thoughts, words and happenings from early childhood and from subsequent years, either unchanged or changed in the way dream work alters them, assume the character of indubitable reality, not subjected to any scrutiny. Psycho-analysis is not only 'material' psychology as its detractors maintain. It is the recognition of the content that helps to ascertain the dynamics and economics of the processes of cathexis.

What I am trying to expound here only corresponds with the breaking through of unconscious contents in psychosis, such as Freud has recognized. As far as I have been able to ascertain, psychiatrists and psycho-analysts hold that there is a long interval between the time of the affect without content and the time when content breaks through; further, that it was then the disease extended and destroyed the normal abilities to scrutinize reality until in the struggle between ego and id the outer world was relinquished and then again partially restored. But during pre-psychosis and remissions I have observed correct and incorrect realization lying so near together in time, and therefore in the economy of cathexis, that they could interchange even during one talk; as a rule a few days elapsed between the three stages. As time goes on the patient himself—provided he can be favourably influenced—can follow pretty exactly the degree of reality in his ideas as they change. He refers to this precisely, except for some partially understandable exceptions. Reality is then either indubitably given or taken away. The really delusional and irrational thinking is a secondary feature of merely thinking on the wrong track—thinking that is, so to speak, correctly on the wrong track.

From this standpoint I was able to explain to Dr. Kris⁴ why real artists who had a very high technical capacity before their psychotic disturbance and do not lose this during their illness, as details clearly shew, yet do not during their illness display any other talent than the psychotic non-artist. The high development of art is partly—as Freud has already shewn—a consequence of an increasing desire to make the work of art pass the test of reality; the work has to be real in order to fulfil not only an individual but also the collective wish for expression. If psychotic thoughts possessed reality because the test of reality fails then the psychotic's work would be specially uncertain and groping; it would be done phantastically and irrationally, but, if the art of representation had been acquired, quite as correctly as

⁴ *Imago*, 1936, Bd. XXII, S. 339 ff.

before. If, however, every thought, even if repeated a hundred times, whatever the sequence and the proportion, *becomes reality per se* without any desire for scrutiny, then all reason vanishes for using one's abilities to come nearer to reality or to portray it perfectly.

The desire for representation is so strong in the psychoses, not only because of the regression to infantile levels, but also because the emerging thoughts are still the expression of trends full of libido cathexis or of anxiety and therefore must be abreacted. Berze is right to distinguish the schizophrenic need for explaining from the normal need for communication; it is a constant endeavour to abreact. A psychotic can no longer repress because the material has become a real outside happening; he has to produce again and again as long as his libido still feeds an ego in him and this cathexis of the ego still holds his ego together—even if it has regressed and its boundaries are very much reduced. After the ego is restored what was his outside world has again become thought and imagination which he is capable of repressing and controlling.

The endowment of a fact with reality is therefore explained by the withdrawal of the cathexis of the ego from the thought, and when it ceases it means that this thought has again been seized by the cathexis of the ego. The withdrawal of ego boundaries is not meant here as a metaphor. In schizophrenia we really meet infantile and adolescent stages of the ego from which much that is later acquired for the ego is withdrawn. The schizophrenic limitation of the ego is based on a somatic process; one, and not the only one, of its effects is a weakness of cathexis which renders the psychical and bodily ego inefficient. Berze has rightly interpreted the main process as a weakness of activity.

So far I have not mentioned any of the contributing normal, neurotic or psychotic reactions and complications, including all mechanisms of defence and restitution. My aim was to stress the main decisive process. I shall discuss only one of the many arguments that could be raised—and which I have raised myself—because it is apparently a contradiction between some parts of my paper and because the answering completes it. When talking of recognition, and in greater detail in another paper of mine, 'Zur Unterscheidung des normalen und pathologischen Narzissmus'⁵ I have explained the psychical reality of fantasies by their impinging on the ego boundary from outside. But now I say that all psychotic material appears real

⁵ *Imago*, 1936, Bd. XXII.

because it happens outside the ego boundary. But though fantasies may manage to replace reality in the economics of the pleasure-pain principle yet their reality is far removed from that of a psychotic reality or delusion. The contradiction is explained by the existence of bodily and psychical ego boundaries. I repeat what I have already published elsewhere : the psychotic incorrect reality ensues when processes of thought and imagination take place outside both the psychical *and* the organic ego boundary. The weakness in cathexis refers to the bodily *and* the psychical ego. Though many workers think this separation within an inseparable thing useless it has to be taken into consideration since it is useful in the differential description and explanation of many important phenomena. A mere withdrawal of the psychical ego boundary can only give the conditions of the psychical reality of a process—which Freud has recognized as being so important. Lifelike day dreams occur in this way, inside the actual bodily ego, but outside the infantile limited mental ego. They often meet there a mental ego boundary which has arisen through an identification of the child (a phantasm in the sense of Bühler).

The incorrect perception of reality in the schizophrenic, with which we are here concerned, lies not only outside the psychical, but also outside the bodily ego boundary. That seems strange at first, for the normal person never feels his cathexis of the ego and its boundaries—the mental and the bodily one—otherwise than a unit. How could there be in us, in our central nervous system, body-ego boundaries? That this is so in a pathological state we gather from patients, not only from schizophrenic patients but, as Pötzl and his pupils have shewn, also from many suffering from brain diseases. Also the wholly ectopic localization of inner voices and sounds indicates the change in the subjective body-ego boundaries. We can believe our schizophrenic patients—those who still speak coherently—in regard to their subjective experiences and their subjective sensations. Because they represent the outside world erroneously one is inclined to ignore what they say about their inner world, or, because so much delusional material is added, to dismiss them as delusionally hypochondriacal. We hear such patients complain again and again of abnormal, very peculiar changes in their feeling of the bodily ego : sensations in the cranium, face, body, especially in the brain. In two cases which I saw through several years many times a week, mostly every day, the cure of the bodily ego sensations ran parallel with the recovery of the normal boundary between outer world and thought. The sensations of sometimes grotesque alteration

of the facial bones and elsewhere in the body decreased and became tiredness and tension within the fully restored bodily ego, and at last they disappeared altogether. When they disappear feelings of alienation often occur again ; all this indicates that in this psychosis certain bodily ego boundaries lose in quality—as we presume through loss of libidinal cathexis—and later on cannot be cathected at all. The ego boundary becomes rigid, loses its normal mobility.

In the normal person a highly variable but always connected cathexis keeps re-establishing the mental and bodily ego unitarily. *The ego is nothing but this unitary cathexis.* It extends in varying boundaries, alters with each thought, each affect, each perception ; separated from this are the various other cathexes which correspond to all that is not the ego and especially the outer world. Since on these ego boundaries and their cathexis depends our mental orientation and the correct distinction of the real from the unreal, *ego cathexis is the most important of all mental processes.*⁶ It decides the free existence of the individual, it exceeds in importance all single capacities, achievements and knowledge. I have drawn the conclusion—and with this I forsake mere description—and assume that such an important distinction in psychical life and functioning as cathexis of the ego, correspond with an essential distinction, meta-psychologically and psychophysically between the ego and other processes ; that is to say, different from all processes that join the ego as contents and achievements capable of being perceived by it. The ego is the unity of the cathexis, the others form a unity only through being accepted into the ego ; otherwise they are more or less complex, but separate. The acceptance into that unity—and this is description again—always proceeds from the ego. What I assume is that the reason why the connectedness of the ego remains unitarily secluded, whatever it embraces in its changes, is because the cathexis that constitutes the ego rests on a *directed* connection from which starts contact and contiguity with the apprehended, excited and excitable psychical processes and contents. From this follows hypothetically the further assumption that the contents approaching the ego and seeking acceptance are separate from the cathexis functioning in a unitary

⁶ We separate the question of what is the essence of consciousness from the question of what is the ego ; we are entitled to do so because there exist also unconscious states of ego, as, for example, the cases of complete dual personality.

way. The connection is made from the ego only. This is how metapsychologically and psychophysically is explained the acceptance into the ego boundary, the existence of the ego boundary—so indubitably clear, but always variable, yet never wholly altered—and the existence, ever equal and yet not isolated, of the core of the ego as a permanent possession of the ego. The phenomenon for which I have given an example when speaking of normal recollection—namely, that the representative of the ego wakes one among all the innumerable contents of the ego which once had all been cathected with content and circumference, and this the only correct one—this phenomenon is an argument for the possibility of the ego being excited to extend its boundary not through increase of cathexis on directed paths but undirected.

We always feel the complete connected unity of the cathexis of the ego. Subjectively we notice nothing of the individual directed functions in our nervous system ; on the other hand, we become conscious of the undirected entry of a process into the cathexis of unity, into the ego, as a separate psychical process. We need not exaggerate the assumption of undirected excitation and therefore say cautiously : a conception, a thought, an impression, in short any act which does not proceed like the will (and its descendant, active attention) from the ego meets the respective ego boundary as an undirected process or as a process surmounting at functional spots an interruption of direction (? Synapsis).

Though I am afraid of weakening this conclusion—that the ego consists of a directed unity—I must stress also in regard to the ego the functional difference between the two processes, the directed ones (proceeding on paths) and the undirected ones. In the ego probably both exist together. We have to remember that the bodily and mental ego are united in the ego : I explain this by assuming that the bodily ego corresponds with the unity constituted through direction, with which at the same time the psychical, undirected, unitary function of the ego is constituted as the psychical ego. The mental undirected cathexis can either merely fill the existing directed unity of the bodily ego or it can extensively surpass it ; it is not restricted to the limits of the contents and functions united by direction to the ego. Undirected mental ego boundaries can extend : i.e. they can embrace other complexes of cathexis.

Having made clear the difference in principle between undirected and directed functions let us see empirically in which functions and mechanisms, in which layers, in which topographical area—using this

word in its anatomical, physiological and psycho-analytical sense—we are inclined to presuppose excitation, awakening, connection and disconnection through direction and without direction.

To do this the extensive disciplines of the physiology of the brain, the nerves and the senses, of normal and pathological psychology and psychiatry have to be examined and re-arranged from a psycho-analytical point of view. The material of exact observations, complete with carefully drawn conclusions, already fills a library ; unfortunately they have led to hypotheses, theories and doctrines diametrically opposed to each other. The division of psychology into different schools—regrettable as it may be, proving the science of the human mind to be hardly capable of guiding human minds—is for our purpose advantageous at least.

In respect of both processes there exists in the literature an enormous material of facts. In the writings of the Pavlov school and other reflexologists we find proof of directed connecting paths, and the Gestalt psychologists constantly point out undirected functioning.⁷ It is a pleasant thought to me that my theory abolishes many differences between these researches which are up to now entirely disconnected. It also does away with many ad hoc suppositions which weigh so heavily on reflexology and Gestalt psychology.

How near I have approached to the Bühler school is shewn by our hearing in discussions and lectures so often the example of sender and recipient. Also their doctrine of the phantasm does justice to the changes in the ego situation and the ego boundaries. But I stress here that I understand ' the undirected functions ' in a real sense and not as a metaphor. There is such a complete microscopical cartography of the central nervous system and its respective physiology that I have no right to speak about the nature of the processes and the structure of their apparatus. It is only in order to hint at the importance of the difference between direction and non-direction that I stress the necessity in the event of our supposition proving correct, of our claiming for an undirected function many paths and directions as afferent paths for receiving and dispatching unconduted communications. For we cannot assume, at least not for normal situations in waking life, a diffuse permeability for undirected excitations—from

⁷ Bartlett (whom I have not yet been able to read in the original) is quoted as saying : An excitation must lead *directly* to that part of the organized residues of former answers which best fits the situation.

everywhere to everywhere. A selective apparatus would correspond with the analyser presupposed by many workers. We must also suppose that there are closed and fenced-in areas to which the normal sphere of action of the dispatching or receiving centres is restricted. In this way we may reach an understanding of the hotly debated problem of localization.

Needless to say many areas of functions presuppose already trodden, directed connections, as, for example, all unconditioned reflexes. What about the conditioned reflexes? The answer is not so simple because, as already mentioned, the effect of analysers ought to be examined. We can regard as based on direction all functions kept in action by the ego from the centre of the ego, especially everything happening automatically unnoticed—without being actually unconscious—even when it is more complex than a reflex. This is true of the great systems of orientation which Gestalt psychology calls the frame work, such as the co-ordinating systems—each enclosed in itself—of the outer world, of the body and separate organs.

These systems of orientation have to be correctly co-ordinated; this is done by movements of the members of the body and the eyes in order to regulate and compensate. Whether these complicated controlling movements come to pass without direction can be ascertained only by an exact analysis of the normal and pathologically disturbed processes. Since this concerns varying innervations—though the conditions they depend on are constant—the co-operation of undirected agencies is not out of the question.

The object in spite of the movement of the eyes or the movement of the object appears in the field of vision as a single impression and not as a film strip. The problem of localization of objects, of which this is an important example, is an argument for Gestalt psychology against empirical psychology which explains this observation by citing the suppression of all disturbing impressions. This topic leads us astray; I should have first to explain the connection between the apprehending of foreground and background and the co-ordinating of it with the bodily ego.

But the problem of the perception by the senses of particular objects cannot be avoided here in spite of the difficulties and generality of the theme. It seems to me impossible—or, more modestly expressed, beyond my powers—to explain the visual recognition of an object as what it really is, the 'grasping' of the object, without assuming an undirected choice. The only possible explanation seems to be that the

first mental picture comes from the retina to the sight centres in a directed way, but from there the choice of the correct recollection proceeds either wholly or partially in an undirected fashion.

Because this assumption grew to a conviction, a process of years, I have ventured to regard the differences found in ego phenomena as proof. I was relieved to find that also the Gestalt psychologists doubt the existing explanations, indeed proved them to be incorrect. The assumption of 'fields of force' does not seem to solve the problem differently from the psycho-analytical one of cathexis of all psychical elements, especially of all engrams. Bernfeld has worked out very clearly that equivalence of the two theories. If I find arguments for my theory in Gestalt psychology I am in no way deviating from psycho-analysis. The basis they have in common seems to be that all mental structures and connections are maintained and recur through the force of dynamically conditioned constancy, and not through static constancy. My theory of ego cathexis, ego sectors and ego boundaries can be found, differently named but the same in content, in Koffka's writings, who presumably arrived at their formulation independently and perhaps published them before me. That two workers should arrive at the same result by different ways seems to be an argument for the validity of the conclusion.

Trying to explain perception by static paths and centres leads to extraordinary consequences in anatomical, physiological and psychological respects. This has often been emphasized by Gestalt psychologists and empirical psychology. This assumption demands the premiss of an apparatus so complicated anatomically that it becomes unimaginable or one has to assume that in practice all pictorial stimuli connect with all engrams. This is very difficult to imagine, although Weiss has actually formulated it in his resonance theory. Or we have to accept a system of relays—rather like a machine for counting coins, though of course a million times more complicated—through which pictures get sorted, differentiated and finally relegated to the engrams to which they belong.

Just as the technician created the robot after his own picture of man so we arrive at a picture of man after the image of the robot if we cling to their idea of entirely directed functioning. The resistance men of science feel and display against such conceptions is quite understandable. My assumption makes this unnecessary, and this is one reason more why I am publishing, in spite of my own misgivings, these far-reaching conclusions derived from a few, but impressive, observations.

Taking as a basis the perception of purely excitative conduction, all carriers of images would have to be connected with all carriers of signification so that the whole visual picture of the world may be activated, always in a varying fashion, from the circumscribed point of central sight. Supposing, however, undirected stimulation, it is reasonable that each picture, arising from the combined excitation of visual elements, can only awake an equal or similar picture. This expresses only the possibility of the principle. The act itself must be very complicated. It is so because each perception is localized in space and in spite of its varying situation (also light, surroundings, clearness) is constant in its content. Besides, the question of coming to consciousness of a recognized perception is to be answered as follows: generally consciousness takes place simultaneously with the acts of recognition and perception. Schematically several possibilities exist: the correct engram is awakened by the actual pictorial stimulus; or the cathected engrams seek the appertaining pictures when we gaze attentively; or both acts stimulate each other, such as we have supposed in the connection between ego boundary and the representative of the object. It is most probable that pictorial impression and awakened engram meet in the neutral field of consciousness, which it is true is still enigmatic, by dint of their identical dynamic cathexis. According to Freud, the field of consciousness must be free of any inherent quality of its own so that it may be readily capable of accepting and bringing to life all present and past contents.

If my explanation in the field of perception is correct we gain a further criterion for the problem when we have to presuppose the co-operation of undirected functioning. The first criterion we presumed was the relation to the ego boundary. The second is that there is a choice of the correct thing among many continuations of the dynamic process; they are all ready to be called upon. This process may be an elementary one of excitation of further emotional elements or it may be complicated, such as traces of perception, thoughts or wishes are, which always co-operate in many different concatenations. In all these cases the corresponding correct effect of the dynamic excitation is chosen in an undirected fashion. In contradistinction one must presuppose a further development by direction whenever typical, or at least recurrent, connections or utilizations of a psychophysical individual process are concerned.

It is a question whether connections established by direction can be again dissolved or whether—apart of course from destructive illnesses

—they continue to exist through life. Probably undirected connections can be stabilized by the establishing of directed connections. On the paths of directed connections, too, a correct choice can be made; the incorrect ones become inhibited or excluded and only the correct possibility remains. Passively seeking and choosing attention acts in this way. So an undirected connection may be constant, one established by direction may shew in an altered shape. In general we may suppose a directed establishing of connections, where something definite is constantly bound to something definite; undirected connections where the definite idea connects alternatively either with a definite idea or with ever-varying thoughts. But we must also consider whether quite typical effects can at times happen undirectedly and whether on the other hand some very delicately varying effects need to be established in a directed way.

We return from these immense problems to psycho-analysis. Here the problems are as extensive, but thanks to the lucidity of Freud's exposition and formulation even themes difficult to make concrete, as in metapsychology, allow a certain precision of explanation. In many respects my views deviate from the hitherto accepted ones. The characteristic of reality in dreams and in psychosis does not seem to me to be sufficiently explained by the regression to perception. Only hallucinations bear the character of the original perception, and even they do not always possess it; but the criterion of reality appertains also to the mere knowledge (intuition, feeling, thoughts) in a dream as in a psychosis. I have given my own explanation above. Hallucination achieves—though not always—the reanimizing of the original perception. We imagine that this physiological regression takes place in an undirected way as we have assumed earlier in the text when talking of the apprehending of a perception. If the characteristic of reality is independent of the physiological regression to perception, then it is as easy to explain a negative hallucination as an ectopic one, for example, an extra campine.

In my opinion a free association takes place in the direction of the repressed material and the return of the repressed proceeds not only through an excitation along directed paths of conscious or unconscious connecting links between conscious and unconscious elements, but also through an immediate evocation. The mechanisms of protection and defence of the ego are brought about by an actual alteration of the ego cathexis as regards connection, extent and strength.

If we base the ego on a unitary cathexis the splitting of the ego in

hysteria loses much of its enigmatic character. We begin to understand that in extreme cases of double personality the representatives of the object are accessible to both ego units by undirected access, though they are not in consciousness at the same time and the unities of ego cathexis themselves are connected in the bodily ego only. The following explanation for obsession lends itself: connections that were previously capable of being established in an undirected way became abnormally established in a directed way and are no longer subject to interruption. This corresponds with the opinion which sees conditioned reflexes in obsession. Moreover, special cathexis of the ego boundary in connection with the content of obsessions have to be considered.

The process of repression consists according to my interpretation in thoughts becoming inaccessible to undirected stimulation. The reason may lie in the psychical material to be invoked. I will not at present discuss the metapsychological significance of resistances. Analysis re-establishes the power of being evoked by overcoming resistances and introducing connecting links. The capacity of being evoked is often more important in respect of previous states of the ego than of individual representatives of objects. Without a psycho-analytical theory of affects—and this remains to be constructed—the metapsychological processes referring to the arising, strengthening and disappearing of repression cannot be understood. In any case they will be found within the scope, outlined by Freud, of displacement and withdrawal of cathexes.

If we wish to bring the capacity of being evoked by undirected excitation into accord with the libido theory one might suggest, on the basis of my former work about sadism and masochism and my later ones about the ego, another divergence from Freud's opinion that libido is without quality, and to understand libido—as all sexuality—as male and female.⁸ Then we could ascribe the power emitting to the cathexis of male libido, the readiness to receive to the cathexis of female libido. We shall anticipate a complication of these functions through simultaneous cathexis with the second kind of libido and with different instinctual charges; it would therefore appear mostly as an affect in everyday life, as a resistance. Whether instincts and affects, and especially anxiety, have their representation and solution only in

⁸ The suggestion that libido be male and anxiety female was not further developed by Freud. A tentative theory of affects can be found in my paper: *Imago*, 1936, Bd. XXII, S. 14.

the central nervous system, or whether they actually run their whole course there, is immaterial to our problem. In any event, they exercise the greatest influence on the process of the directed and undirected psychical connections.

If the inability of a psychical element to be evoked without direction is the characteristic feature of repression we understand that it can be abrogated temporarily or lastingly, with or without psycho-analysis, by awakening a whole layer, or a previous state of the ego, or a sector of the ego with all its complications. On the other hand, the readiness to be evoked of cathected memory strands can more easily be restored by withdrawing certain complete cathexes—that is to say, by cessation of the harmonious cathexis of large areas and systems.

There naturally occurs to one the idea that expressions may be discovered, together with an undirected continuance of mental work, where even psycho-analysis does not look for intermediary links because experience has taught us that they do not appear. This happens in symbolism. Although we uncover many connecting links phylogenetically, the final product, the symbol itself, is likely to have been formed here also through the undirected effect of the many significations of which the symbol is a final unification. The same thing happens to-day in every new creation or novel use of a symbol. Old typical symbols, like grammalogues in shorthand, belong as labels to the actual content ; our criterion of varying choice no longer applies to them. When new symbols are created, especially in auto-symbolism, whose informative qualities were well apprehended by Silberer, we all feel, as he did, that this process is different from continued thought on well-worn paths. The auto-symbolic association is lived through subjectively, immediately, as a spontaneous substitute, and this is how it is to be understood. This was explained metapsychologically thus: conscious thought ceases and the symbol—as in a joke—is unconsciously transmitted. The old explanation and my new one complete each other. The remarkable result of Freud's metapsychology is that the psyche in its true sense is the unconscious. This sentence has been misunderstood by many writers ; it says only that we know nothing about the essence of psychical life although we experience it consciously. Neither do we know in what the undirected psychical process consists ; the moment it approaches the ego it turns into conscious mental material which from now on treads directed paths. In the unconscious, too, there are probably directed connections, made equally automatic as those in consciousness.

As a rule, therefore, a new symbolic expression is made in an undirected way with the help of several groups of links whose connection to each other is partly conscious, partly unconscious. But peculiar associations and images exist also or conceptions in a most concentrated image which, like erratic pictures, appear suddenly in the imagery of thought in a quite isolated way, become understood, first schematically, but soon vividly and as—so to speak—a revelation. When images they are as vivid as the most intense dream forms ; when thoughts they are forceful and convincing, and we do not know how they arose. Sometimes they are significant, sometimes quite unimportant products of mental work ; they are often fertile and liberating only because they unify and transpose thoughts from one mental sphere to another or change them into thought material of a different order. These manifestations alone might have suggested my theory of an undirected function. The newer and more original the product is, the less can we explain and trace back its history and the stronger is our subjective feeling of having awakened a thought in an undirected way.

Continuing our reasoning we should expect that all processes of condensation, a main part, therefore, of the primary process, arise in an undirected way ; here it is very much a matter of primitive contents, abnormal contents when measured by cultural grown-up mentality. Nevertheless the primitive undirected function collaborates in the highest mental achievements though—or perhaps because—it is the way primeval magical and animistic thought works. The regulating attachment to the secondary process through the more varied though more rigid cultural thought, which no longer issues in all directions, has created in nearly all fields of thought and imagination more and more distinct connections of a reflexological nature. But in every regression the primary process immediately predominates in undirected functioning.

We started from the mere choosing and finding of correct engrams or fitting associations and have penetrated, by way of symbolism, to creative work through undirected processes. Correct, dynamically strongly cathected mental images will find thus in an undirected way what does justice to wishes, to questions, to the desire to express oneself. Often it is only a picture of a far-distant goal, one which has already been known and latent. In other cases the unconscious undirected work has led to a result, different from all previous phantasies or any aim ; it has condensed different things to a new form, has created something new. Only through connections that had arisen

in a constant change of directed and undirected modes, through examining and comparing all links and conclusions, are the results then put into their right order and conceptually understood.

In all mental work, be it apperception, presentation, or true productive work, achievement through the will alternates with achievement through inspiration and imagination. It seems that will consists in a transition of one or several undirected excitations, tending along a co-ordinated path, to the directed function; that is why the will is always felt as a psychical act, which influences the body.

At the end of our metapsychological applications of our new assumption we have returned by way of the will to the ego, since the will is—as I have shewn earlier—ego energy which creates or strengthens a determining motor impulse. Our starting point, however, was the idea of the ego being based on a unitary directed cathexis, and yet I have just said that the will emanates from impulses arising in an undirected way. But this contradiction is no counter-argument against the way we have arrived at our deduction. In investigating the ego we meet over and over again the contradiction in unity I have stressed: the bodily and the psychical ego are always one and yet always divorced. Although, therefore, we have assumed the directed functional unity as essential for the complete ego, it is nevertheless probable that at the same time this psychical ego is ultimately based on an experience of a cathectisized unit formed in an undirected way.

I have endeavoured to deduce this result from my own observations and experiences, and have ventured to ascribe the most important tasks to a function which to begin with presented itself only as an assumption. The knowledge that my work was not really necessary to draw attention to this piece of knowledge has made this boldness easier. I have allies in the vitalists, for example, Driesch, von Monakow, Bergson, Jung and many others. But at times they proceed from *a priori* inner experiences and convictions. The facts are sometimes subjected to their convictions. I also quote the beliefs of Buddhism and other mystical religions and the individual great mystics of the West. They all have partly secret methods to gain insight into life, which are not dependent on any bodily sense organs. Personally I admit to trusting their communications and confessions. But the people, or at least the state they were in when they arrived at their knowledge, are considered as abnormal by most scientists, and their communications are therefore denied objective validity.

Let us repeat the final result: *The undirected function is the essence*

of the psyche. The directed function is the physical side of the psychical and the psychical side of the physical life.

There are two scientific ways of investigation very different from my own which reach the same result. One concerns the facts of parapsychology. Here I can point to Freud who has himself investigated telepathic phenomena, found their unconscious roots and likened them to wireless telegraphy. If only one communication referring to a transference of psychical contents beyond space and time was verified then—it seems to me—it is proved that psychical material can be passed on in an undirected way, that there exists such a thing as an undirected sending and receiving. I know that many people, for example, Schilder, deny and ignore these facts and dismiss parapsychology as occultism and superstition. In my opinion this can only be due to a faulty knowledge of the proofs. Parapsychology furnishes an argument of probability for my hypothesis: a happening that expresses itself in an undirected way, an action *par distance* over whole continents, can be in itself a phenomenon proceeding undirectedly. But two objections are not to be overlooked: besides the assumption of the psychical nature of telepathy there exist also spiritistic and mechanistic hypotheses. The second objection is that an act taking place at a distance between two people does not necessarily tell us anything about the same happening inside a person. Anyhow the parapsychological experiences support my hypothesis.

Weiss's experimental work can stand investigation. This distinguished worker has formulated the theory of the principle of resonance from his transplantation experiments. He found that each muscle reacts to another specific stimulus and contracts with impulses of reflex or voluntary impulses, even when it was connected with different nerve centres by quite different nervous paths through transplantation. It receives the innervation meant for it, the innervation that acted. Weiss presumes that all stimuli of muscle innervation approach all muscles diffusely through all nerve paths (more correctly through all nerve paths of the spinal cord), and that only in the muscle itself does the correct stimulus appear selectively. He therefore assumes an unspecified direction and a specified resonance. Whether the phrase 'unspecified direction' would better designate the psychical activities *par distance* I have assumed that the one of 'undirected awakening' which I chose must be left to further investigation. That is one of the answers which I expect from physiology.

Freud has always separated the psyche, which he discovered anew

for modern medicine, from the somatic. My precise concept of the connection between mental and bodily ego does not depart from the psycho-analytical groundwork. Freud has said that psychical processes are to be understood as virtual images, resembling pictures between lens systems, and not to be imagined as being in the cells. J. von Kries has studied the same problem as I have and has arrived at a diametrically opposed opinion. In any event the subject is of the utmost importance. This is why I crave indulgence for the boldness of my assumption and the multiplicity of my communications centering around it. What will prove correct in it will help our understanding of processes observable by psycho-analysis and its metapsychological theories. This wish and desire has prompted the present work.

EROS AND APHRODITE¹

BY

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BUDAPEST

In classical antiquity there are two sovereign deities of Love, figures which are no mere doublets but separate and distinct beings. The one, Aphrodite, probably belongs to the same group of goddesses as Istar, Astarte and Isis ; that is to say, she was originally a mother-goddess. In the more highly developed conception of the classical period, however, she is represented as a young, enchantingly beautiful woman, who kindles love on all sides and is herself as a rule in love. She is subject to no moral law and has many lovers, amongst them Adonis and Anchises. She has also several husbands, Hephaestus, Ares and Hermes. She leads, indeed, a mature sexual life, though not always with the same partner and, when she loves anyone, she gives herself up to her love. The other love-deity is Eros, a mighty god and yet a child, a mischievous, wanton, impudent rogue. Ethnologists will, of course, prove that he really symbolizes the penis, but we need not at the moment trouble about this. The important point for us is that Eros is never conceived of as a grown man ; he is the constant companion of Aphrodite but never her sexual partner. He only plays, yet in his play he performs most difficult tasks. He is a child and yet mightier than the major gods. A favourite subject for plastic representation is the Triumph of Eros, in which Zeus himself is led behind the triumphal car, smiling but in chains. Or again, the Loves are represented as playing with the insignia of the high gods or taming wild beasts. Eros is indeed a child but his arrows spare no one. First of all the gods he issued forth directly out of Chaos, and Plato wrote the finest of his dialogues in his honour.

Thus the Greeks divided the phenomena of love into two groups which they then embodied in two ideas, two deities. A similar duality of libidinal experience was described by Freud in the *Drei Abhandlungen*. In sexual gratification we have to distinguish fore-pleasure and end-pleasure, and of the latter infantile sexuality as yet knows nothing. All the writings on the theory of instincts which have appeared since Freud's work was published begin by postulating

¹ Ferenczi Memorial Lecture, Budapest, May 23, 1936.

these facts, but their full implication has never yet been worked out. End-pleasure has been tacitly assumed to be a more highly developed, somewhat more complicated, let us say an adult form of pleasure, not fundamentally different from fore-pleasure. Even Ferenczi, who emphasized the exceptional position of genitality amongst the other component instincts, treats end-pleasure in his *amphimixis* theory² simply as the sum-total of the mechanisms of fore-pleasure. This assumption seems to me doubtful and I would suggest that fore-pleasure and end-pleasure are two separate modes of experiencing pleasure, akin but fundamentally different. This distinction is, I think, brought out in the contrast between Eros and Aphrodite.

This hypothesis is supported by the universally recognized fact that there is a close connection between end-pleasure and anxiety: it looks as though end-pleasure were designed to make adult human beings immune from anxiety. In proportion as a man's capacity to tolerate orgasm is small and his opportunities for periodically experiencing end-pleasure are limited from within and from without, he will readily succumb to anxiety. This fact, also, is noted in Freud's earliest works. We may recollect the familiar example of an anxiety-neurosis, in which anxiety constantly recurs as long as unconsummated excitations continue, while the anxiety attacks cease as soon as complete gratification, end-pleasure, is secured. We know too that a child, who as yet has no knowledge of orgasm, is much more subject to anxiety than an adult. It seems then that one condition of anxiety is the disproportion between the actual excitations on the one hand, and, on the other, the opportunities which are provided for gratification. If the excitation passes a certain point of intensity, orgasm—end-pleasure—is the only adequate means of discharge.

There is in this connection an important clinical observation to which Ferenczi called my attention in 1925. Sadger was the first to describe it, some years later.³ Curiously enough he alluded to it only as it were in parenthesis, in a footnote, and since then no more attention has been paid to the subject. The point was this. We learn from genuine perverts that they derive no gratification from their actual perverse activity: it merely produces a state of tremendously strong excitation. They find ultimate relief only subsequently through

² *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie*, 1924, Chapter I.

³ 'Genital and Extragenital Libido', this JOURNAL, Vol. X, 1929, p. 350, footnote.

genital masturbation or coitus. This applies equally to active and passive scopophilia, fetishism, sadism, masochism, or whatever form the perversion may take.

I will give two examples out of many. A man of about forty was exclusively homosexual and had only tried relations with a girl once or twice, out of curiosity, to see how he would get on. On no such occasion, however, did he feel the least excitement. Throughout life he played a passive part in the sexual act, which nearly always took the form of coitus *per anum*, and for long periods at a time he earned his living as a male prostitute, generally dressed as a woman. He came to the Policlinic on account of obsessional masturbation. Even when he had an opportunity of performing the sexual act with a suitable partner, possibly several times over, it resulted merely in excitation, which had finally to be discharged by means of repeated masturbation. The only form of gratification of which he was capable was masturbation during *pædicatio*.

The second patient was a young man of about thirty and exhibited a motley collection of perversions—various methods of handling the anus, which resembled masturbation, scopophilia, the objects being young lads in tight-fitting shorts (Boy Scouts, athletes and so on), a compulsion, which he found pleasurable, to get and put on shorts himself, various homosexual practices, both active and passive, but also attempts at heterosexual relations with prostitutes. In his pursuit of gratification he often combined several of these activities, but the result of it all was merely a state of the most intense excitation and never satisfaction. He could attain the latter only by means of masturbation, whether performed by himself or by someone else.

I must defer to a future occasion the attempt to shew the bearing of these observations on the general theory of perversion. At the moment I will merely say that we have been accustomed to think that in the perversions one or other of the component instincts has usurped the hegemony of genitality and that the whole of the individual's sexuality has become organized under the primacy of this component instinct. But this is only part of the truth. It is true that in perverts some component instinct occupies the foreground and that its excitation preponderates over all the rest, but ultimately it finds discharge by the genital method of end-pleasure, even though it be almost in secret. Thus the perversion is only a means of stimulation, an indirect way to genital end-pleasure, a way often very circuitous and sometimes actually dangerous to the subject himself, but a way

which he must tread, because all other paths are blocked by repressions. The mechanism of perversion, like that of dreams, is displacement of affect. The accent is displaced from the primary to the secondary—i.e. to the component instinct—in order that subsequently genital gratification may at this price be after all attained. The gross symptoms of the perversions are really only a blind or even a piece of deception, a fraud, and indeed this is entirely in accordance with the general character of these unhappy people.

We have an allusion to this fact in the old joke about two men who had a bet as to which of them knew more ways of sexual enjoyment. The one mentioned normal intercourse as the first way, whereupon the other—generally represented as an old roué—declared that he had lost his bet, for he had never thought of that method. Now this may have been true; but he certainly had many other devices for getting pleasure at his command. Why did he not disclose them? No doubt because all of them, taken together, did not, even in his eyes, tip the scale against normal intercourse.

If we thus accord an exceptional position in the libidinal economy to genital end-pleasure, we answer at the same time the old question why genitality is not a perversion. This question arose logically out of the theory of the libido, according to which genitality was only a component instinct, not in any way distinguished from the other component instincts. So long as only the fore-pleasure mechanisms function, genitality has actually no preferential position. But the whole situation changes as soon as end-pleasure can be regularly experienced, for it seems to be somehow bound up with genitality. On the other hand perversions, i.e. roundabout methods, can be formed only from fore-pleasure mechanisms.

There is another distinction which is equally important but does not seem to be so universally valid. We know that fore-pleasure erotism is neither masculine nor feminine but is experienced by both the sexes in the same way, their aims and often their objects being the same. It is, in fact, actually sexless. It is true that we call some of these activities and modes of behaviour masculine or feminine, but this description is to a large extent arbitrary and, besides, nearly all these interpretations are based on the two more than doubtful equations 'active = masculine' 'passive = feminine'.⁴ All this applies with

⁴ Hermann, 'The Use of the Term "Active" in the Definition of Masculinity', this JOURNAL, Vol. XVI, 1935.

special force to the fore-pleasure associated with genitality. As I have already shewn, this kind of fore-pleasure is actually no more important than the other component instincts, until the experience of end-pleasure has been secured. If we bear this in mind, we shall perhaps be able to give a simpler account of the much discussed phallic phase. Above all, we shall have more insight into the very remarkable observation that in that phase the two sexes are still not yet differentiated. On the other hand the end-pleasure function is always sexually differentiated. It is quite plain that, in contrast to the mechanisms of fore-pleasure, end-pleasure, and end-pleasure alone, has two forms—masculine and feminine.

The mechanism which produces fore-pleasure is very simple: it generally takes the form of stroking, tickling, licking or sucking. In adults the corresponding reaction may be smiling, giggling, laughing, or even screaming and crying out, etc. The whole affair is akin to jokes and the comic. Hence fore-pleasure erotism is, for adults, a kind of game, something quite simple, without any very definite aim and consequently disjointed and incoherent. It is, in fact, a sort of pastime. The end-pleasure function, on the contrary, is serious, dramatic, if not tragic. It is often even a matter of deadly earnest, for the animals of many species die during the first orgasm. Even the facial expression conveys this meaning, for it becomes almost gloomy. We think, for example, of Michelangelo's *Leda*. Above all, coitus is something very definitely in pursuit of an aim: it is not a pastime but a process with a precise intention, a task to be performed. But anyone who knows how to make ample and skilful use in coitus of a number of the mechanisms of fore-pleasure will be dubbed a pervert not only by strict Catholic or Puritan theologians but by the laity in general. This is entirely in accordance with what I said earlier; for here again it is a matter of taking a longer way round, with the aim of heightening excitation in the greatest possible degree. We see then that, especially in adults, fore-pleasure is related to end-pleasure as play is to earnest. We are not surprised at this, for it is only when orgasm follows surely upon excitation that the youth becomes a man and the girl a woman.

Finally, fore-pleasure erotism is manifested by children from the beginning, while there is no doubt that the end-pleasure function is subject to limitations of time. It is not possible to state with any precision when it begins or ends, but the division of human life into childhood, puberty, maturity, the climacteric and old age is based on the phases of the function of end-pleasure. The capacity for such

pleasure is not originally present but probably develops during or immediately before puberty and is then slowly and gradually established. In old age it becomes weaker and finally disappears or at most makes quite sporadic appearances. Fore-pleasure erotism on the contrary is perennial ; it begins with birth and ceases only with death. This difference is finely expressed in the figures of the two Greek love-deities : Eros issues out of Chaos as a child and never becomes an adult, while Aphrodite was never a child but, according to the myth, rose from the sea as an adult woman, Anadyomene, and remains eternally young.

I will now summarize in tabular form some further differences between fore-pleasure and end-pleasure. There is the less need for me to describe them at length since Sadger ⁵ has dealt with them in some detail.

Fore-pleasure	End-pleasure
From birth on.	Developed later, probably about the time of puberty.
Always ready to function.	Marked periodicity.
Persists till death.	Is invariably subject to limits. The limits vary with the individual.
A relatively simple mechanism.	Very complicated (erection, friction, ejaculation, secretion of viscous mucus, contractions).
No executive organ of its own.	An organ of its own.
Always attached to ego-functions.	Independent system closely associated with reproduction.
Both organ and function are only secondarily designed to secure gratification.	The organ is specially adapted to secure gratification.
Strictly speaking, sexless.	Two distinct forms according to sex.
No definite termination, can be continued indefinitely.	When successful, terminates in orgasm, cannot be prolonged, insusceptible of further stimulus.
May turn into a perversion.	Is a final act.
?	Renders the subject immune from anxiety.
Play.	A serious task.

⁵ *Loc. cit.*

We have now arrived at our main problem. Has the function of end-pleasure been evolved from fore-pleasure erotism or has it developed quite separately? It is very remarkable that the question of origin has never been raised in relation to fore-pleasure erotism. Fore-pleasure issues—apparently like Eros himself—directly out of Chaos. On the other hand, throughout the ages there have been many who have racked their brains in the effort to discover why, whence and how end-pleasure has come to us. In myths, in legends, in fairy-tales, in jests and in philosophical and scientific theories attempts have been made to solve this problem. In psycho-analytical literature the accepted view—accepted, indeed, without discussion—has been that which Rank ⁶ formulated most exactly as follows: 'It is certain that genitality has developed from pre-genital erotism, through displacement of libido'. Most of the psycho-analytical literature on this subject appeared between 1924 and 1930 and was no doubt inspired by Ferenczi's genital theory. The writers unanimously adopted this standpoint. In the *Genitaltheorie* itself Ferenczi gives a detailed account of the physiology of genital end-pleasure. He holds that in the history of the race genitality, like Aphrodite Anadyomene, rose from the sea. It is quite clear that he would have liked to give it a special position, but he was far too much under the influence of the general view for our present question even to occur to him. In spite of the title of his paper 'Zur Genese der Genitalität' Rank deals only with the genesis of genital object-relations. Sadger's fine study ⁷ is an exemplary piece of clinical description but it does not deal with the genesis of orgasm. In *Die Funktion des Orgasmus* ⁸ Reich comes to the conclusion that genitality is made up of the three following fundamental elements: (1) local erotogenicity of the genital zone (genital susceptibility to stimulus), (2) somatic libido centred in the genitals (genital impulsion), (3) psychogenital libido (genital desire). Under the second heading Ferenczi's amphotism theory is reproduced. The third point, genital desire or, more correctly, active love, does not really come within the scope of this paper and, besides, I have recently stated in a concise form all that I know on that subject.⁹ The first

⁶ 'Zur Genese der Genitalität', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XI, 1925.

⁷ *Loc. cit.*

⁸ Vienna, 1927, especially Chapter VI.

⁹ 'Zur Kritik der Lehre von den prägenitalen Libidoorganisationen', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XXI, 1935.

point, genital susceptibility to stimulus, i.e. the question of why the genital organ in particular is adapted to produce orgasm, leads directly to our problem. Reich, however, went no further, but referred his readers to physiology: 'The explanation of the fact that the genital apparatus is the sole instrument of orgasmic gratification must lie in the physiological structure of the different erotogenic zones'.¹⁰ This is certainly true, but let us not give up the attempt to advance at any rate a step further in the field of psychology.

First, however, we must make an excursion into biology. As we have seen, fore-pleasure lasts as long as human life itself, it arises continually and is inseparably connected with all somatic functions (e.g. nutrition, digestion, excretion, sense-perception, muscular activity, etc.). So it is probably one of the primal functions of our body, the soma. End-pleasure—orgasm—on the other hand, seems to be a relatively recent acquisition. Throughout life there is an alien element in it; it acts upon the soma in an intoxicating or even in a stupefying manner. Also, in contra-distinction to fore-pleasure, end-pleasure can be done without for quite a long time and, moreover, the capacity for it does not endure throughout life. We often even hear that old people are quite glad when they can feel free at last from its demands.¹¹ It might then be concluded that the soma, i.e. our body, was originally asexual, incapable of orgasm but not of eroticism, and that at first it knew only fore-pleasure but later, in the course of phylogenesis, became subject to sexual differentiation and capable of end-pleasure. We know that we, like all vertebrates, are made up of two different systems, the diploid body-cells and the haploid germ-cells, and, after all, there must be some significance in the fact that the period of end-pleasure roughly coincides with that in which mature haploid germ-cells are present in the body. I once made an attempt¹² to work out these relations, but I only succeeded in arriving at the conclusion that copulation, orgasm, individualization and death make their appearance together in the history of the race and that they develop on parallel lines and probably must have a common

¹⁰ *Loc. cit.*, S. 150.

¹¹ Cf. Cicero, *De senectute*; Schopenhauer, *Vom Unterschiede der Lebensalter*; Wells, *William Clissold*; and many others.

¹² 'Psychosexuelle Parallelen zum biogenetischen Grundgesetz', *Imago*, Bd. XVIII, 1932, S. 28 ff.

explanation, since none of these functions is a primal attribute of life or of the soma.

In the psychic life also a strong genital wish, the longing for end-pleasure (and sometimes that experience itself) involve considerable disturbance. This impulse leads, much more often than any other—to conflicts, and then the solution is often the familiar one of regression. End-pleasure is prohibited and gratification in a 'pregenital' form, that is to say fore-pleasure, is substituted for it. To the psyche as well as to the soma the function of fore-pleasure seems much more akin and less dangerous, as though the source of end-pleasure were more remote and lay in some other system. This is in accordance with the fact that end-pleasure, in contrast to those forms of fore-pleasure which are almost continuous, is obviously intermittent. So in this respect too it may be said to occupy an intermediate position between the genuinely somatic instinctual stimuli and those which originate in the external world. This biological argument suggests that fore-pleasure and end-pleasure are two separate functions, i.e. that end-pleasure has not been evolved from the mechanisms of fore-pleasure.

Now let us turn to psychology. With the exception of Ferenczi,¹³ most psycho-analytical writers have discussed the orgasmic function from the dynamic standpoint. Let us consider its economic aspect. Our first idea would probably be that fore-pleasure is associated with a lesser, and end-pleasure with a greater, degree of excitation, but this does not correspond to the facts. As we have seen in the case of perversions and the subtleties of the *ars amandi*, the fore-pleasure mechanisms are capable of producing intense excitation. They can produce it, but they cannot discharge it. It seems as though any considerable quantity of excitation could be discharged only by means of genital end-pleasure. If this outlet is blocked by the resistances due to repression and the only way open to the individual is that of fore-pleasure, the result is either an anxiety neurosis or some form of morbid craving. From the economic point of view the anxiety-neurosis would correspond to the ever increasing tension while the craving would represent a forced discharge *in refracta dosi*—the tension being in this case constant and painfully great, as is the case in *ischuria paradoxa*.

The genital organ, on the other hand, is not adapted to producing

¹³ *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie, loc. cit.*; 'Sprachverwirrung zwischen den Erwachsenen und dem Kind', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XIX, 1933.

such excessive tension, for the culminating gratification is easily induced and is followed by a phase of resistance to stimuli. Coquetry is coquetry only so long as it does not lead to end-pleasure ; its weapons are the mechanisms of fore-pleasure, and end-pleasure is fatal to it. On the other hand, if there has been no preparatory fore-pleasure, the gratification afforded by coitus is less complete, as Ferenczi showed in 1912, in his contribution to the discussion on masturbation in the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society.¹⁴ One of the essential conditions of satisfactory end-pleasure is that it should be preceded by an appreciable heightening of tension, but fore-pleasure in no way depends on this.

To some extent this heightening of tension is brought about by the objective situation. If a man is to obtain genital gratification, he must first secure the compliance of his love-object. This is not an indispensable condition in the case of every instinct : it is far less necessary where the oral and the anal instincts are concerned but somewhat more so in active or passive scopophilia. In many perversions, e.g. kleptomania and fetishism, the love-object is something inanimate. Genitality (like sado-masochism) demands the greatest degree of compliance in the love-object. If our object does not yield or fall in with our wishes and feel itself one with us, genital gratification is scarcely possible. Something must be done therefore to convert the object into a genital partner.¹⁵

Thus the objective situation does in part explain the necessity for a heightening of tension before end-pleasure. But this explanation is very inadequate. The clinical phenomena which precede and accompany the act of coitus are certainly of much too violent a character to be explained simply as the process of securing the compliance of the love-object. The movements can hardly be said to be co-ordinated any longer and consciousness is in some degree clouded. If we look for similar phenomena, we shall note first epileptic attacks, then outbreaks of affect, as in rage and panic, and finally traumatic neuroses. All of these are characterized by intolerable tension, which unceasingly produces movements of a particular type. These are almost or entirely

¹⁴ ' On Onanism ', *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, Chapter VI.

¹⁵ This compliance is brought about by means of fore-pleasure mechanisms : it is as though the two partners must first become children together, in order to develop together to the adult capacity for orgasm. (Note by Alice Bálint.)

uncontrollable, in the nature of reflexes and yet rhythmical, and have to be continued for a certain length of time in order to cause the tension to disappear. Freud holds¹⁶ that in these situations the individual has experienced some excessively strong stimulus and that the resulting excitation is so intense that he cannot discharge it all at once. The dominance of the pleasure-principle is for the time being suspended: that is to say, the crucial point is no longer whether the excitation is pleasurable or painful; it must be reduced at all costs. The effort so to reduce it always takes the form of movement. Freud deduced this archaic mode of functioning of the psychic apparatus from traumatic neuroses, certain children's games and the phenomena of transference. A fourth object of study in this connection might well be the function of end-pleasure, for in it, I think, we can observe a traumatic situation *in statu nascendi*. Unfortunately nearly everything that our analysts tell us on this subject relates to the body. We can learn very little of the mental processes, perhaps just because they take place in archaic strata to which it is hard to gain access. The meagre material which patients produce has some such content as this:—They feel increasing tension, which produces an impulsion towards rhythmical movement; the tension becomes even greater . . . they want to be relieved of it at all costs, even if it involves suffering . . . they can hardly bear it . . . they often groan, sob, cry out or even curse; sometimes they go so far as acts of aggression or violence against their sexual partner. . . . They describe the feeling before the excitation reaches its climax as an inability to contain themselves, a sense of bursting, dissolving or disintegration. . . . It is only at the end that there is a tranquil, quiet sense of well-being. This latter feeling seems to be the primal form of pleasure. It is certain that all the fore-pleasure functions have this for their direct aim and, even if they cannot by themselves compass it, this state is nevertheless striven after and finally attained by the roundabout way of increasing excitation and end-pleasure.

What I have just said throws light on one particular disturbance of the sexual function. When the stimulus is excessive—as may frequently be observed in the case of men who have been abstinent for a long time—the tendency to relieve the tension becomes so powerful that the pleasure of gratification is considerably reduced or may even disappear altogether. Some men make a regular system of this; the

¹⁶ *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.*

first coitus is of this traumatic character and produces nothing but relief and not until the second is there any pleasure. When the amount of excitation can be exactly regulated, so that a man is quite sure that it will not exceed what he himself desires and knows himself capable of tolerating, then and then only is gratification—end-pleasure—satisfactory.

From the economic point of view end-pleasure is the integration of two conflicting tendencies. The one is the more archaic and may almost be called biological. It dates from the period before the pleasure-principle asserted itself, its aim is to relieve tension at all costs and it is not necessarily pleasurable. The tendency to autotomy, described by Ferenczi,¹⁷ may serve as the prototype of this tendency. The second is of much more recent origin and is undoubtedly mental. Its aim is to keep the excitation at a certain level which has been found to be safe and to submit consciously and deliberately to this degree of excitation with the assurance of being able to discharge it. This function, which might almost be called an accomplishment, is eminently pleasurable.

S. Pfeifer¹⁸ has a similar line of thought. He too distinguishes two types of discharge. The more primitive an instinct, the smaller will be the increase in tension which can be tolerated and the more care must be taken to contrive that 'stimulus and gratification shall coincide as nearly as may be in time'. Pfeifer holds that the difference between this mode of discharge and genitility lies in a certain 'catastrophic' element which has been imported into the process.

If we follow out this train of thought, it leads us straight to the psychology of the ego. The concept of the 'strength of the ego' is one which we have frequently employed, especially of late years. It has not yet been exactly defined, but it is clearly based on a quantitative idea. I would now suggest that the strength of the ego at a given moment may be measured by the maximum tension or excitation which it can tolerate without disturbance. Where conditions are fairly normal, the only excitation which approximates to this maximum in adults is the excitation before and during orgasm. Even supposing that it were not the only one, it is certainly the most frequent, for it is one of the normal conditions of adult life. Here we have a simple

¹⁷ *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie*, 1924, Chapter IV.

¹⁸ 'Die neurotische Dauerlust', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XIV, 1928.

explanation of what sounds somewhat mystical—the dictum that the sexual life is the pattern of all life. The first signs of a latent disturbance or defect in the ego become perceptible when it is subjected to a heavier strain of excitation, i.e. precisely in the 'orgastic function'. On the other hand, people who can safely expose themselves periodically to orgasm have a sufficiently strong ego, which can stand strains of other kinds.

Broadly speaking, all those who bring up the young have only two methods. On the one hand, children are treated lovingly; that is to say, they are subjected to a libidinal strain, from the economic point of view. (I am thinking of such things as caressing, rocking, embracing and kissing a child or taking him on one's knee.) On the other hand, certain channels of fore-pleasure are closed to him; that is to say, when he is weaned, when pleasure-sucking is forbidden or when he is trained in habits of cleanliness and regularity. Thus education menaces the already unstable libidinal balance of the child simultaneously from both sides: actual excitation is increased and opportunities of discharge are restricted.

When the strain is too great, the child has two ways of recovering his balance. Either his ego may be overwhelmed by the growing excitation and a state of panic set in, which then finds relief in an outbreak of affect and unco-ordinated movements. Or else he will do his utmost and call up all his energies to stem the excitation. The first method resembles a clonic, and the second a tonic spasm. Now there is no doubt that these two modes of reaction are the ego's primal forms of defence; and I think that the later forms, of which Anna Freud was the first to give a systematic account in her recent book,¹⁹ are derived from these and are, as it were, psychic superstructures based on these two almost physical modes of defence.

Clearly education is in favour of tolerating excitation: it regards with horror any outbreak of affect. Sometimes it succeeds only too well in its purpose: children do indeed learn to tolerate everything—but they pay for it with a chronically spastic condition. They react to every stimulus with an increased spasm, especially if they are uncertain whether the stimulus may not become more powerful. Ferenczi²⁰ was the first to draw attention to these physical forms of

¹⁹ *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, 1937.

²⁰ 'Technical Difficulties in the Analysis of a Case of Hysteria' (1919), *Further Contributions*, Chapter XV; 'Psycho-Analysis of Sexual Habits' (1925), *ibid.*, Chapter XXXII.

defence (especially chronic muscular tension). People with this spastic disposition can give themselves up to free association only in the face of great resistance and can never abandon themselves in love and hardly ever relax in enjoyment. We have a return of repressed material when women suffering from spastic frigidity laugh or weep convulsively instead of experiencing orgasm. The tonic spasm has here, after all, paved the way for the clonic outbreak of affect.

In the function of end-pleasure also we find these two tendencies : the more biological, clonic tendency to relieve tension and the more psychological tendency, which has a greater affinity with the ego, to tolerate or even to increase excitation. We can now understand that the undisturbed co-operation of these two tendencies demands a certain strength in the ego (and the instincts). Probably this can be achieved only after the biological upheavals of puberty ; but even then, at least in our modern civilization, the discovery of end-pleasure has a traumatic effect. Kovács²¹ was the first to show that, when end-pleasure is experienced for the first time, it often arouses fear and anxiety. In men this occurs on the occasion of the first ejaculation, in women of the first orgasm, whether these be induced by masturbation or coitus (defloration). It is very seldom that these processes take place without any disturbance. The 'spontaneous cure of pre-genitality', described by Anna Freud,²² takes place only very gradually and the first acts are almost never pleasurable in tone. It is true that they relieve tension, but it is long before they are enjoyable. Thus there is much to be said in defence of the apparent paradox that coitus, the prototype of pleasure, is originally entirely devoid of pleasure and merely serves the tendency to autotomy, and that only later, when eroticization has taken place, does it become pleasurable and a source of enjoyment.

The many people who suffer from disturbances in potency or from frigidity are not really ill but merely inhibited in their development. Their ego is not yet strong enough to bear so high a degree of tension : either it relieves itself in a kind of short circuit (e.g. *ejaculatio præcox*) or it loses itself in convulsive attempts to force the excitation to an even higher pitch (frigidity). Sometimes this is successful up to a point, but the spasm itself prevents end-pleasure and there is nothing left but to stop from exhaustion. Patients of this type always describe

²¹ 'Das Erbe des Fortunatus', *Imago*, Bd. XII, 1926.

²² *Loc. cit.*, p. 162.

the progress of their analysis in the same terms. They say such things as 'I could quite well have gone on longer', 'I managed to screw myself up', 'I could have borne more', etc.

The train of thought which I have been pursuing in this paper would lead us to a number of interesting problems, such as the difference between masculine and feminine, the phenomenon of primary anxiety in the face of instinctual danger, the economic differences between the instinctual life of children and that of adults, and other similar points. On the present occasion, however, I cannot deal with these, so I will merely summarize the principal conclusions at which we have arrived.

The difference between fore-pleasure and end-pleasure is much more fundamental than has hitherto been supposed. The function of fore-pleasure is comparatively simple and it seems to be a primal attribute of living beings. The function of end-pleasure, on the contrary, is a new acquisition in the history of the race and so complicated that each individual has to learn it afresh. It comprises two opposite tendencies and the integration of the two constitutes an orgasm. This may be called an accomplishment and depends on the ability to tolerate a degree of excitation which is all but traumatic. I have tried to show the bearing of these observations upon the theory of libido and the psychology of the ego.

SOME PALÆOBIOLOGICAL AND BIOPSYCHICAL REFLECTIONS ¹

BY

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THE CASTRATION COMPLEX AND THE PERFORATION COMPLEX

Psycho-analysis has long recognized the importance of the phallic castration complex in men, and also in women, in whom it generates penis-envy. The phantasies of being ripped open which have been so effectively demonstrated by Melanie Klein seem to me to form a counterpart, in every respect as significant, in the psycho-sexual make-up of women.

But, as I have indicated in a previous communication,² I differ from Melanie Klein on a point of fundamental importance in holding that the source of the little girl's anxiety connected with her fear of being penetrated, perforated or ripped open is something anterior to and independent of a super-ego in any shape or form.

THE PRIMITIVE FEAR OF IRRUPTION INTO THE PROTOPLASM

I believe that the biological reaction of fear manifested by an organism in the face of what may be described in very general terms as penetration or irruption into its own substance, is something extremely primitive.

Let us try to imagine for a moment a mass of primal protoplasm. Surrounded and threatened from every quarter by hostile forces this primitive organism must defend itself against these dangers if it is to survive at all. But what forms do these threats and dangers take? There is the danger of dessication ; or the danger of solid objects of greater strength penetrating into the substance and even destroying it. We may suppose that the tiny protoplasmic mass will, in virtue of life's mysterious powers of adaptation to environment, have had to learn to react with some signal to the external dangers which threaten it. It will surround itself with a protective membrane against dessica-

¹ Read before the Fourteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Marienbad, 1936.

² 'Passivity, Masochism and Femininity', this JOURNAL, Vol. XVI, 1935.

tion ; it will draw back or take to flight from solid objects which threaten to penetrate it.

This defence, this garrisoning of the ' sacred frontiers of the body ', persists throughout the increasing complexity of organic life. Every living organism from the lowliest microbe to the mammals recoils before anything which threatens to force its way inside its body.

PENETRATION AND NUTRITION

Nevertheless living organisms cannot survive without penetration by the outside world : exchanges must occur in connection with the acts of respiration and nutrition, accompanied by the constant anabolism and katabolism which are of the very essence of life. And so the organism will also have had to learn to absorb what is beneficial to it while avoiding penetration by injurious substances. It has to look for the necessities of existence in the world surrounding it, to possess itself of foreign substances which it can assimilate, and indeed more often than not this means that it must kill in order to live itself. The digestive juices enable it to ' bind ' or assimilate by osmosis the foreign bodies penetrating it and to make them part of itself.

Moreover a sure sign that the nutritional impulse has been satisfied is a feeling of pleasure ; oral-erotism, in virtue of which living creatures derive enjoyment from oral ingestion, is its ally. The elimination of substance can itself be a source of vital pleasure, and anal and urethral erotism give appropriate expression to the satisfaction of an organism whose digestive system is functioning as it should.

THE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SPECIES

From the very beginning of living substance, however, it was impossible for the protoplasm to remain, as such, in security unless it refrained from perpetuating itself. For the individual is ephemeral and the absolute narcissism of the earliest cells would have brought the beginnings of life to an early close. The cells, the earliest individual entities, must multiply if the dynamism of life is not to fail. At this point the fissiparity of cells originated, and the productive union of two cells prior to fission.

I have no desire to endow the cells at this early stage with a psychology. But, if it is granted that man must psychologize his thoughts before he can make his meaning understood, I shall consider myself justified in maintaining that these primitive acts leading to reproduction must already have been felt biologically as in some sense

a wound to the cell's primitive narcissism. The antagonism between the integrity of the individual and the perpetuation of the species was already operative at the early palæobiological stages we are trying to visualize.

PENETRATION AND DISINTEGRATION : PERFORATION COMPLEX AND CASTRATION COMPLEX

In reality two dangers threaten the cell in the process of reproduction. On the one hand, the conjugation of two cells implies the penetration of one substance by another which remains active and alive and has not, as happens in nutrition, first been rendered innocuous by the digestive juices and its prior death. And, on the other hand, the act of fission involves a disintegration of the substance which if continued would result in its annihilation.

Now I think that the substance is biologically aware of these two dangers, that they are transmitted throughout the whole course of evolution down to man himself and that they thus constitute the most primitive sources both of the perforation complex and the castration complex which we discover at work in women and in men.

The fear of *penetration* of the protoplasm is reflected in the dread of penetration felt by so many virgins and is no doubt at the root of many cases of frigidity in women. It can provide the foundation of the imposing edifice (to which all the accretions of the super-ego contribute) which we know under the form of symptoms.

The fear of *disintegration* of the protoplasm would in turn be found to underlie the castration complex. In order to perpetuate its existence every individual must abandon a part of its substance which becomes detached from it. But the narcissistic integrity of the substance suffers in consequence. And this narcissistic aversion to fission, transferred to the executive and representative organ of procreation, can serve as the foundation of the castration complex, with all the accretions derived from phylogenetic and ontogenetic experiences.

LIBIDINAL EROTISM AND MORTAL ANXIETY

Certainly the erotic impulsion, which prompts the individual to seek biological pleasure—this pleasure being a sign that its vital instincts are satisfied—soon seems to place itself at the disposal of the aspirations of the species. The irruption of one living creature into another of its own species is distinguished by the organism from all

other kinds of irruption. Even the cellular protoplasm, in the earliest phases of life as we have imagined them, must feel that it makes a difference whether its substance is penetrated by a kindred substance or (let us say) by a grain of sand. Some part of what it experiences in the course of feeding on other organic substances must play a part here: the primitive pleasure in nutrition invests in some degree the libidinal pleasure derived by the cell from its receptive activities prior to reproduction. But it is no less certain that beneath this process of eroticization something survives of the primitive fears which penetration holds for the substance.

Similarly there can be no denying the erotic pleasure the male obtains from expelling his seminal fluid, especially in the higher ranks of the animal kingdom. Did the first mass of protoplasm experience a biological foretaste of it at the moment of fissiparous division? I do not know. But no less undeniable than this pleasure found in the more advanced forms of animal life is the deep anxiety present in man at the idea of being separated from a part of himself, an anxiety always ready to rise to the surface and to give substance to the ubiquitous castration complex. The sudden fear which often attends the first ejaculation or loss of semen in adolescence would lend colour to these views.

FEAR OF PERFORATION THE MORE GENERAL FEAR

If we survey the whole extent of the animal kingdom we shall see that in those species in which fertilization takes place internally, the females all exhibit in varying degrees a fear of the male. The castration complex in human beings seems to have few recognizable prototypes among animals; on the other hand something analogous to the perforation complex in women is found in many female mammals. One has only to observe the domestic animals around us. For example, some bitches actually refuse the male altogether and begin to tremble in what one might describe as a hysterical manner if an attempt is made to force them to submit.

And so in spite of the fact that in the course of cellular evolution certain ovules have developed a micropyle, a kind of primitive cellular 'vagina' or channel for reception, and that female mammals have acquired a definitely receptive vagina, sexual penetration by the male continues to be regarded as a formidable irruption even by females which, like the bitch, have no hymen but simply a contraction of the genital canal between the vulva and the vagina.

But here we are concerned with the perforation complex in women,

and in them the hymen is fully formed. Accordingly their fear of sexual penetration, which finds expression in the terrifying sadistic form of the perforation complex, does not rest merely upon a palæobiological cellular foundation but upon a present-day anatomical reality, renewed in every virgin.

The male mammal on the other hand seems to show a more spirited reaction to the disintegration of his substance in sexual discharge than does the female to penetration. Generous and aggressive, he may go so far as to dissipate for a time the major part of his vital energies, as stags will during the rutting season. Doubtless the centrifugal, i.e. male, sexual impulsion is more in accordance with the original direction of life, which aims at expansion and the conquest of ever wider territories in which to find scope for its energies.

We need not be surprised then, when we turn to the human race, if we find that women react with anxiety and terror to their sexuality far more often than do men. And not without reason. Sexuality in mammals quite generally implies for the female an internal violation of her substance, a violation prolonged by reason of gestation and followed by disruption in the process of giving birth. It is therefore more dangerous for her than for the male and really deserves to be feared more.

It would be interesting to discover the relations between sexuality and anxiety in the male of the bee, the praying mantis and the spider, for whom love brings death.

ANXIETY ALWAYS A REACTION TO OBJECTIVE DANGER

And this brings me to some reflections on the nature of anxiety in general. The problem, which occupies a central position alike in psychology and in physiology, has already been discussed many times.

Just as the anxiety women feel on account of their sexuality (leaving aside the question of a more repressive attitude on the part of society) seems to be objectively founded, so all anxiety must in the last instance, or rather in the first instance, have been at one time objectively founded.

Anxiety is a signal of mortal danger. And, even if we adopt the classification favoured by Anna Freud in her recent book³ and distinguish three principal types of anxiety, we are nevertheless still able to find a common denominator for all these three types in the organism's reaction to an objective danger.

³ *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, 1937.

So far as regards the *objective* anxiety of Anna Freud's classification, it is self-evident that this emanates from an objective danger and that the danger-signal, which is what it really is, is justified. *Moral* anxiety is the internalized anxiety which the child feels before his teacher or the criminal before his judge, for very definite objective reasons. Lastly, *instinctual* anxiety seems to have an entirely objective or social basis if we regard it as a reaction to the danger of giving way to crime, with punishment as a corollary.

Even the most manifestly neurotic anxiety can be reduced to a reaction originally inspired by an objective danger. Let us take for example a phobia of spiders. The spiders in our part of the world are not particularly dangerous. But when we reflect that spiders are a more or less widespread symbol of a 'bad mother' we shall recognize that the dread experienced by those who suffer from a phobia of spiders had a very real basis in the early history both of the individual and of the race. Bad mothers are a serious danger to their children, as witness even in our own day the cases of illtreated children which are reported in the Press. And this anxiety of a bad mother which was once justified objectively has only become neurotic because it has persisted at a stage when the mother is no longer to be feared and has been displaced and localized where the fear is no longer relevant—thus constituting a dual disorder of the preconscious categories of time and space.

Let us revert, however, to Anna Freud's conception of instinctual anxiety. She treats it as a reaction to the perception of instinct regarded as a danger in itself. But from the palæobiological standpoint which we are trying to describe, we can also justify it, without denying it its significance as a reaction to an objective danger.

Anna Freud surmises that the topographical ego is afraid of the instincts in the id which threaten to overwhelm it; hence the acute anxiety of childhood and adolescence when the balance of power between the ego and the instincts is weighted in favour of the latter. I think that this view is quite correct, but we may supplement it with the conception derived from our palæobiological theme.

Bleuler⁴ had already spoken, in somewhat confused terms to be sure, of man's fear of his sexuality as such. If it is true then that human beings are afraid of their sexual instincts, quite apart from all

⁴ 'Der Sexualwiderstand', *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen*, Bd. V, 1913.

social or moral repression, it is no doubt because those instincts interfere with the preservation of the narcissistic integrity of the biological ego, of the individual as such.

Because it threatens the male substance with disintegration and decrees penetration for the female, sexuality acts as a disturber of the peace. And all the erotic feeling that is associated with this drive of the species against the individual is not always enough to ensure acceptance of its demands. Individual self-preservation rebels against the race-preservative aims of the libido.

HUMAN ANXIETY AND THE HUMAN BRAIN

Finally, I should like to say a few words concerning the relation between human anxiety and the human brain. Just as the volume of our libido must be connected with the development of our nervous system, it is no doubt to the volume of our brain that we owe our great capacity for anxiety, which is probably incomparably greater than that of the other animals. Fear in the face of mortal dangers we have in common with them; but the specific fear, which children in particular feel before the rising tide of their sexuality, is doubtless related to the size of the brain in which the idea of the ego is developing.

More deeply than the other animals, the human child and after him the adult female and even the male must, thanks to the human brain, feel the danger to the individual, to the biological ego, implicit in the claims of the species.

It is because he must die that these claims make themselves heard and it seems as though he understood this from the very first. It seems as though, behind all the blandishments which nature uses to disguise the sexual trap, he were aware that it lay stretched before him and that he is to remain caught in it while others are to pursue the path.

When the brain is less developed, the animal seems to fall more blindly into the trap. Man, his ego's existence threatened by the claims of his sexuality which involve the expulsion or the violation of his substance, always experiences mingled feelings of attraction and anxiety in varying proportions before the demands of Eros.

SHORT COMMUNICATIONS

THE ANALYSIS OF A POEM¹

The following poem, which was accepted for publication in one of the leading literary magazines, was written during the author's analysis.

KAROO²

What ails me now ?

What ails this land—bare, barren of all green life ? . . . fretted by hot winds, hot curling puffs ? . . . and all is still again—hard, granite rock.

And I ?

I wander listlessly from rock to rock,
searching to find one flicker of life within its hidden creases.

But hope dies.

Nothing is found but molten metal—the dung of a thousand sun-strained mornings.

The sun, sullen in its powerful might, stares brazenly on Earth's blackened loins

and, staring, stabs relentlessly at dugs it has sucked dry.

My life is stilled at last—scorched.

Wrenched from the burnt-up corpse, the spirit rises in fast gyrations . . .
mounts into the face of the sullen monster

and strikes, with all life's force, its callous, brutal disc :

in the striking is released in a myriad scattered echoes :

in this last act ascends, descends—everlastingly—

in immortal waves.

The object in presenting the analysis of this poem is to exemplify the extent to which the unconscious mind works in the creation of poetic literature. The style of it is in the modern vogue of ' vers libre '. Rhyming is absent. Rhythm is abundantly present and adapted throughout to the feeling-tone of the subject matter.

The poem was written by the patient during a spell of analysis, while in the lavatory making a constipated stool. He was aware while writing it that the constipation was in some way connected with the poem. Recently analysis had been bringing into consciousness

¹ The poet's permission has been given for the publication of this article.

² With due acknowledgement to the *New English Weekly*.

the period in the patient's history when bottles were being exchanged for milk from a mug and more solid food ; and the replacement of the bottle-teat by a dummy-teat. It is well-known that change of food usually brings about a temporary constipation, or its opposite—diarrhœa. This, of course, may be so slight as to pass notice ; but, generally speaking, this statement holds true.

Analysis of the poem at the time of writing gave the following interpretation of the unconscious material which was being dramatized.

' The sun, sullen in its powerful might . . . '

This was felt to relate to the mother's or nurse's stern demand for the morning stool to be made.

' Dugs it has sucked dry '.

This referred to a dummy-teat in place of a bottle.

' the dung of a thousand sun-strained mornings '.

The sun's dung is the mother's dung. And the sun's dung and the child's dung are one and the same for *all dung* belongs to the mother. This had been made abundantly clear from previous analysis. In the case of this patient, up to this point in analysis, the sun, contrary to the usual unconscious meaning or symbolization given to it, represented the mother almost entirely. Later it was used also as a father symbol. This was all that was brought forward in interpretation of the unconscious meanings of the poem at the time of its creation.

Six months later the patient was typing the poem and became suddenly aware that every word had its unconscious meaning ; and, at the same time, saw in a mental vision the early episode that was the activating stimulus in the creation of it. I give his own words :

' While transcribing my poem I was interested to see how clear it was to me now. I found myself typing it with a running commentary going on in my head and seeing the whole scene of its origin. . . . I see myself sitting on my chamber, a child of one year or thereabouts. I have struggled ineffectively to produce my morning stool. Nurse stands over me, angry and demanding.

" " What ails me now ? " is myself wondering why nothing comes. " What ails this land—" translated, is " What is the matter with my insides ? " " bare, barren of all green life " is referring to the absence of babies (green life) from my stools. (The expectation of finding babies in the stool was already a conscious realization to the patient.)

"*Fretted by hot winds, hot curling puffs, and all is still again*" indicates two things. Firstly, colly-wobbles or flatus and, secondly, the heat of my face produced with and by each terrific effort at expelling my stool.

"*All is still again*" refers to the rest taken after such an effort. "*And I ? I wander listlessly from rock to rock*" shows a lessening of effort. I am tired now, but am still hoping that something will happen and the reluctant stool will emerge for I am still searching to find "*one flicker of life within its hidden creases*"—the creases of "*granite rock*" of constipated faecal matter which is pressing on my anus but cannot be moved.

The tiny "*fart*" that always, when it comes, helps on a constipated stool is the "*one flicker of life*" which is being searched for. With the absence of this "*hope dies*". Nothing is found but "*molten metal*", the end-result of "*a thousand sun-strained mornings*". This refers to the many mornings on which I have had to suffer the anger of the waiting nurse and the consequent constipation. The nurse is there, standing over me, demanding my stool, hurrying me over my stool and pouring down on my defenceless head her hot anger at my delays ; and thus, through the fear engendered, drying up my stool inside. (Analysis has shown constipation as well as diarrhoea to be the result of fear among other things.)

"*The sun, sullen in its powerful might, stares brazenly on Earth's blackened loins*"—the nurse stands sullenly by and stares menacingly at me. My loins are "*blackened*"—this is a reference to the blackness that invades one's eyes and, therefore, one's whole being when a long, terrific and sustained effort is made to expel the stool while holding the breath.

"*And, staring, stabs relentlessly at dags it has sucked dry*" refers to my childish belief that the nurse is depriving me of valuable food-milk by her matutinal demands and has thus dried up the contents of my bowel ; for, if it were not so, there would be the usual flow of "*er-er*". ("*Er-er*" was the patient's baby-word for stools. Previous analysis had shown this episodic constipation to have occurred at the moment of weaning from bottles and, at the same time, when solid food was being introduced into the daily diet.)

"*My life is stilled at last*" means I am exhausted and cannot make any further effort.

' "*Scorched. Wrenched from the burnt-up corpse . . .*"—the corpse is the "er-er" baby that I feel is dead within me, for it does not move to come out in the usual way. The expectation of a baby out of my stools was frequently present.

' The rest of the poem is a picture of the hate roused in me at this bafflement to my life's expression. She, "*the sullen monster*", is the cause of this death to me and my "er-er" baby. Into her face I fly and strike myself to pieces on her "*callous, brutal disc*". Life is poured out in hate and, in so doing, finds life again—" *in this last act ascends, descends—everlastingly—in immortal waves* ".'

The idea of ceasing to exist is impossible of comprehension to the unconscious. The freedom that is desired is freedom from the cause of the '*stilled life*' within; that is, from the stoppage of the peristaltic wave or rhythm. The idea of the part as the whole is evident here—the microcosm as the macrocosm. Each piece of the many pieces of the broken entity flung wide from the impact with the sun's '*callous, brutal disc*' lives separately and entirely as a whole throughout eternity. Immortality is held untouchable. Death to gain immortal freedom—to escape the frustration that is killing the life within. 'Flying to death to escape death'—a favourite expression of the patient's—is once more used as a means of avoiding the otherwise inescapable. Previously the phrase 'Flying to death to escape death' had been used in relation to an unknown fear, later seen through analysis to be the fear of punishment. This was one aspect of it. Here, in the subject under review, is another—that anything that threatens life can only be avoided by taking the way of death. Death in either case is a gaining of release from intolerable tension. The gain of life through death was connected with the Christ myth—'Except ye die and be born again ye cannot enter the kingdom of heaven' (that is, enter life). This phrase was frequently on the lips of the patient. Fear or block to expression, that is the act of living, are two important reasons, amongst others, for suicide. The writer of this poem had been very near death for these reasons on at least two occasions.

The peculiar interest of this poem lies in the fact that every single phrase had its unconscious reason. The unconscious inspired the poem. Not a single phrase or word was superfluous to the story it had to tell. Equally remarkable is the extraordinary way in which the unconscious selects from reality-experience the subject-equivalents to suit the unconscious needs. Its power of selection reaches an exactitude

that is almost mathematic in its accuracy of sensation equivalents, for the unconscious situation is perfect in its association to the Karoo. The unconscious seizes any material available to hand to stage its story. The opportunity was here since the patient had seen the Karoo : and the dried, burnt-up land and fiery sun lent itself so aptly as ' props ' to the dramatization of this episode.

While the poem was being written there was no mental consciousness of the Karoo. There was merely the feeling on the part of the patient that it all had to do with the constipation that was present at the time.

Grace W. Pailthorpe
(London).

A PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL EXPLANATION OF MICROPSIA

Several years ago a boy about eight years of age was brought to me because he saw objects smaller than normal. Asked for an example, the mother said that a day or two before she had been holding up an apple and her son had suddenly called out 'I have such a funny sensation ; that apple is growing smaller and smaller as I look at it '. The temptation—the word is apt in connection with the subject of apples—to use the association was irresistible, and I asked the mother in what way her child's behaviour at the breast had been unusual. The phenomenon he described gave me the impression of a rapidly receding object appearing as if seen through the wrong end of a telescope. She told me rather shamefacedly that she had not weaned him until he was two years old. Was he looking back through the intervening years and seeing the beloved breast in the same way as the theologians do when they trace man's troubles in the Old Testament to the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden ? The notes of the case have been temporarily misplaced, and the incident was not recalled until recently, when once more I was asked to deal with a similar problem. The patient was a boy of ten, who complained that objects became smaller as he gazed at them. The mother gave as an instance the cups and saucers on the table, whilst the boy said it often happened after he had read the page of a book, and sometimes when he looked at his mother. The association of mother with food receptacles and literature (food for the mind) seemed not unlike the apple theme of the previous case, so I now went further than merely suggesting an abnormal breast-feeding period ; I said that it must have been excessively long. The mother agreed ; the child had not been weaned until he was fifteen months old, because, as she said, ' he had been so cross about it '. Yet she had had no difficulty in weaning at the eighth month her other child, a boy five years older, when it became necessary for her to go into a nursing home for curetting of the uterus.

She was naturally curious to know how I had been able to arrive at my conclusion from the boy's symptom. I explained to her something of a child's attitude towards the mother's breast, and showed her how it might determine other reactions later in life ; for instance the boy would most likely prefer raw apples to those that had lost their breast-like shape from cooking. This proved to be true about her boy, as were also guesses that he disliked milk pudding and especially the

'skin' covering it, and hated kissing. Since the nipples must have played a big part in his early life, I suggested that he reacted to raspberries and strawberries unusually. She said that he liked them, but dare not eat many because they brought out a rash all over his body. His digestion generally was weak, and that schoolboy delicacy, chocolate, had to be eschewed because it made him feel sick.

It seemed likely that such pronounced oral characters might be accompanied by abnormal dentition, and I was not surprised to learn that both milk and permanent teeth had appeared late; he was ten months old before he cut his first two teeth, whilst the second dentition was much delayed. How far and in what way these two factors are inter-dependent I cannot say, nor can I link up definitely his breast interests with a habit of stammering that he had acquired early. The left-handedness so commonly associated with stammering was represented by a curious single activity; he always pinned his soft collar from the left side with the left hand. The significance of the resulting prominence of the tie from the use of the collar-pin need not be emphasized here.

I was interested to know what were the reactions of the mother's breasts in such a case. She said that they swelled up and were exquisitely tender for a week before the period, the lightest touch being then intolerable; when the flow began, the swelling and sensitiveness quickly subsided. The discomfort seemed thus to be associated with ovulation, and relief with the external sign of a missed pregnancy; during her two actual pregnancies the breasts had been comfortable. Erotic desire had never been very great, but it certainly was more manifest in the immediate pre-menstrual phase.

Ophthalmic text-books speak of micropsia as an hysterical symptom without, as far as I am aware, offering any solution of its significance. The condition is not common. In the two cases now described which form the limit of my recent experience there was nothing in the eyes to account for the symptom. The only abnormality discovered was a small amount of hypermetropia, an amount that usually gives rise to no discomfort until middle age is reached. Whether oral fixation is responsible for every case of micropsia must be left to further investigation.

Elsewhere I have recorded the frequency with which mothers tell me how another eye disease, squint, is most noticeable at meal times. Transient micropsia is probably dependent upon some vagary of the intrinsic muscles of the eye, whilst squint with its potential double

vision is due to inco-ordination of the extrinsic muscles. What determines the choice of one or other of these mechanisms to express the emotion is a fascinating problem yet to be solved, though a possible explanation was suggested by a middle-aged woman whom I analysed. She had a latent squint and strong oral fixations, and associated her occasional double vision with a desire to see both breasts at the same time. On one occasion, whilst sketching her naked husband who acted as a model for her during a spell of intense heat abroad, she was astonished to find that she, a frigid woman, had duplicated the penis.

Physiologically the inter-dependence of the intrinsic and extrinsic muscles is well known, and is applied in the treatment of squint by the provision of glasses to relieve the strain on the former and by correcting the excessive correlated action of the converging muscles, to induce parallelism. How often this fails to bring about a cure is notorious. Ever-widening experience in the application of psycho-analytic principles helps to explain why.

W. S. Inman
(Portsmouth).

ABSTRACTS

CLINICAL

Michael Bálint. 'Frühe Entwicklungsstadien des Ichs. Primäre Objektliebe.' *Imago*, 1937, Bd. XXIII, pp. 270-288.

The author makes an attempt to compare and contrast the differences in the theoretical opinions about the earliest development of the human psyche as held in the three analytical centres, London, Vienna and Budapest. He maintains that the material upon which the three contradictory points of view are built is entirely the same, namely, the description of the infantile psyche as given by Freud in his paper on 'Female Sexuality.' Bálint presupposes that with that description scientists in London, Vienna and Budapest agree, as it contains all the facts and abstains from any theoretical explanation. In London, analysts would see in this description a corroboration of their own opinions. According to J. Riviere's paper, 'On the Genesis of Psychical Conflicts in Earliest Infancy' the most important assumptions underlying the English theories are the following: (1) The child is born in the condition of primary narcissism. (2) Sadistic and aggressive impulses appear very early; it remains undecided what proportion of these aggressive impulses originates in the primary death instinct and what proportion is due to hatred arising out of actions of the surrounding. But it is taken for granted that loving emotions make their appearance considerably later and are much weaker. (3) There is uncertainty, when and how reality sense begins to develop. (4) It is assumed that the perception of the primary experiences happens mainly by way of introjection and projection.

Here the criticism of the Vienna school starts. Wälder in his paper, 'The Problem of the Genesis of Psychical Conflicts in Earliest Infancy' doubts the ubiquity and intensity of oral-sadistic manifestations and therefore also the truth of the consequences which are won by a generalization of these so-called observations. He also criticizes the inexact use of the terms introjection and projection and the way in which in London phantasy and reality or rather external and psychical reality is described. He doubts whether the experiences of these earliest developmental stages can ever become conscious and be expressed in words.

These objections are important and convincing. But nevertheless they do not make anything clearer. If one deserts the London point of view and agrees with Vienna, one does not understand the qualities of the infantile mind as described by Freud. Why are children so greedy, so impossible to satisfy, why is there always hostility and the reproach that the mother has not properly fed them? The situation seems rather

hopeless ; on the one hand a theory which is able to throw light on a number of very important qualities of the infantile psyche, but whose assumptions cannot stand severe criticism ; on the other hand criticism which cannot be disproved, but which does not give any explanation of the points in question .

Here the work done in Budapest offers a solution. The authors, A. Bálint and I. Hermann have come to the same result by different ways and independently of one another. Influenced by Ferenczi, the underlying idea of their work was to consider the formal elements of the analytical situation as transference appearance. It could be observed that certain characteristics of the transference situation were present in each analysis and became the clearer the more the patient was freed from mechanisms which could be made conscious. As a working hypothesis they assumed that these attitudes are to be considered-as sediments of the first psychical experiences and further how far from these observations one could assume the infantile psychic processes. The results of this work are the following : the author observed that after the analysis has proceeded to some depth, the patient claims urgently satisfaction of primitive desires from the analyst or the surrounding. If these wishes are frustrated, despair, inferiority feeling, bitter disappointment, very hostile aggressions, wild sadistic phantasies, anxiety attacks followed. If the wishes were fulfilled, a maniacal stage happens followed by the same disappointment after the first frustration. The wishes in itself are harmless ; a kind word from the analyst, to see the analyst outside the hour, to touch or to be touched by the analyst and so on. These desires have two distinct qualities ; they are directed towards an object and they never surmount the initial pleasure. Bálint assumes that these constant attitudes of the patients are reaction formations from the very earliest times. Therefore, in his opinion, the first phase of the extra-uterine life is not narcissistic but directed towards an object. This object relationship is of a passive nature, its aim is : I want to be loved and satisfied without giving away anything on my part. This is the aim of every erotic desire. Reality later on changes this form of desire. One way out is narcissism. The clinically observed narcissism is therefore always a protection against the bad or obstinate object. The other way out is active object love. We love the partner and satisfy him in order to be loved again. Hermann's investigations into the desire for bodily contact confirm the theory just mentioned and he brings it in connection with the primitive contact reflexes. Further, Hermann states that the clinging to a person is the primary stage of a number of object relationships. A. Bálint in her investigations confirms the above-mentioned theory by showing that also for the mother there is a libidinal desire to feel the child as a part of her body as well as to feel it hostile, in the same way as the child feels the body of the mother.

This primitive egoistical form of love cannot discriminate between the own and the object's desires. Therefore desires of the object which are not identical with the own desires are intolerable and cause anxiety and aggression. This happens also during the analytical treatment.

The common result of these three lines of investigation are the following :—

(1) The described primitive phase of object relationship is a very early developmental phase. (2) This phase is a necessary stage of the psychical development. (3) This form of object relationship is not bound to an erotogenic zone but is something in itself comparable to autoeroticism, narcissism or object-love. (4) The biological basis of this primary object-relationship is the instinctual clinging together of mother and child, they form a dual-unity. (5) This dual-unity becomes very soon disturbed in our culture. The result is the tendency to clinging on and also the general dissatisfaction and greediness of our children. (6) Should this instinctual desire become satisfied, the satisfaction never surmounts the initial pleasure satisfaction. Frustration causes violent reactions.

This theory, so Bálint assumes, makes it possible to understand and perhaps clear up the differences between London and Vienna. In London only the violent reactions after frustration were studied. The Vienna criticism saw this, but could not explain the reactions. The basis for the differences actually is the assumption of a primary narcissism. Bálint gives a number of reasons with which he intends to show that the primary narcissism could clinically never be observed and that his theory of the primary object relationship serves better the task to understand the manifestations of the pre-œdipal instincts.

K. Friedlander.

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Frieda Fromm-Reichmann. 'Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Migraine.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1937, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, pp. 26-33.

The paper is based on the conclusions drawn from the analysis of eight cases of migraine. The migraine expressed unresolved ambivalence—a very deep-seated hostility which could not be expressed against beloved persons. Current neurological theories of migraine are reviewed and the author shows that these point to a spasmodic contraction of smooth muscle not only in the cerebral blood vessels but in other smooth muscle, intestines, bladder, etc. The natural reaction to hostile feelings is muscular contraction expressing the desire to fight. The patients described their feelings after the migraine variously as relaxed, full of goodness and tenderness.

Two questions are raised : what is the reason for this ambivalence and why is the head chosen ? To the first she answers that migraine sufferers

come from cultural groups where hostility is especially taboo and its expression would produce great insecurity and fear of punishment. In considering the second question the author finds it significant that the hostility often takes the form of intellectual rivalry and the desire to destroy the hated one's intellect is expressed. The idea of a castration phantasy of others expressed by a displacement upwards was also found in one case.

Clara Thompson.

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Harold D. Lasswell. 'Veränderungen an einer Versuchsperson während einer kurzen Folge von psychoanalytischen Interviews.' *Imago*, 1937, Bd. XXIII, pp. 375-380.

The author undertook a series of experiments in order to find a method of objective examination of the analytical situation. The problem was whether, if one could find certain physiological indicators of tension (unconscious processes) and affects (conscious processes), one could predict changes of the affective life from the data for tension and *vice versa*. Examination of a patient during twenty-eight psycho-analytical interviews gave traces which show that verbal and psychical changes are connected in a characteristic way; that changes of the conscious affects are in close relationship to the pulse frequency and that changes in tension are closely related to the electrical conductivity of the skin.

K. Friedlander.

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Franz Alexander and Leon J. Saul. 'Three Criminal Types as seen by the Psychoanalyst: A Symposium.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, April, 1937, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, pp. 113-130.

(1) Franz Alexander. A Double Murder Committed by a Nineteen-year-old Boy.

During a quarrel Mark shot his brother two years younger and his brother's boy friend. He gave two different statements of the act, subsequently withdrawing the second. The first was that his brother's reproaching him about his disorderliness with book shelves stirred in him a senseless rage and he shot his brother and the friend who intervened. The second statement was that he shot the friend first for making slanderous remarks about his former girl friend.

Several important life history facts are related, among them the fact that he was inferior to his brother physically and had several times been treated brutally and humiliated by his brother. When he tried to show himself a man with girls, the thought of his humiliation at the hands of his brother would come to his mind and block him. Similar humiliation in childhood about masturbation was associated. The gun was purchased

probably without conscious murderous intent, but to be kept as a sign of virility.

There was strong resentment for the brother but, at the same time, the desire to lean on the strong person. Murder was a denial of his own weakness and wish to submit. Also, jealousy of the friend was probably present but could not be admitted because it involved being conscious of the desire to lean on and be loved by the brother.

He developed paranoid schizophrenia in jail.

(2) Leon J. Saul. Case Presentation of a Young Sexual Delinquent.

This delinquent was the 'tough on the outside, soft on the inside' type. The toughness was a defence against his dependent attitude. The delinquencies were expressions of being a 'he-man.' He felt weak in comparison with his older brother. In situations where he felt he could not compete, he became important by being different. He felt life in prison was exactly what he wanted. He would in reality be completely dependent while looking as if he were a 'he-man.'

The third case is not reported for reasons of discretion.

Clara Thompson.



Gerald R. Jameison. 'Suicide in Mental Disease. A Clinical Analysis of 100 Cases.' *Arch. Neur. and Psychiat.*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, pp. 1-12.

Jameison reviews the clinical records of 100 patients who have committed suicide. He tabulates the diagnostic groupings of the patients, the average length of time out of the hospital and the various means employed to kill themselves.

He finds that, in general, patients whose infantile motives were based on murder, incestuous strivings or homosexuality employed active self-destructive methods, while those, in whom the motives of atonement, reunion in death or exhibitionism seemed most prominent, used so-called passive or receptive techniques. Failure of an attempt in the first group often initiated a period of violent aggression, while failure in the second group often was the beginning of recovery, complete or temporary, in the patient. The family histories of the patients studied showed a high rate of psychosis.

E. C. Milch.



APPLIED

'Parent Education and Psychoanalysis. A Symposium.' (Reprint from *Parent Education*, Vol. III, No. 4, pp. 3-26.)

Ralph Bridgman, in an introduction to the Symposium, remarks upon

the influence that psycho-analysis is having on parent education workers. The articles which follow discuss and criticize this influence.

With a view to estimating the value of psycho-analytic findings in the teaching of parents, Helen Leland Witmer (Psychoanalytic Psychology in Parent Education) sums up the process of normal development (basing her summary on Freudian literature) and relates this development to the rôle of the parent and to ways in which psychical growth can be facilitated or hindered.

In a contribution entitled 'Psychoanalysis and Parent Learning', Lewis Brown Hill discusses some of the difficulties of parent education due to the parents' own conflicts and attitudes towards the teacher. He points out that insight into the learning process has been developed by psycho-analysis and warns teachers against the indiscriminate use of psychological knowledge in dealing with parents lest their sense of guilt should be over-stimulated.

Elizabeth Healy Ross (Some Effects of Psycho-Analysis on Counselling) shows professional counselling to be a development of ordinary human readiness to give on the one hand, and, on the other, to take help and advice. She refers to the "annoyance, pique, antagonism, interest, and deep conviction" aroused by Freud's discoveries concerning the unconscious and to the inappropriate and unsuccessful application some counsellors have tried to make of them, but lays stress on the advantage to the counsellor of some knowledge of unconscious functioning, provided that this does not lead to incursions into the provinces of psychiatry or psycho-analysis. She gives some practical advice on the handling of the complex emotional relationship of counsellor to parent counsellee.

Franz Alexander, in a concluding article, 'The Social Problem and the Individual,' maintains that social adjustment to the economic structure and to new ways of living inaugurated by the advance in natural sciences can only be made if security for the individual, proportionate to the sacrifice made by him for the community, is guaranteed by the environment. Evolution, rather than revolution, comes about by means of such adaptation. As with the organized group, so with the child. He can accept restrictions imposed upon him only if he gains equivalent compensation, viz., the love of his parents and their concern about his welfare.

The future depends upon whether the increasing social tension (due to infantile emotional factors transferred to political situations) will lead to an eruption more rapidly than sound educational methods are able to combat the psychological maladjustments which alienate groups from each other to a greater extent than is justified by their objective situations.

H. Sheehan-Dare.



Barbara Low. 'Co-Education : Some Psycho-Analytical Considerations.' *The New Era in Home and School*, April, 1937, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, pp. 91-94.

Psycho-Analysis does not hold any brief for or against co-education, but aims at discovering the facts involved in any problem under review.

The influence of the castration complex cannot be disregarded in any scheme of education which lays claim to a sound basis. This complex has different inhibiting effects and finds different resolutions in the man and in the woman. It is possible for co-education to make the resolution of the conflict more difficult both for boys and girls. It does not necessarily do so. The rivalry in activities encouraged may do violence to the girl's mental mechanisms which are based on her bodily functioning. The boy may find that being obliged to share his sublimation with the girl robs it of that which made it specifically masculine and therefore of greater value to him.

The camaraderie between the boys and girls, which often exists and is cited by the protagonists of co-education as one of its benefits, may involve a repression of sexual impulses so wholesale as to impoverish sublimation.

The mingling of the sexes in the staff of a co-education school has advantages and tends to create a healthy atmosphere for the immature person to develop in, and affords an outlet for the pupils towards the opposite sex.

H. Sheehan-Dare.



Ella Freeman Sharpe. "Feminine Development : Is Co-Education a Help or a Hindrance ?" *The New Era in Home and School*, April, 1937, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, pp. 109-111.

Woman's biological functioning is dependent upon times and seasons and a natural maturing. In so far as her education fits in with this natural order it will enable her to make the best response to the demands of adult life.

Owing to the nature of our cultural environment, sexual maturity is reached long before the psychical stability which makes possible a real independence from the parents. Extremes of emotional stress should therefore be avoided during adolescence.

It is doubtful whether co-education during puberty provides a suitable atmosphere for feminine development. The present-day drive (masculine in type) towards mechanisation and speed may interfere with a natural rhythm which should be a determining factor in the girl's psychical growth.

To force the pace is detrimental both to her and to the children she may

bear or handle. The over-stimulation of the sexual urges by the constant presence of members of the other sex tends either towards sexual precocity or to excessive repression with its resulting rivalry with the man.

H. Sheehan-Dare.

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R. E. Money-Kyrle. 'The Development of War,' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1937, Vol. XVI, pp. 219-236.

The successive theories of war—as indeed of any subject—represent a series of approximations towards the truth. New theories supplement, rather than supersede, their predecessors.

Biologists used to attribute war to the struggle for existence, pre-psycho-analytical psychologists, to such motives as ambition, vengeance or fear. These theories were true enough as far as they went; but they were superficial because they neglected unconscious motives.

Coming to psycho-analytical theories, perhaps four may be distinguished: sexual, Œdipean, paranoid and (added in a postscript to the paper) restitutive. The first stressed the phallic symbolism of offensive weapons and regarded war as an outbreak of sadistic perversion sanctioned by the state. The second introduced the two aspects of the father Imago as the beloved leader and hated foe (who threatened the motherland). The third emphasized the paranoid projection of aggression between rival groups, each taking defensive measures which confirm the other's fears. Finally, the fourth regards peace, with its constructive (restitutive) drives, as the normal condition, and war as a reaction to the despondency that follows their apparent failure.

On the basis of these theories of the motive of war, it is possible to build a (tentative) theory of the development of war. The higher animals are aggressive for a variety of reasons, but seldom attack their own species except when stirred by sexual jealousy. They do not make war, that is, they do not fight as a group, under a leader, against another group. As man's infancy period lengthened, parental authority became a permanent endopsychic force, which inhibited intra-group sexual and aggressive impulses. Man became exogamous and 'extrahomicidal'; loyal to his own group and its leader, and paranoid in his attitude to strangers and strange groups. The first wars were possibly wife-hunting raids. But, even among primitive peoples, the conscious sexual motive has been replaced by a variety of irrational ones. Among civilized nations, these motives are not only rationalized, but also defended on moral grounds. Moreover, the conscious desire for peace is probably stronger; but the restitutive mechanisms on which it is based remain unstable.

Author's Abstract.

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T. V. Moore. 'A Study in Sadism: The Life of Algernon Charles Swinburne.' *Character and Personality*, 1937, Vol. VI, No. 1, pp. 1-15.

By means of many quotations from Swinburne's verse the writer has no difficulty in demonstrating the close association between pain and pleasure in his temperament. He contributes nothing more to the understanding of it and draws no clearer distinction between algolagnia, sadism and masochism.

E. J.

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H. S. Darlington. 'Confession of Sins.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, April, 1937, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, pp. 150-164.

In simple cultures sin is often considered an entity and can be expelled orally from the body by confession and thereby the individual escapes death. Emetics are taken in many rituals to produce a similar cleansing. In both, the cleansing is made through the lips and is accompanied by breath passing out. This breath may become personified, and in an Australian tribe women fear to be struck by a whirlwind for they think the spirit in the whirlwind enters the womb to be reborn as a child.

Vomiting as a means of confession may be associated originally with having eaten the forbidden totem animal.

In some African tribes sexual sins, especially sins against the totem taboos, have to be confessed, and in addition the delivery of the child also plays a part. Difficult labour is believed to be due to an illicit union and the child can be delivered only when the mother utters the real name of her lover. Thus her body is cleansed in two directions, by the spoken confession through the lips and by the delivery of the child through the labia. An illegitimate child is a falsehood parading under ancestral names to which he has no right and therefore cannot be born until the stolen name is brought forth by confession. Several related customs are described, all of the data being from African tribes. However, a few similar situations are reported from other parts of the world.

Clara Thompson.

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Immanuel Velikovsky. 'Zu Tolstois Kreutzersonate.' *Imago*, 1937, Bd. XXIII, pp. 363-370.

The hero's struggle against unconscious homosexual tendencies is the driving force in this tragic story.

Paula Heimann.

BOOK REVIEWS

Papers on Psycho-Analysis. By Ernest Jones. (Baillière, Tindall and Cox, London, 1938. Pp. 644. Price 25s. net.)

The appearance of a fourth edition of Jones' *Papers on Psycho-Analysis* is an event that deserves more than passing notice. The omission of as many as twenty chapters to give place to twelve more recent papers not only brings this clinical text-book up-to-date, but for all practical purposes makes a new book of it. To these considerations the author adds point when, in the Preface to the new edition, he hints that his publishers may not prevail on him to undertake the laborious task of preparing another. It is to be hoped that when the time comes they will overcome this natural reluctance. In the meantime, the occasion is ripe to review afresh what is in effect the clinical testament of one who is *de facto et jure* leader of the present-day psycho-analytical movement.

For the better orientation of readers who have only recently become attached to this movement it may be well to interpolate here some general observations on the original form of psycho-analytical text-books. When, in course of time, Freud's earliest supporters set out to develop psycho-analysis in various parts of the world, it was only natural that their writings should reflect the existing state of psycho-analytical knowledge. This involved an exposition, with or without amplification, of the already published works of Freud. There was inevitably a certain sameness in all these early text-books. Sections were devoted to the theory and analysis of dreams, to the psycho-pathology of everyday life, to clinical case-histories illustrating the part played in unconscious mental life by infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex. To these were usually added a few chapters on applied psycho-analysis, concerned as a rule with the origin and nature of cultural activities. As a matter of fact the method had and still has its advantages. One of the easiest ways of acquiring a working knowledge of analytical theory is to start with the earliest of Freud's clinical papers and follow each subject as it is developed in subsequent contributions. For the same reason, many of the earlier expositions of Freudian theory are still well worth reading. Not only does the student proceed in the natural order from simple to complex, but he can make for himself the sobering discovery that in the early days psycho-analytic findings were not just chicken food to stay simple appetites. Naturally, those who have never read the earlier literature are inclined to feel that nothing worth calling psycho-analysis existed until five or at most ten years ago. Indeed, this feeling is not confined to students. There never was any serious justification for this view. With the appearance of this fourth edition of Jones' *Papers* there is still less. For here we have a book

which covers the clinical field and in which the original contributions (the earliest paper included was given in 1910) are as full of essential information as the latest. Added to this the author has edited his own papers with considerable skill. By arranging four sections, viz. general papers, papers on dreams, clinical papers and papers on child study, respectively, he has been able to distribute his earlier work throughout the book. Not only is the total salad effect more palatable, but each section gains in completeness of exposition. For the purpose of review, however, it is perhaps more interesting to sort out the different components and in this way assess the nature of the author's contributions to psycho-analysis at different periods.

In the first two sections there are several noteworthy contributions belonging to what one might call his first period. Jones' exposition of the theory and practice of dream interpretation is one of the clearest in the language and can be recommended to those who find Freud's classical text-book either too involved, too diffuse or too difficult for a beginner. Next to this should be placed the monograph on Symbolism which although appearing in a different section might properly be considered a companion chapter. This is in the reviewer's opinion the most comprehensive original contribution to this subject that has been made. One has the impression that recently trained analysts are inclined to neglect the importance of dream analysis and of symbolism, and certainly it is rare to hear nowadays of a clinical analysis conducted almost exclusively by the investigation of dream material. Perhaps this neglect is due to some extent to timidity. As the theory of analysis becomes more expansive, its effect on therapeutic practice is somewhat mixed. On the one hand it widens the scope of clinical investigation, but this very widening may lead to an undue depreciation of earlier clinical findings and methods. A similar reflection is stimulated by reading the chapter on *Psycho-Pathology of Everyday Life*. Recent squabbles over the relative importance of deep or superficial endopsychic factors on the one hand and deep or superficial environmental factors on the other may well obscure the practical fact that, whatever their ætiological significance, a considerable part of the average analysis must be devoted to the ventilation of everyday life in both major and minor aspects. Indeed it is well worth considering whether an old impression is not still valid, namely, that each analyst, general training and orientation apart, should work according to his lights and abilities, that any of the major channels to the unconscious can be used to deal effectively with the majority of cases encountered in psycho-analytical practice. There are good dream analysts, good everyday-life analysts, good deep phantasy analysts, etc., etc., and though they are, no doubt, fanatically devoted to their favourite method of approach, each can produce satisfactory results by his or her favourite method.

Also belonging to the first period is the famous paper on anal-erotism. This brings out very clearly what can be discovered by glancing through early volumes of the *Jahrbuch*, that observations made in earlier times were extremely copious and detailed. Apart from the discovery of early anal phantasy systems in young children, very little has been added to Jones' description of anal-erotism, its contribution to character formation, and its association with hate, sadism, homosexuality, etc. It is interesting to reflect that these observations were much more accurately documented than subsequent descriptions of the oral character and that by comparison attempts to delineate a 'genital' character have been much less convincing. It should not be forgotten that in its time this work on anal-erotism was of considerable service in demonstrating the polymorphous nature of infantile sexuality. Next to the Œdipus and castration complexes, the concept of anal-erotism aroused the most violent resistance in the minds of psychologists and of the lay public. This paper based as it was on numerous sources of information apart from the interpretation of obsessional symptoms put the matter beyond question.

Of the papers belonging to what one might call the middle period those on auto-suggestion and the formation of the super-ego are outstanding. By this time the investigation of ego-structure had made great strides, and it was inevitable that many old problems should be re-assessed in the light of newer knowledge. In this sense Jones' paper on auto-suggestion was not simply a reaction to contemporary interest in Couéism, but a completion of his earlier study on the nature of suggestion. During this phase, too, the author found himself at closer grips with the problems of instinct and of the nature of anxiety. He had always been interested in these subjects and at a time when most analysts accepted without question Freud's earlier views on anxiety the author had shewn considerable independence of thinking and judgement. Indeed, it is clear that his early interest in morbid anxiety was responsible for most of the papers he has published in recent years. These last are of two varieties, contributions to the theory of affects, such as that on hate, fear, and guilt, in which the earliest layers of mental development are reconstructed in terms of the relation of instinct to anxiety, and more clinical papers on the nature of female sexuality and of the so-called phallic phase. It is probable that the author himself would regard these as amongst the most important of his contributions to psycho-analysis, and, although this would be scarcely fair to his earlier work, it is true he has succeeded to a considerable extent in reducing these complicated and extremely controversial issues to some degree of order. But the author does more than reduce the issues to order: he takes a very definite stand on both of the main issues. His division of the phallic phase into a protophallic and a deuterophallic stage and his interpretation of the latter as a variety of neurotic reaction formation

against anxiety and guilt reflects a point of view that has gained currency in this country in recent years. The defence mechanism of mastering anxieties by libidization of their ideational representatives is now well recognized, and Jones has made use of this discovery to characterize a complete phase of libidinal development as a defensive phenomenon. In this case, of course, the process is not one of libidization of a non-sexual component but of increasing enormously an existing libidinal cathexis. This conclusion is not perhaps so controversial as it appears at first sight. Orthodox analysts have always been prepared to accept the view (strongly maintained by Sachs) that the perversions single out and over-emphasize one component of infantile sexuality in order to defend against the (unconscious) rest of the Oedipus complex. And the present reviewer, studying the nature of perversion formation, has stated that many of the libidinal manifestations of early childhood are already 'in principle perversions'. Jones' view of the deuterophallic phase might therefore be summarized as 'a normal infantile perversion brought about by a defensive narcissistic regression'. The arguments against this view are well known, viz. that it over-emphasizes the reactive nature of libidinal drives and that it neglects the normal constitutional factors in the order of development of sexual impulses. Although the first of these criticisms is without foundation, there is no doubt a risk of undue emphasis of reactive factors. In the meantime, it can be said that Jones' view is perfectly plausible, but that a final settlement of the dispute must be delayed until we know more about the actual distribution of components of sexuality in the first two years.

As for the controversy over female sexual development, it can only be said that, despite Jones' strenuous efforts to state clearly and amplify this issue, current views on the subject remain deplorably confused. This is due largely to the fact that not only are there marked divergences of view on the nature of female sexual development but marked differences of opinion on the early development of the psyche altogether, and consequently on the relative importance of early endopsychic and environmental factors respectively. The second set of differences inevitably inflames the first. Added to this, problems of early development in general and of early female development in particular are calculated to draw out the deepest emotional allegiances or preconceptions. The reconstruction of early development is in the nature of things a matter of plausible inferences. And his plausibility test can be very considerably vitiated by emotional preconceptions as to sexual differences and as to the significance of mother-child relations. This fact has, of course, been recognized on all sides and Freud's suggestion that recrimination should be avoided because of its boomerang effect is no doubt the best policy. But there is considerable difference between recognition of error and elimination of error. Perhaps the greatest service Jones has rendered in

this particular connection is to provide us with an unusually accurate résumé of the views of other contributors and of the problem as a whole. The fact that the total effect is far from clear is no disparagement of his effort, but a reflection of lack of clarity or comprehensiveness in the papers abstracted. As far as his own contributions to this subject are concerned perhaps the most fruitful is the emphasis he places on the factor of *aphanasis*. The word itself wears a somewhat alien aspect, and may never gain the popularity achieved by the term cathexis, but the fear of aphanasis is a well observed fact, and there is no doubt that the different forms it exhibits in boy and girl respectively are responsible for many characteristic differences between the psychology of the sexes.

Anyhow, here is a book of which, both as to form and content, its author may well be proud. One frequently hears the complaint that there is no very satisfactory exposition of psycho-analysis suitable for students and practitioners. And to some extent the complaint is justified. It is all the more credit to Dr. Jones that by making a judicious selection from his own papers he has produced a satisfying clinical text-book.

Edward Glover.



Predavanja iz psihoanalize [*Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*]. By M. Nikola Popovic. (Verlag Geza Kon, Belgrade, 1934. Pp. 296.)

Professor Popovic's work is the first book on psycho-analysis to be published by a Serbian author in the Serbian language. The fourteen chapters consist of lectures delivered by the author, mostly at the Kolarac University in Belgrade, but also at other centres in Belgrade, Sombor and Ljubljana. The author has refrained from criticism of any kind because (as he insists in his Preface) criticism only becomes relevant when the reader is already familiar with the subject; whereas the book is written for beginners, being designed to prepare the ground for a preliminary study of analysis. Besides, as the author explains with an engaging candour, no one has a right to criticize psycho-analysis who has not himself had a varied experience in the application of the psycho-analytic method. We see then that the book lays no claim to originality but bases itself on Freud's writings. There would, therefore, be no object in indicating its contents at any length here; instead I propose to reproduce the chapter headings, which are as follows: (1) The Life of Sigmund Freud; (2) The Concept of Psycho-Analysis; (3) The Psycho-Analytic Method and its Practical Significance; (4) Man's Sexual Instinct and Sexual Morality; (5) The Metapsychological Principles of Psycho-Analysis; (6) Psycho-Analysis on Dreams and the Occult; (7) Parapraxes and Jokes; (8) Neuroses as Disorders of Sexual Function; (9) Psycho-Analysis and

Insanity ; (10) The Poet and Phantasy ; (11) Mental Life from a Psycho-Analytic Standpoint ; (12) The Philosophical and Pedagogic Significance of Psycho-Analysis ; (13) Child Analysis and Education ; (14) The Contemporary Crisis in Psychology.

In general the problems implied in the chapter headings have been happily stated, while clear and common-sense definitions have been given of the various analytical terms.

One or two less favourable features of the book must not be allowed to pass without comment. It is not altogether fitting in an elementary book of this kind to treat as accepted knowledge what is no more than hypothesis, as has been done for example with the theory of a death instinct. Again there occur passages in which outmoded and obsolete views stand side by side with the most recent additions to our psycho-analytical knowledge. Thus in a book so recently published as this one (in 1934) we still find it being said that the best way to become an analyst is by analysing one's own dreams. A similar view must be taken of the author's interpretation of Freud's ideas on masturbation : ' Medical science erroneously fails to distinguish between two separate varieties of masturbation, the infantile and the adolescent. During puberty the practice is by no means so dangerous ; the danger arises when it occurs in infancy. Psycho-analysis has shewn that this infantile masturbation is pathogenetic '. A third example of the same defect occurs in connection with the author's account of Freud's views on neurasthenia : ' Neurasthenia is to be distinguished from anxiety-neurosis in that its source is a disturbance of sexual function differing from that which gives rise to anxiety-neurosis. *Neurasthenia is the result either of excessive masturbation or of too frequent emissions* '.¹

The fundamental rule of analysis is incorrectly stated in so far as there is apparently to be an entire exclusion of affect. According to Popovic's version the analysand must ' place himself in a state of attentive self-observation so that he may be in a position to observe calmly and *without any emotion* ' ¹ all the thoughts which present themselves to his conscious mind '. Psycho-analysis has maintained from the very first that affects are no less important than content : whence the old saying that the patient must be freed from his ' strangled affects '.

Nevertheless, leaving aside the errors I have enumerated, the book is in general well calculated to awaken interest in psycho-analysis and to provide a preliminary orientation in this field of science. Rectification of the errors in question would make a substantial difference to the value and usefulness of a second edition. But even as it is the book is well worth reading and will rank in Yugoslavia as an important pioneer work. It

¹ Reviewer's italics.

contains much that will help to popularize analysis in that country ; and Professor Popovic's achievement is therefore both useful and welcome.

N. Sugar.

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Le Problème de l'Hystérie. By G. Parcheminey. (Bibliothèque Psychanalytique, Denoël et Steele, Paris, 1935. Pp. 20.)

Readers of this JOURNAL will find this little work instructive for the concise critical survey it gives of the most important theories dealing with the problem of hysteria, with special reference to those of French workers. Psycho-analytic views receive due prominence. The work is also a plea for psycho-analysis: the author is concerned to shew that the other theories are under a heavy obligation to it and generally that the explanation which psycho-analysis puts forward is not in conflict but in entire accord with other accounts. An exception must be made for Babinski's pithiatism, which, however, scarcely finds support nowadays even in France.

The author rightly begins with the point that while it is true that Freud has revealed the motives and unconscious content of the illness, together with its dynamics and its economics, nevertheless the actual mechanism of hysteria, or more specifically the mechanism of conversion, is still an unsolved problem. The author seeks to find an explanation in the factor of regression to magical processes, in which thought, expression and performance are one, so that ideas, phantasies and symbols always emerge in connection with their somatic manifestations. (As we know Ferenczi explained many hysterical symptoms as 'magical gestures'.) But, so long as we fail to understand the magical process itself either in its physiological or its psychological aspect, the establishment of the equation shews just as much that we can proceed from our knowledge of hysteria to throw light on the magical process as in the reverse direction. The presence of magical processes in hysteria is said by the author to depend on fixation as a static factor and on regression as a dynamic one. In opposition to him, we should feel more disposed to regard regression as a topographical phenomenon, the dynamics of which are to be found partly in the repetition-compulsion and partly in intolerably powerful or else in inadequate cathexes of recent layers, so that the fixation-points are able to radiate a dynamic attraction. The author, in a fruitful classification of the various theories, divides them into psychological, physiological, biological (Kretschmer, Monakow), physio-pathological (Claude and others) and constitutional (Dupré and his school). The feature common to them all he sees in the 'dissociation' characteristic of hysteria—the collapse of unified functioning. The dissociation lies in Janet's theory between consciousness and unconscious processes; in the physiological explanations, between cortex and sub-cortex; in the biological ones, between archaic

and recent processes. Claude has proposed the designation 'schizoses' for hysteria and schizophrenia on the ground that the same dissociation characterizes them both. Unfortunately these terms fail to advance us beyond the position that in the realm of the psyche we are concerned with functions at a number of levels, the unified control of which has, in these disorders, broken down.

P. Federn.



Dream Analysis. By Ella Freeman Sharpe. (International Psycho-Analytical Library, Hogarth Press, London, 1937. Pp. 211. Price 10s. 6d.)

There is a passage in Freud's *New Introductory Lectures* where he remarks on the steady decline in recent years in the number of scientific contributions to the interpretation of dreams. 'Analysts', he observes, 'behave as though they had nothing more to say about the dream, as though the whole subject of dream-theory were finished and done with'. Now it certainly cannot be said that we have solved all the problems connected with the dream. Much as psycho-analysis has taught us concerning the aims and essence of dreams, a whole series of questions still await an answer. Some of these will be found discussed in Ella Sharpe's valuable new book, which she describes as *A Practical Handbook for Psycho-Analysts*.

This designation alone tells us that the new book is primarily concerned with the practical aspects of psycho-therapy. This aim defines its scope and prescribes its method. Proceeding from the conception that the dream has something to say, the author deals with the question: 'How does the dream say it?' Here she introduces a happy analogy between the modes of expression available to the dream and to language, the images and metaphors of everyday speech and poetry. One only regrets that the author has confined herself in this part of the book to individual mental products; one could have wished that besides the neat examples culled from poetic sources she had turned to mythology, puns and jokes for others. (For instance, on p. 22 it would have been relevant to recall the part played by the totem-tree, the biblical tree of life, etc.) The view which Miss Sharpe sustains that we all learn our mother-tongue phonetically is worth pursuing for its important bearings on the dream-work. In the field of symbolism we shall have once more to turn our attention to the problem how symbols are created afresh out of individual material. We are given an able and vigorous exposition of the mechanism of dramatization and of the relation between the interpretation of dreams and the explanation of neuroses. (I would call special attention to the apt remark that there is generally no awareness that the dream is the creation of the dreamer.) Drawing on a large number of dream-analyses, she

discloses the aims which govern both the dream and the telling of it, distinguishes those dreams occurring in the course of analysis which confirm interpretations or express defiance and reveals the dreamer's attitude to his own dreams and the various transference reactions which the dream reflects. The behaviour of the patient as he tells his dreams is quite rightly regarded as specially significant from a psychological point of view. Throughout the whole book the interpretation of dreams has been rescued from its position of isolation and assigned its proper place in the analytical process; the dream has been treated throughout as an element in the analytic situation and we are shewn how the analytic material contributes to the dream and how this in turn leads back to the analysis. Special attention has been paid to the sequence and arrangement of the dream-associations. The author has presented many of her examples with such skill that no sooner has the reader been given the material of a dream and the accompanying associations than he finds his way naturally to the same conclusions as the analyst herself. The author has frequently found occasion in the course of these lectures to allude to special problems, as when she touches upon the relation between dreams and phantasies, makes reference to the specific affects which precede or follow a dream or reveals the significance of dream-stimuli and their connection with the latent dream content. Certain special features have been brought out, such as the tendency of dreams to become shorter, more laconic and subject to a greater degree of distortion as analysis proceeds, or the way in which mental and physical crises are reflected in the changed character of a person's dreams. It is impossible here to give an adequate idea of the variety of the problems treated in the book or of the numerous suggestions it contains. The author's discernment, her remarkable gifts of observation and her independence of judgement must be acknowledged even where the analytically schooled reader finds himself unable to subscribe to the views which she defends.

For many passages do occur which will awaken in the reader difficulties, doubts and disagreement, and if he is able to appreciate the book's good qualities he will also feel free to consider this other aspect of it. A true appreciation of a book should include rather than exclude criticism of it. The greatest difficulty I feel is inspired by the over-confident spirit in which many pronouncements are made and the somewhat facile and simplified solutions advanced, leaving no room for uncertain and doubtful points or for any gaps in our knowledge. We can understand that a book primarily intended as a guide to practice should not favour prolonged scientific discussions, but it ought not to conceal the extent of our ignorance or the difficulties which still beset the psychology of dreams. The interpretation of a dream does not proceed as smoothly as the author's presentation suggests and the explanations are seldom so certain and straight-

forward. It seems to me a questionable procedure to make use of single dreams for purposes of prognosis, to use interpretation as if, speaking figuratively, it were possible to read off the quantity of instinctual tension from a dream just as though it were a pressure-gauge. Moreover, in passing such judgements, Miss Sharpe often proceeds from a consideration of the manifest content alone. Thus she selects two dreams for comparison, in the first of which a patient dreamt: 'I saw a house on fire', and in the second: 'The house I was in was on fire' (p. 172). Both dreams represented aggressive impulses towards the patient's mother stimulated by infantile jealousy over her pregnancy. The author tells us that the first dream contained less anxiety than the second because the patient who dreamt the first dream only saw the burning house from outside; that the ego in the second dream suffered more from anxiety than in the first because the dreamer was *within* the house, that is, inside her mother's body. The libido, however, is stronger in the second dream, the wish to save stronger than the desire to destroy. Simply on the basis of the dream content, that is a highly questionable assumption. But from such doubtful premises as these the author arrives at the following conclusion: 'Hence one would conclude that this second patient will preserve psychical equilibrium in spite of distressing anxiety and the sublimation of both aggressive and libidinal impulses is given in the dream' (p. 174). In my opinion a conclusion of this nature is not merely daring but false. In all probability the analyst based her conclusion on other material obtained from the analysis and unconsciously displaced it on to the dream.

The interpretation of dreams is a valuable aid to psychological understanding; but it is unreasonable to expect it to fulfil prognostic and prospective functions as well. Nor as a rule do I think that dreams enable us to perceive the advances made by a patient undergoing analysis, that we can deduce psychological changes from the manifest dream content, can detect in dreams, for instance, modifications of the super-ego or that they possess characteristics which reveal the extent of the patient's ability to come to terms with his mental conflicts. 'I for my mortal part do not believe that'. But even assuming that these assumptions should prove correct up to a point, their truth or at any rate their probability would have demanded a much broader basis in clinical material before it could be made to assume a plausible form. The few examples adduced and the assertions, which in this connection are made in a particularly over-confident spirit, are not sufficient to meet the occasion. The examples in question are a number of dreams which are compared with one another in respect of their manifest content.

This examination of the manifest dream content is distinguished by the author from analysis proper as 'comments on the dream' (p. 181).

On the basis of these investigations, she finds that changes in the manifest content of a patient's dreams shew that his mental conflicts have also undergone changes. I cannot see that the manifest dream-content affords any better evidence of this than other conscious material and I am therefore unable to assign to it any special function in this direction. Let me give one of the examples adduced by the author. She says: 'For example, if a patient who at times of stress has dreamt of terrifying seas responds after a period of analysis to psychical painful stimuli by dreaming of floating on water and a certainty of not drowning, the analyst may well conclude that sufficient readjustment has been made to enable the patient to deal with his own inner problems' (p. 183). No doubt the analyst may arrive at that conclusion: the only question is whether his conclusion, in so far as it is based on manifest dream material, is correct. Equally unproven in my opinion is the claim founded on a number of other examples that the manifest dream-content reflects advances made under analytic treatment, the relinquishment of aggressive tendencies in favour of erotic ones, the overcoming of homosexual by heterosexual impulses, and so forth. As a significant exception we should perhaps allow those cases of alcoholics which Miss Sharpe brings forward. Here the fact that patients dream of alcoholic excesses may sometimes have a bearing on prognosis—though I am thinking only of the fact that 'they dream of drunkenness instead of actually becoming drunk' (p. 187).

The scepticism I feel concerning the validity of the manifest dream-content as a guide to prognosis applies equally to the hypothesis that dreams may indicate when an analysis is approaching termination. In the final chapter of the book, which is concerned with the dreams of 'analysed' persons, the author seeks to discover differences which would enable us to distinguish their dreams from those of other people: such distinguishing marks are the fact that the significance of the primitive impulses is accepted, the severity of the super-ego is lessened, a greater integration of the ego has been achieved, etc. I fail to see that these differences have any connection with the dream as such; at most they would relate to the dreamer's attitude to his dreams, to the reception with which they meet from him. Nor do I believe that analysed persons have fewer anxiety-dreams or 'dreams in which animals represent the animal nature of the dreamer' (p. 197). And is it true that the dreams of analysed persons are much shorter or more indefinite than those of people who have not been analysed? Miss Sharpe explains this by saying that analysis has made possible greater satisfaction in reality. Unfortunately I cannot offer any dream material bearing on this comparison, but I am rather sceptical. I am very much afraid that Miss Sharpe has an unduly high opinion of people who have been analysed, regarding them as a kind of superman.

The reservations and criticisms we have made relate chiefly to the last chapters of the book which introduce new theoretical considerations concerning dreams, in my opinion without sufficient evidence. The fact that we have reviewed the book in considerable detail will perhaps suffice to shew that we think it worthy of serious consideration and have applied the highest standards in our criticism of this valuable work.

Th. Reik.

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Einführung in die Psychoanalyse für Pädagogen. By Anna Freud. (Bücher des Werdenden. Band VIII. Herausgegeben von Paul Federn und Heinrich Meng. 2 Auflage. Verlag Hans Huber, Berne, 1935. Pp. 104.)

A review of Miss Barbara Low's translation of the first edition of this book—*Introduction to Psycho-Analysis for Teachers* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1931. Pp. 117. Price 3s. 6d. net)—was published in this JOURNAL, Vol. XII, 1931.

★

Nachdenkliche Heiterkeit. By Theodor Reik. (Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Vienna, 1933. Pp. 183. Price, R.M. 5.50.)

This work is devoted to the 'realm of the comic', which is 'as extensive as the domain of tragedy' and more so, ranging 'from joking which reviles to humour which reconciles' (p. 5); it consists of fifteen studies of varying range, which, grouped in three divisions ('Borderline Problems of Joking', 'Jest becomes Earnest' and 'Between Horror and Laughter'), have yet 'unpretentiously though firmly rejected every attempt at orderly arrangement' (p. 90). They include penetrating monographs, such as that on the 'Intimacies of Jewish Jokes' (the depreciatory tendencies of which Reik attributes to the influence of the need for punishment), brilliant notes, in one of which, for example, slips of the tongue occurring in jokes are regarded as 'a bridge between failure and achievement in function', and short essays, some of them only loosely connected with the author's theme, but linking on to other earlier work of his, and completing and expanding the lines of thought there developed. Thus, for instance, the chapter on 'Bawdy Jokes in Goethe's *Faust*', a title which fails to cover the paper's wide range of thought—I cannot conceal my feeling that the author's fear that even an analytically trained mind will hesitate to follow him here without reserve is not altogether without foundation—is a contribution to the psychological interpretation of Goethe's art which proves to be closely connected with Reik's earlier account of Goethe's relationship to Friederike Brion (*Imago*, Bd. XV, 1929). So too the noble chapter written in memory of Arthur Schnitzler takes us back to a study of Reik's published more than twenty years ago; the present contribution proceeds from the work and personality of the

poet to investigate the fear of dying and the longing to be loved, those 'two mighty primal impulses . . . by which all human thought and conduct are determined' (p. 115), and rises to a height at which the shadow of death itself is dispelled by laughter.

Like all this author's work, the book is distinguished by the excellences of a style which helps the reader easily over the difficulties of his subject matter, but may nevertheless cause us here and there to overlook the train of thought underlying his remarks. It may therefore be useful to bring into separate relief some of the additions which this loosely connected series of papers has made to the psycho-analytical theory of the comic: not so much the wealth of happy single observations and *aperçus*—they can scarcely be overlooked—as rather some of the fundamental ideas which are scattered here and there, mostly in the form of fleeting allusions. For instance, we may mention Reik's view that 'a strict differentiation between innocent and tendentious jokes in Freud's sense cannot be maintained'. For a joke, he says, is a rebellious movement against a compulsion proceeding 'from without'—and manifestly also from within—in which 'the shadows of those old dangers, never wholly dispelled' (viz. of infantile instinctual life), emerge once again (p. 61). Allied to this conception is the one already developed by Reik in earlier studies (collected in the volume *Lust und Leid im Witz*, published in 1929) concerning the relation of jokes to terror; in the book under review, Reik arrives at a formulation in accordance with which 'the joke rediscovers an old, unconscious anxiety in the form of terror, in order then to obtain the mastery over it and transmute it into pleasure'. The characteristics of humour also—which he describes as 'an act of grace'—are elaborated by Reik on the basis of similar considerations; humour also has a point of transition 'at which we can discern how the ego has contrived a hurried escape from impending annihilation or severe injury' (p. 120). Such reflections would lead one to expect a formulation of more general validity concerning the part played by the comic in the mental apparatus; for, speaking quite generally, it is possible to combine the function of the comic as a defence against anxiety or as a mastery of pain—both in the service of obtaining pleasure—with Freud's original formula, according to which the comic was held to have as its aim the reduction of tensions in the economy of the mind. However that may be, it lies in the very nature of this work that its author should be unwilling to bring forward theoretical considerations except in the form of what might be described as glimpses.

Other lines of thought developed by Reik, likewise only indicated though apparently of wide bearing, are concerned with genetic problems. We would single out two reflections. The one refers to a special question of ontogenesis. Reik starts off from Freud's perception of the connection between the manipulation of words in jokes and in the children's play

with words. He expands this conception, bringing forward convincing arguments to shew that the child's play-activity with words has its roots beyond the pleasure-principle and that, for instance, the childhood phase described by Groos of experimental play with verbal material is preceded by one in which this activity 'promotes the purpose of assimilating, of understanding, and in general of obtaining psychical mastery' (p. 39). The other reflection concerns the problem of phylogenesis, and here too Reik takes up a theme already broached occasionally in his previous work; he wishes to regard gesture and facial expression as preliminary stages of verbal representation (pp. 13, 20), and also to demonstrate—as in the case of irony, for instance—the archaic elements in the significance of words, which he is disposed to bring into relation with 'a contradictory primal meaning of sentences'.

In Reik's presentation, the clinical aspects of psycho-analysis assume a position of special importance. On the one hand they contribute transparent, if indeed occasionally somewhat remote illustrative material, and, on the other, they continually enable the author to delimit and interpret isolated phenomena with greater accuracy, as in the chapter entitled 'Derision in Jokes and in the Obsessional Neurosis'. Clinical experience, too, gave rise to the fine psychological analysis of irony, the genesis of which in the mental domain is explained in terms of the oral-cannibalistic mechanism.

Here we will break off, without pretending to have indicated even the more important conclusions or ideas. We will permit ourselves a single remark only with reference to a further special problem. It can scarcely be a coincidence that the majority of the clinical parallels which Reik offers us lie upon the outer fringes of the obsessional neurosis; for it would appear that the comic in its tendentious aspects and the obsessional neurosis both originate from the conflict of ambivalence.

E. Kris.



Black Hamlet. By Wulf Sachs. (Geoffrey Bles, London, 1937. Pp. 280. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Dr. Wulf Sachs has been ambitious, he has set out to record and conduct a psycho-analytic study of an African Negro. From the records given it does not appear that he has achieved his ambition; certainly he used the method of free association, but from what can be gathered, the transference situation was hardly dealt with. In fact the writer reproaches himself that he has not been concerned enough over 'John' as a patient, but only as a subject of research. No true psycho-analysis can be done under these conditions. Notwithstanding this fact, Dr. Sachs has succeeded in getting very original material which makes a book of great interest.

It is a very readable book ; in fact in most places it reads like a novel. It is of interest as a sociological study of the Negro problem in South Africa.

For the psycho-analyst, the chief interest is in connection with the whole system of magic which is revealed by ' John ', who is a medicine man. Ignorance has caused extreme fear of evil happenings, paranoid ideas have been successfully combated in the community so long as the magic beliefs are made possible because they are so arranged as to really function, i.e. the bones shew improvement in the health of the patient when there is a reasonable probability of cure. But when faced by the real power and evils of English administration, magic is used no more, for magic will not work against the English. The African is thus left without the aid of magic, at the mercy of his fears, and paranoid ideas increase and flourish.

Dr. Sachs has satisfied himself that the normal fundamental principles of the mind in European and African are the same. For instance, it is easily seen that the Œdipus complex is the same, only with ambivalent feelings to the father focused on two people—the love feelings on the real dead father, the hate feelings on the father substitute—the Uncle who had married John's mother.

Sybille L. Yates.

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Outlines of Psychiatry. By William Alanson White. (Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., New York, Fourteenth Edition, 1935. Pp. 494. Price \$4.00.)

The manner in which this book has evolved into its final form and the success which it has achieved throw a light not only on the character and development of its author but in an equal degree on the evolution of psychiatry in America. The first edition of *Outlines of Psychiatry* appeared in 1907 and every second year since then there has been a demand for a new edition, so that the edition of 1935 is the fourteenth. The beginning of this development belonged to a period when White had as yet scarcely made the acquaintance of psycho-analysis and had not advanced beyond the standpoint of Kræpelin. The second edition shewed him entering on a new path ; in particular, at that period he was occupied with the concept of the ' complex '. As time went on, causal psychology became increasingly prominent. The 1935 edition of the work is the last to be produced by the author : White died on March 7, 1937. Like its predecessors, this edition is intended for students and its systematic structure follows the lines laid down by Kræpelin. The book is not an attempt at a psycho-analytical psychiatry, but it contains a synopsis of all the contributions made by psycho-analysis to the fundamental problems of psychiatry. White treats

upon an equal basis Kræpelin's well-established, traditional clinical system, based on descriptive phenomenology and Freud's causal and genetic psycho-analysis. The result of this combination is not a compromise but an integral factor in American psychiatry; and there is an increasing amount of evidence to shew that White's plan is not only workable but successful. In the 'General Section' causal and descriptive psychology are contrasted and compared. This section contains also a general symptomatology. The 'Clinical Section' gives an account of the major groupings of psychoses, amongst which a special place is assigned to paranoia. The third and last section describes the methods of psychiatric examination.

Martin Grotjahn.

★

The Principles and Practice of Clinical Psychiatry. By Morris Braude. (P. Blakiston's Son and Company, Inc., Philadelphia. Pp. 382.)

The author's purpose is 'to ease the lot of the student of medicine . . . in the difficult field of mental disease'. As usual when this objective is pursued in psychiatric text-books, it tempts the author into oversimplification and at times inaccuracy. As has been the vogue in American text-books on psychiatry for the past two decades, the author makes free use of psycho-analytic terminology and includes a chapter on psycho-analysis which reveals many misconceptions (Free Association, p. 359), factual errors (p. 344) and lack of acquaintance with reliable sources of psycho-analytic authority (p. 351). While the misrepresentation of psycho-analysis in books of this type is regrettable, still the attention given to the subject indicates the extent to which psycho-analytic thought has permeated American psychiatry, to the benefit of management and understanding of cases, especially the schizophrenics, on whom no analysis is attempted.

C. P. O.

★

Mentality and Homosexuality. By Samuel Kahn. (Meador Publishing Company, Boston, Massachusetts. Pp. 249. Price \$3.00.)

It is surprising that with such wealth of homosexual material at his disposal the author should have produced a book which adds nothing to our present knowledge of the subject.

The chapter on Treatment, which is specially recommended in the Foreword to the book, gives no information of the results obtained, and thus nothing of real value can be gleaned from it.

D. B.

★

Peter Kürten : A Study in Sadism. By George Godwin. (The Acorn Press, London, 1938. Pp. 58. Price 5s.)

This little volume was originally written as a Preface to a larger study of Peter Kürten which the same publishers intend to issue shortly. It is a condensed account of the life of the so-called 'Düsseldorf monster' with some attempt at a psychological understanding of his peculiarities. The larger volume will doubtless be awaited with interest.

E. J.



The Single Woman and Her Emotional Problems. By Laura Hutton. (Baillière, Tindall & Cox, London, 1935. Pp. xii + 152. Price 5s. net.)

This small book of about 150 pages is a revealing sign of the times in that on the one hand the author faces certain fundamental sexual problems with much frankness and objectivity, and on the other, that there exists a public, as the publishers courageously recognize, anxious to be enlightened on such problems. As the title shews, Dr. Hutton has set herself to deal with the facts of female celibate life, taking for her main sections first a general survey, 'The Single Woman To-day', next 'Emotional Friendships and Psychological Problems Involved' (Chap. II), thirdly, 'Sexual Problems' (one of which is Sexual Inversion) (Chap. III) and ending with a discussion of 'Adjustments' (Chap. V).

Whether one has full agreement with the author's point of view or not (from the psycho-analytical angle there will certainly be disagreements), her honest and sincere attempt to see the problems involved without shirking the difficulties, must be appreciated by every reader. Dr. Hutton herself says in the Preface (p. vii) : 'Nothing profound is attempted, but my aim has been to give clues to the psychological factors which may be playing a part in these troubles, and to indicate constructive ways of dealing with them'. Also in his 'Foreword', Dr. David Forsyth writes : 'At the least, this book will help in establishing a platform where all aspects of human nature can be openly discussed, free from the interference of prejudice of whatever kind' (p. x).

Perhaps too ambitious a claim, for it is hard to visualize an era in which man will have achieved freedom from prejudice, 'of whatever kind', but it is a step in progress if we can even begin to approach some of the profounder human problems with a lessening of fear and hostility. Nevertheless, if we are aiming at free discussion of 'all aspects of human nature', as Dr. Forsyth desires, it is of the first importance that such discussion shall be based upon the most proved knowledge we can obtain, based upon the widest survey of existing material. It is the inevitable defect in all 'summings up' that they suffer from final conclusions and a too limited selection, a defect which Dr. Hutton could not altogether avoid in so small

a book as this. Indeed, it is remarkable how much material she has actually handled, and still more suggested, in her restricted scope. But some statements which contain Dr. Hutton's considered opinions call for criticism. In her chapter on 'Emotional Friendships' (Chap. II) on the question of masochism and sadism, there seems to be a good deal of confusion. After stating that both these elements are to be seen in the developments of normal sexual relationships, she continues: 'The woman tending to masochistic (receptive), the man to sadistic (aggressive) behaviour'. This statement, without qualification, is misleading. It is true that in *certain* manifestations of the sexual instinct the woman shews herself more masochistic than the man, largely owing to the greater passivity in the sexual act itself. But if we consider the far greater emotional claims often made by the woman upon the man, and her attempts to limit the man's aims and desires in favour of domesticity (one recalls Tanner's remark in *Man and Superman* when bitterly he comments to Anne that after they are married all she'll want is to keep him busy working for her and the children, and 'good-bye to my dreams and hopes'), we see that female aggressive behaviour is part and parcel of her sexual development. Equally, the man can manifest extreme masochism in the relative values he credits to himself and his woman; we are all familiar with the conception of the woman as saint, as the far-off worshipful object, the being 'unsplotted from the world', a conception created again and again by the male lover, in life and in art. On the subject of jealousy (p. 32 *et seq.*) again, Dr. Hutton appears confused. She writes: 'Jealousy is always an off-shoot of the demand for love, never of active loving' (p. 35), but on the next page adds, 'This account does not perhaps altogether explain sexual jealousy—a jealousy concerned with actual physical relations'. In the first place, *all* jealousy has a sexual element in it, we discover, if we penetrate deep enough. Secondly the statement that jealousy is never an off-shoot of active loving is surely unfounded. It is obvious that the giver of love, who feels intense uncertainty as to the acceptance of this gift, and then sees himself put aside for another, is just the person to feel the pangs of jealousy—Dr. Hutton may claim that this love is of infantile type, but the infant gives, as well as demands, emotion, only its demands operate in a fantasy world, as may be the case with the jealous adult. For instance when the adult most seeks to give out what he has within him, he may be also most dominated by castration anxiety which renders him impotent, possibly both psychically and physically, and hence his jealousy of the actual or possible rival. As a fact analysis shews us that there is no human emotion into which jealousy may not enter.

On the whole subject of selfishness Dr. Hutton is making, it seems, only a conscious interpretation and so fails to get at useful conclusions. Though

disclaiming, and even definitely condemning, 'rough and ready interpretations' too often it is just such interpretation we get. An extreme example of this is found in the chapter on 'Emotional Friendships', where we read, with surprise: 'The love of an emotionally mature person is not ambivalent. It does not exact, therefore it meets with no intolerable frustration: and there is no place for resentment or hostility'.

One can only affirm that this is an entire misconception. There is no love, indeed no emotion of any kind, which has not some ambivalency in it, however mature the lovers may be, and it is impossible that resentment or hostility should not have some place, although with greater understanding and a more real maturity it may be hoped that intolerable frustration can be avoided.

In Chapter IV, 'Sexual Inversion', we see again a good deal of unproven statement. For example, 'Both sexes tend during adolescence to go through an emotionally homosexual phase, accompanied as a rule by no physical sexual feelings whatever'. The physical sexual feelings, it is true, will very often be disguised as manifestations *apparently* non-sexual, but surely Dr. Hutton must be perfectly familiar with the headaches, back-aches, and malaise of the adolescent girl or boy, things which correct interpretation will appreciate as forms of sexual disturbance.

In the last chapter, 'Adjustments', Dr. Hutton has some wise and helpful advice to give, especially in her concluding reminder that in spite of her great difficulties, the 'lonely woman' has some alleviation if 'the forces at work are understood, and the rich resources of life in our present age tested in a spirit of adventurous enquiry'.

Certainly a book to stimulate thought in the general public, and to suggest a new point of view on matters too often met with mere prejudice.

Barbara Low.



The Growing Child and Its Problems. Edited by Emanuel Miller. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, 1937. Pp. 228. Price 6s. net.)

The scope of this volume of Essays, contributed by seven different authors, is best described by the editor himself. He writes that the aim of the book is, 'to provide insight into problems presented by the mental growth of children from five years of age to the close of adolescence. It is also hoped that guidance too will be obtained in steering children through the difficulties encountered in these years when school life begins and presents to the child special stress'.

Any book of this kind is bound to suffer from a certain degree of redundancy and some lack of continuity, but apart from such inevitable drawbacks the book presents a very clear and interesting picture of the environmental influences, the main needs, and the most important problems of the nursery-child, the school-age child, and the adolescent.

Since the book is intended for the intelligent general public, above all for parents and teachers, not much reference is made to the deeper levels of mind, nor to technicalities, but it is obvious that the authors are familiar with the work of the last thirty years or more, which has revealed, under the leadership of Freud, the hitherto buried aspects of human personality and its important mechanisms.

It forms an excellent companion to another volume of Essays dealing with many of the same themes, but treated from a deeper standpoint, the volume entitled *On the Bringing up of Children*, edited by Dr. John Rickman, and containing contributions from five psycho-analysts. In this the writers concentrate mainly upon basic developmental factors, such as early frustration, conflicts due to the ambivalency of the parent-child relationship, and to the setting up of internal standards. The former set of Essays seeks to illustrate by concrete examples these various psychological situations. This is specially well carried out in 'Habits' by Dr. Paterson Brown, in 'The Adolescent Girl' by Dr. Laura Hutton, in 'Neurosis in School-Children' by Dr. Burns, and in the last Essay by the editor—'Problems of the Growing Child'. Two Essays give valuable practical lines of guidance for the teacher (who may be parent or nurse)—'The Child's Needs and His Play', by Gwen E. Chesters, and 'Educational Guidance' by Constance Simmins. In the former, a 'Play Chart' is introduced, supplying a guide to the type of material suitable for various aspects of development at various ages. These different aspects are classified under each heading as 'Free Play', 'Constructive Play', 'Acting Play', 'Physical Play', 'Musical Play', 'Social Games', etc., and though sometimes a little arbitrary and sometimes overlapping, the very rich selection of material appropriate to each stage, based on psychological needs, will be of real value to educators. It is good to note that this chart starts off with a heading named 'Social Provision', under which we read: 'At all ages, material required, contemporary and sympathetic adult companionship'. Even though there is a very considerable advance in understanding of the young child's needs, it is remarkable how often we meet with the absence of 'sympathetic adult companionship'. Mothers, nurses, and even teachers often assume that the young child (the child up to three or four) has no use for intelligent adult companionship, whereas, as this Essay points out, many needs can be satisfied by the friendly adults, above all in respect to affording the child reassurance and stability.

In the second Essay of a predominantly practical nature, 'Educational Guidance' by Constance Simmins, there is more debatable material. The author attaches importance to intelligence tests, of which she says: 'A good intelligence test measures a child's power of education, his ability to "get the hang of things", to put two and two together', and continues with a still more arguable proposition, 'Each individual is endowed at

birth with a certain definite amount of this mental power or "general ability", which normally increases during childhood until it reaches its maximum about the age of sixteen'.

The second statement appears to have no foundation in fact, and so far nothing worthy the name of evidence has been established in its favour. Even if it were a fact, the conflicts of the individual can so much retard and distort development, that it is impossible to say at any given stage, 'Thus far and no further'. All experience confirms this, whether in the sphere of outstanding personalities or more average ones. One thinks of Clive of India, the backward dullard, to all seeming, until he reached manhood, when he displayed such gifts of clear perception, vigorous initiative, and general capacity; of Oliver Cromwell and his fumbling obscure early life, and of a whole host of like instances in every field of human activity.

Among the more psychological Essays in the volume, one of the most interesting is 'The Adolescent Girl' by Dr. Laura Hutton, which gives a very full and understanding account of the conflicts, and the causes, of this stage of development. She traces the earliest emotional relationships in the girl-child's life, and their effects upon her potential love-life with great clarity and sympathy. Perhaps the only criticism which is called for is in respect to her views on imparting sex-knowledge. Here Dr. Hutton seems, rather strangely, to overlook some of the very truths she has already demonstrated so clearly. She emphasizes again and again, and rightly so, how onerous is the girl's task of growing up, how fraught with intense conflict is the triangular situation between little girl, mother and father—'Beside it any adult drama grows pale', to quote her own words—yet a few pages later we are told in reference to giving information about the sex act itself, and the producing and suckling of a child, 'There is no embarrassment when real interest has been aroused'. Why not, one asks, since these matters are bound up with the deepest unconscious emotions—love, hate, rivalry, guilt—of the girl? Indeed, one would be inclined to feel disquieted if no embarrassment should manifest itself, and, as Dr. Hutton says: 'To talk or act as if the intellectual interest of the subject were all we were concerned with is to be insincere and is probably evidence of that same fear and condemnation of sexuality so common in the older generation'. Here, surely, is some contradiction.

In an interesting section on homosexuality, Dr. Hutton expresses the view that 'the homosexual phase of adolescence accepted by some psychologists in my opinion is not an inevitable stage through which all boys and girls must pass, but is rather the product of an educational system, which as a general rule separates the sexes . . . at the very time when sexual love is dawning'. The known facts would hardly seem to bear out such a theory. Whether separated or whether association between the sexes is freely encouraged as in some of the 'advanced' schools, whether day or

boarding-schools are in question, all the evidence seems to show that the homosexual phase is a reality and needs expression: by non-recognition a great deal of disadvantageous frustration may be brought about, with important consequences for later emotional development.

But in spite of some disagreement, this Essay ranks as one of the most significant, and best-written, in the volume.

Some of the topics dealt with by Dr. Miller in his Essay on 'Problems of the Growing Child' are similar to those handled by Dr. Hutton, for instance, 'Homosexuality in the Adolescent Boy' (not girl), 'Parental Influence, the Giving of Sexual Information', and this concluding chapter forms a kind of general summing-up. It is written with enlightened and sympathetic understanding, but perhaps there is a rather strong tendency (one shewn also by other authors in this volume) to invoke 'common-sense' in some of the difficult situations—a flight, surely, rather than a solution! In speaking of sexual disturbances at the onset of adolescence, Dr. Miller says: 'It is important to deal with such problems in two ways. Firstly to see that a *matter-of-fact sexual enlightenment* is given to boys before puberty comes on', and, 'Passionate parental attachments should be dealt with as early as possible . . . by a *matter-of-fact naturalness* with regard to bodily functions' (the italics are my own).

Now in such examples—and various other instances might be given—is there not an attempt to turn what is, and must remain, a mystery, infused with emotion, into something ordinary and rational—an attempt which would seem to show some fear? For sex is not a 'matter of fact' affair and it hardly seems the function of the psychologist to distort and disguise. Indeed Dr. Miller himself is at pains to repudiate such distortion, and he reminds us at the beginning of his Essay that 'the deep instructural and emotional bonds between parents and children remain for all practical purposes the same'—out of which bonds arise sexual developments in the child.

It will be realized that this volume is an interesting publication, well worth thoughtful attention.

Barbara Low.

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Child at Play. By Marjorie Thorburn. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1937. Pp. 187. Price 6s.)

Mrs. Thorburn publishes a faithful record of her little girl's spontaneous activities uninterrupted by suggestions from without. The child's play during the first four years of life was observed at intervals and noted. Both its general trend at certain ages and some periods in greater detail are described. The book has a Foreword by Dr. Susan Isaacs and ends with the conclusions the author draws from the observations she has made. She deduces from the play ways in which the child meets emotional diffi-

culties, advances socially, and will probably face like situations in later life. These deductions, as well as the records, are full of interest for the psycho-analyst.

Notable in this child's play are the close identification with mother and nurse, the attempt to do what they did, the adherence to 'reality' (especially domestic) activities, and the rejection of playthings in the accepted sense, all of which brings us further evidence, from a fresh source, of the fact so well known to child analysts, viz. that types of spontaneous play are closely related to the choice of ego-defence. An interesting study of different types of play in relation to character-development, and some deductions as to the normal rate of development in play might possibly be based on great numbers of such impartial records of the play of 'normal' children.

H. Sheehan-Dare.

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Early One Morning. By Walter de la Mare. (Faber & Faber, London. Pp. 605. Price 21s. net.)

Walter de la Mare has brought to the making of this book the veritable cream of memories, sayings, stories and verses of childhood gathered from literature extending from the third century to the present time. The range of personalities is remarkable; the children whom he cites grew up to be distinguished people in adult life. To illustrate any specific theme the author brings in bewildering succession quotations from the records of children, not only widely separated by years or centuries but by nature and gifts. Mathematician and theologian, poet and man of arms, saint and sinner, recluse and publicist are found in this compendium of recorded experiences of childhood.

The author divides his material into three parts which he calls (1) Early Life, (2) Early Memories, (3) Early Writings. In the first part Walter de la Mare while disclaiming any expert psychological knowledge nevertheless quotes at some length statistics and opinions gained from the works of psychologists. These are valuable as far as they go. But they are incongruous when one considers the true nature of this book, a record of individual children's experiences, the fascination of which is individuality.

The second part comprises a wonderful collection of children's recorded sayings and writings on such immensely vital interests as clothes, dolls, toys, play, food, woes, night-fears, school, bullies and 'the hidden' (i.e. the sexual).

De la Mare's own unobstructed imagination has made it possible for him to garner this particular harvest and to see these occupations and pre-occupations of a child's mind with something of the same serious import as they are by children themselves.

In Part III, one gets into closer contact with the mental output of individual children for the author quotes verse and prose at some length. One is less distracted by a swift succession of quotations comparing and contrasting children's phantasy life.

Walter de la Mare makes no more than an occasional passing reference to the psycho-analyst. He disclaims any knowledge that would justify him in dealing with his material from any profound psychological point of view. The book is not intended for scientific study. Yet no one who is interested in children could put down this book after reading it without regret that the author has nothing more to offer. To a psycho-analyst it appears a golden opportunity lost.

Surely here is collected the most poignant witness of the sufferings of children down the ages. These children were articulate, giving the world in later years, art and song and service distilled from suffering. What of the army of the inarticulate? Unless we demand more from the author of a book like this we are of that unthinking mass who are content to say of recordings like these, 'How quaint!' 'How sweet!' 'How pitiful!'. Once identified with that mass we are not in a very different place from those who once acquiesced in driving children up chimneys and sweating them in mines; gross physical cruelty may have ceased, but subtler psychological forms flourish among us like the bay tree.

The psycho-analyst should read this book. It impresses one again with the urgency of the task of alleviating the mental suffering of children not only for their own sakes but for those of their children's children. The iniquity of the fathers that is visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generation is rooted in childhood fear and suffering. This book abundantly illustrates the fact.

The practising psycho-analyst has little time to get into touch with so great a range of past experience as is collected in this book and thus it supplies a real need.

Here are two examples out of the thousands of thought-provoking records of childhood. (1) Of Thomas Hardy it is recorded (p. 301), that at fifteen years of age he hastened before breakfast with a telescope to a hill on the heath, in order to witness the execution of a prisoner on the gallows in front of a gaol a quarter of a mile away. It was the *second* execution he had witnessed, the first (when he was twelve) having been that of an 'ill-used' woman—when 'he stood close to the gallows'. He could remember in detail his grandmother's account of the burning of a woman for poisoning her husband.

Thomas Hardy wrote *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*!

(2) 'When Ibsen was eight years he took to a paint box—copying pictures out of books. Then as monkeys and other "uglies" he would caricature his brother and sister when he was angry with them. Later, he

cut his paintings out, paraded them on cardboard, and with little wooden blocks for base paraded them as characters for a kind of doll theatre. He hated anybody touching it: it was his solitary joy. There could hardly be a more condensed epitome of his life's work' (p. 223).

From doll's theatre to 'The Doll's House' in fact. From those unforgettable women in his plays we think back to his sister who played with dolls, and the significance of the mood and temper in Ibsen's plays is to be understood as a derivative of the mood and temper of his childhood's play.

Of such records as these two is this book made, but only 'he who runs may read'.

Ella Freeman Sharpe.



The Self in Psychology. By A. H. B. Allen. (Psyche Monographs No. 5. Kegan Paul, London, 1935. Pp. 282. Price 10s. 6d.)

This is a book which, because of the difficult, elusive and highly controversial nature of its subject, will probably make but little appeal to the general reader of psychological literature, but which will prove very useful to the student concerned with the special problem with which the author deals. It is an elaborate and critical review of modern speculation, observation and experimentation dealing with, or bearing on, the nature of the Self. Psycho-Analysts will regret that more consideration is not given to the psycho-analytic concept of the ego which has emerged as a consequence of Freud's formulations in *The Ego and the Id* and of subsequent attempts to make these formulations more precise. On the other hand they may well profit from the author's survey of the experimentalists' endeavours to describe introspectively the nature of the self, as revealed in various processes of willing, feeling and cognizing. As a result of his review the author concludes that the evidence at present available is in favour of the theory that selfhood is present in *all* mental life, 'obscurely in the earlier, with clear consciousness in the later stages'. He is thus opposed to the alternative views (both of which can boast of eminent advocates), (1) that the self is at bottom almost an illusion and that mental life is little more than just a series of contents, and (2) that the self is something, 'the emergence of which is contingent and which appears more or less late in the history of mental development'.

J. C. F.



New Frontiers of the Mind. By J. B. Rhine. (Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1938. Pp. 278. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

In this book Professor Rhine gives an abridged and popular account of certain experiments conducted under his direction into the possibilities of telepathy and telesthesia (clairvoyance). The subjects were required to

name a card they could not see. Usually this card was taken from the top of a shuffled pack by the experimenter ; but in tests for pure telepathy he merely thought of it, and in tests for pure telesthesia he did not examine it until after the experiment. Since there were five types of card the chance score was one in five. Most subjects, as we should expect, came somewhere near this figure. But a few averaged far higher scores even over a long series of trials. These in Professor Rhine's terminology possessed the power of extra-sensory perception (ESP).

The attitude of the reader to such results will probably depend on his personal philosophy. If it includes a place for what is called the supernatural he would have accepted them on a tenth of the evidence Professor Rhine brings in their support. If it includes no such place he would have rejected them even if they had been confirmed by all the psychological laboratories of Europe and America. Everyone's unconscious retains its infantile belief in animism and magic ; but whether he consciously denies or defends this belief depends not only on rational considerations, but also upon the nature of his mechanisms for dealing with anxiety.

R. Money-Kyrle.



Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. 1st Vol. : *Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes.* By Norbert Elias. (Academia Verlag Prag Vorabdruck, 1937. Pp. 327.)

We refer to our mode of living, habits, customs, moral standards and so on as civilization. What is considered as 'civilized' behaviour is, however, subject to constant development. Its standards are by no means absolute but change from one country to another and from one period to another in the same country. This standard is always set by the ruling class in each society and shews a similar curve of development in the Western European countries. In some epochs the change is a more rapid one than in others, and its repercussions are therefore more obvious to the consciousness of the contemporaries. It is a process, the nature, causes, direction and means of which we are just now beginning to realize.

Here is a work approaching this subject, not by means of more or less vague and speculative generalizations, but by concrete and sober data. The author, who has seen what seems to be the general direction of this process, puts representative documents of each epoch on the stage and lets them speak for themselves. He produces examples of the actual behaviour in situations which have not hitherto usually been made the object of historical research. We are shewn how, in different countries, people in polite society behaved at table, in speech, what their attitude was towards sexual matters, defæcation, urination and other similar activities, as for instance, spitting, blowing one's nose, etc. This evidence is collected under the headings of such natural functions and, as centuries

march past, the curve of the development of the social taboos emerges only the more clearly, as under time-concentration. This curve shews the same general characteristics in all the fields under review. Contrary to what we would perhaps expect, there is an ever increasing severity and specification of these social restrictions. The reasons for this will be dealt with in a second volume of the present work. Obviously they are to be found in the ever increasing difficulty and complexity of social life. They cannot be of a primarily psychological nature because that would mean that a tendency in a definite direction is inherent in the psyche itself, an assumption which we, as natural scientists, see no reason to make. On the contrary, what forms the content and object of our mental life (and, for that matter, of psychology) is of necessity being constantly modified by these 'external' circumstances. This statement might surprise psycho-analysts for the moment and even shock them, until they understand that psycho-analysis alone holds the key position for a scientific understanding of this process (which key position is fully realized and conceded to psycho-analysis by some modern sociologists, such as Elias): namely, in shewing how the restrictions which society demands are communicated to the growing child until they become second nature, and why and in what way the prohibitions accumulated in history become transferred to each new generation. What the author is able to shew is that the regulations which had to be forced upon the individual by the living conditions of society gradually become more and more internalized. What has been an external conflict (a 'real' one), becomes an internal one. Originally the individual is much more at liberty to give vent to his aggressiveness, but at the same time much more at the mercy of his fellow beings. Life, therefore, is far more insecure and there is much more reason for fear from external dangers. More and more, however, the application of crude physical force and violence is monopolized by the State. Correspondingly aggressive impulses have to be directed towards the inside and fear becomes internalized as well. At the same time the former personifications of inner fantastic anxieties are displaced from the outside world into the inner world of the person and become attached to the internalized objects (and into the 'unconscious').

All this, it should be noted, can be shewn to take place in historical times and there is no need to jump at once to hypothetical assumptions of prehistoric life. In short, this material is relevant for us as a contribution to the historical understanding of ego and super-ego formation. The fact that the individual has to arrive (and at an ever earlier age) at the level of civilization reached by its surrounding society, thereby passing through phases similar but not identical to the historical stages, is described as 'sociogenetic principle' (*soziogenetisches Grundgesetz*). The author calls his mode of approach as a whole 'sociogenetic'.

Psycho-analysis has hitherto tried to trace the sources of the all-important super-ego formation in the human species mainly in two directions: firstly, the phylogenetic, as a precipitation of pre-history (Œdipus complex); secondly, the psychogenetic, as an outcome of the history of the individual (in particular in this country). In addition to these two modes of approach we seem to get gradual access to material which opens the way for a third, and perhaps not less important, one, namely the sociogenetic (historical).

It need not be said that any one of these modes of approach cannot be meant to supersede, but only to supplement, the others, nor that there is no hard and fast line between them and that they are all the time linked up with each other and in a state of interaction. In fact they meet in the field of psycho-analysis, with its commanding outlook on every sphere of the human body and mind. Psycho-analysis is indeed indispensable as a link between them, but this our position, which we rightly value so highly, brings with it an obligation for the analyst at least to know what is behind the doors he may help to unlock. At the same time, the analyst is only human and must be economical with his time. Because the present reviewer can be credited with a full appreciation of this, he hopes it may be taken for more than a phrase when he says that every analyst who is at all aware of the importance of an understanding of social and historical processes should read this book for himself. He will find in it a wealth of information and an abundance of stimulation. Moreover, he will find it pleasant and compelling reading. It need scarcely be said, therefore, that for the benefit of the English reader an early translation of the book is highly desirable.

S. H. Fuchs.



The Mind of the Dog. By F. J. J. Buytendijk. (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1935. Pp. 215. Price 6s. 6d.)

The dog is an animal who lives in a unique relationship to man and between whom and man there is a unique bond of sympathy. Professor Buytendijk is inclined to attribute this to the fact that both are in a sense exiles from the straightforward simple life of nature. 'Through his mind which desires to know and *will* know, man no longer forms part of the natural world. He is no longer a member of one single milieu, but consciously realizes his own ego, his loneliness'. The dog, on his part, has forsaken the wolf pack and clung to man, and to a large extent exchanged his primitive gregariousness as a pack animal for a parasitic attachment to man, an attachment, however, which is not based merely on the fact that man is his 'source of food and comfort', but which has been possible because 'there is in man something that holds him fast. . . . Man is

more master of the dog than even the leader of the wolf pack ever was'. The security of the herd has been lost and as a substitute there is dependence on a human master. Thus, in both man and dog, love is nourished 'by the homesick longing for a vanished shelter' (anaclitic love, as Freud might call it). Thus, too, perhaps is developed the obedience to man, which seems to be based on love as well as fear and which it is so difficult for us to consider as based on anything other than a primitive conscience. But man also in all probability has developed his morality from the conditions of life in a primal horde, hence too, we may surmise (though Professor Buytendijk scarcely takes us thus far), the peculiar bond of moral sympathy in which man plays the rôle of super-ego.

In his adoption of the subordinate, dependent rôle the dog has been helped, the author thinks, by the development of certain 'youthful' instincts, playfulness, docility, acceptance; while many men on their part 'like nothing better than to have a dog which takes the attitude with regard to them that a puppy would display to its mother'. In addition to these and to the pack instincts (which have undergone the above-mentioned curious modification in the case of the dog) there are further tendencies in common, such as 'seeking out and tracking down', 'attack, defence, pursuit and flight' and 'living in lairs'. This last tendency makes the dog willing to share the abode that man provides, to find its way back to it and to be trained to cleanliness within it. Furthermore, sympathy between man and dog is fostered by the dog's rather unique power of giving bodily expression to its feelings and emotions—which enables man to feel in his turn that he 'understands' the dog.

The dog also displays some striking similarities to man in the sexual sphere. Professor Buytendijk recognizes the dog's tendency here to 'symbolic acts and to perversions that are not always recognized as such'. In other words it displays a liability to displacement of affect and a foundation of 'polymorphous perversity' (which makes its behaviour sometimes appear as a rather painful caricature of human sexuality). Above all, of course, the dog is unashamedly osphresiolagniac, in accordance with its greater dependence on the sense of smell, whereas man with his more developed sense of vision is more prone to scopophilia. It is greatly to be regretted that there has as yet appeared no thoroughgoing study of the sexual behaviour of the dog, which would surely be illuminating both as regards similarities to, and its differences from, human behaviour, as revealed by the modern researches of psycho-analysts and sexologists.

Though Professor Buytendijk adds little to our knowledge in this field, beyond calling attention to the relevance of Freudian concepts, his book contains an interesting and readable account of much experimental work in other directions. The dog's sense of smell, vision and hearing, its perception of form, its ability to follow a trail and the nature of the clues on

which it works, its methods of searching for an object, its memory and insight, the work of the Pavlov school on the establishment of conditioned reflexes—all these are treated briefly but adequately in separate chapters. Particularly elaborate are Konrad Most's experiments on tracking, carried out with the help of a specially conducted aerial railway which allowed of a man being carried along above the ground without touching it or of drops of odoriferous substance being deposited on the ground at any desired intervals.

Professor Buytendijk is cautious in the interpretation of the results of all the experiments he reports. In general he adopts the Gestalt point of view as regards the dog's perceptions and stresses the importance of whole situations, any one item of which, however, may become predominant when the dog is taught by circumstances to pay special attention to it. The dog, however, like the human being, tends to act upon the principle of least effort and is inclined to devote no more mental energy to a task than is absolutely necessary. But this does not prove that he is incapable of greater attention or discrimination when repeated failure of simpler methods induces him to make a greater call upon his mental powers. In all experiments, too, Professor Buytendijk is well aware of the possible influences of apparently irrelevant stimuli due to the unconscious behaviour of the human experimenter—a factor the full significance of which was gradually brought home to Pavlov and his pupils in the course of their prolonged researches: at the same time he is careful to point out that the absence of a human being, as in many of the later and more refined methods of experimentation, may deprive the dog of one of its powerful incentives to submit to training, an impulse the influence of which may in simpler experiments be added to that of the food-seeking impulse on which most investigators ostensibly rely to ensure the dog's co-operation.

The book appears to be intended for the intelligent 'dog lover' rather than for the student and the attractive illustrations it contains should undoubtedly increase its appeal to the general public. Nevertheless, one cannot help regretting the absence of a bibliography, which to many would have added to the usefulness of this pleasant and instructive little volume. The translation from the Dutch edition of 1932 is on the whole agreeable, though there is occasionally a slight ambiguity or vagueness (especially in dealing with the experiments described) which may be due either to some inexactitude on the part of the translator or to some inadequacy in the original description.

J. C. F.

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Twins: A Study of Heredity and Environment. By H. H. Newman, F. N. Freeman and K. S. Holzinger. (The University of Chicago Press, 1937. Pp. 369. Price 18s.)

The authors of this work, who are respectively experts in the study of genetics, of statistics and of psychology, have devoted ten years to the amassing of such a wealth of material—now presented in this book—as those interested in the subject had hardly dreamed of securing. The book opens with an account of investigations made in relation to fifty pairs of identical twins and the comparison of these with fifty pairs of like-sexed fraternal twins. The purpose of this was to arrive at a standard of comparison of the traits which may, with certainty or with probability, be looked for. In the second section of the book the findings thus obtained are compared with the most important part of the new material, namely, the results of investigation in relation to nineteen pairs of identical twins, i.e. twins of exactly the same heredity, who in every case had been separated at an early age, in most cases before they were a year old, and who were brought up apart from each other for periods varying from eleven to fifty years. Unfortunately the psychological side of the enquiry is confined to the sphere of achievements: the reader learns little of the way in which the subjects of the experiment had developed and next to nothing of their personalities, the method adopted being exclusively that of psychological tests. From motives of discretion and a desire to elude reporters, with their thirst for sensational news, the authors expressly state that they are not 'out to write stories'. Thus it comes about that far too little justice is done to the unique possibilities presented in this incomparable material. The final conclusion is disappointing but not surprising in view of the unpromising methods of investigation: what can be determined by heredity can also be determined by environment. It should be noted that the authors state that they are prepared to put at the disposal of those who are interested in the problem of heredity and environment the whole body of material which they have collected, part of which has not as yet been published at all. This is an offer which will be attractive to analysts no less than to other workers.

Martin Grotjahn.



The Chemistry of Thought. By Claude A. Claremont. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1935. Pp. 240. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

The title of Mr. Claremont's book is so happy, its aim and scope as set forth in the introduction sounds so realistic yet comprehensive, that we are led to expect great things. For what could be more appealing than this description (Introduction, p. 20) of his purpose?

'This book has no pretensions to be a philosophical book. It is the much more limited book of a scientist; of a scientist moreover, who is really writing science and not philosophy'; and again (Introduction, p. 22): 'The present work is of the synthetic type. It . . . results simply from marshalling certain facts, scientifically obtained, in their

bearing on a particular problem. It is accordingly limited, incomplete, and claims to see nothing but facts. It is not even hindered by philosophy and for that reason it lets itself see what is to be seen'.

One is a little inclined to recall: 'Methinks the lady doth protest too much', and to remind Mr. Claremont of two differing points involved. 'Facts', said Dickens' Mr. Gradgrind, 'give me facts—none of your fancies and feelings', and on that basis became the foolish coarse-grained tyrant. Again we are at the opposite pole in Shakespeare's dictum: 'There's nothing truly good or bad, but thinking makes it so'.

Is it quite scientific to be so positive about one's data, or again to make an abstract term stand for all the things one does not happen to like? Mr. Claremont seems to have a positive phobia of the word 'Philosophy', but is he convinced that a human being can exist without a philosophy, or as we might more simply state it, without some *point of view* (a belief in some conception of more universal validity than the isolated 'facts' of daily life, or a method of tolerating circumstance, or some idea of progress in human evolution)—which, howsoever it may shape itself, constitutes a 'Philosophy'. Indeed Mr. Claremont's own Philosophy appears to be an opposition to Philosophy! And why does he make this strange antithesis between Science and 'Philosophy'? The one does not necessarily exclude the other.

Professor Haldane, for example, holds as his 'Philosophy' the development of a Socialist Ideal—but this need not militate against his scientific knowledge and attitude.

No doubt 'orthodox' psychology has something to say both in agreement and disagreement concerning Mr. Claremont's book. It is full of interesting material and deals with many problems of mind and its mechanisms which are by no means yet settled, but it is from the psycho-analytical angle that I draw attention to some of its ideas. Mr. Claremont has divided his book into three sections—Part I: The Psychological Elements of which thought is composed; Part II: 'Application to the Arts'. Part III: 'Addenda', which comprises sub-sections on 'Why is the Montessori Method Scientifically Valid?' 'Causation, Necessity and Perception', 'Why not Behaviourism?' In his Introduction (p. 16) he gives his scheme for an 'alphabet' of thought, in his own words, 'a list of those fundamental happenings, out of which all thoughts are made up'. It is difficult in the light of psycho-analysis, to understand this list and the use of it, in my opinion, is bound to lead to incorrect inferences. The list (which, very surprisingly) the author notes 'looks simple', consists of the following elements:

The Complex Unit.

The Psychic Event by which Complex Units Become Combined.

The Element of Associative Recall.

The Direct Perception of Causation.

The Conative Element—Aim, Intention, Wish.

The 'Manipulative' Element.

The 'Character' Element.

It is a bewildering list, at times treating wholes as parts, at times parts as wholes, making impossible its application for use. In what relation, one asks, do these elements stand to one another, what is cause and what is fact, what is primary and what secondary?

For the psycho-analyst, to whom Wish or Aim (called by the author the 'Conative Element') is the fundamental dynamic, the first criticism arises concerning the assumption that the various elements in the above list are equal to and independent of the human wish, conscious and unconscious. Equally the element of 'Associative Recall' does not function *in vacuo*, but is dependent upon the conative element. Although this fundamental confusion affects many of the subsequent enquiries and conclusions, Mr. Claremont has undoubtedly a most interesting theme and deals with certain aspects of it very clearly, making use of vivid analogy and illustration. That many of the problems he raises need enquiry and solution is indisputable: the mechanism of thinking is full of complexity, and when the author deals with such matters as the child's grasp of a conception as a whole, the seemingly sudden resolution of problems hitherto obscure, the understanding of likeness and difference, the creative power, instinctive action, and all that is signified by what we call the artistic gift—he makes very interesting and often illuminating discussion.

Barbara Low.

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY

EDWARD GLOVER, GENERAL SECRETARY

The Fifteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress will be held in Paris from August 1 to August 5 inclusive. Members and Associate Members are reminded that notification of papers should be made to the International Secretary before May 1. Arrangements concerning accommodation, etc., are in the hands of the local Committee (Secretary: Dr. Raymond de Saussure, 12, rue de Chanoinesse, Paris IVe).

ERRATA

Membership List

Dr. Eduard Kronengold, Gusshausstrasse 5, Vienna IV, is a full Member, not an Associate Member as stated.

Omission

Dr. Ives Hendrick, 70, Chestnut Street, Boston (*Member*).

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COMMISSION

Edited by EDWARD BIBRING, Secretary of the I.T.C.

I. INTRODUCTION

At the Marienbad Congress, it was decided¹ to publish the report of each Training Institute separately. The I.T.C. reports now appear every year in the second part of the *JOURNAL* and the *Zeitschrift*.

In the following report, the first of its kind, we propose to make a comprehensive survey of the various training activities that have been carried on under the auspices of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. These activities are not entirely confined to the official Training Institutes of the I.P.A.; for alongside of them other educational organizations have grown up, such as the Training Centres and Study Groups; and there are also those members who live at a distance from their Society and whose work often includes some form of training.

In the following report we shall give an account of all the training activities that are being carried on by organizations and individuals working within the I.P.A., in so far, that is, as we have received information about them. In this way it will be possible to get a general view of the actual as well as the official training work that is being done under the auspices of the I.P.A.

¹ Cf. Bulletin, this *JOURNAL*, Vol. XVIII, p. 104, 1937.

Besides this aim of giving a more complete picture of psycho-analytical training activities, we should like to see the various reports presented in a fuller and more informative way. The reports of the Branch Societies naturally fulfil a different function from those of the training organizations. Communications about the training arrangements should deal with the *problems* of training as well, and, indeed, put them in the foreground, so as to form a supplement to the regular Circular Letters. Unfortunately not all of the Training Institutes have so far responded to this idea ; but we have every confidence that they will show a greater degree of co-operation in the future.

Before we present the separate reports and in order to make them properly intelligible, it will be necessary, I think, in a first communication of this kind, to make a few general remarks about the various kinds of training institutions that are in existence.

The status and organization of most of the bigger Institutes is well known to us. In spite of certain minor differences their aims and methods are in general the same. Their educational activities continue in undiminished or growing measure and shew a certain increase and advance of training work in child analysis and pedagogy.

Two of the Institutes have, incidentally, passed a milestone in the history of their career during the preceding year. The London Institute, together with the London Clinic, have celebrated the tenth year of their activity, and the Chicago Institute, the fifth ; and both have taken the occasion to publish a report covering those periods of work. (The reports are more fully discussed in this volume of the *JOURNAL* under the *Reviews*.)

The Institutes are, nevertheless, not identical in structure. That of the Berlin Institute has undergone a radical change. It has been incorporated with other therapeutic bodies in a central organization. This change, however, has affected not so much its training activities as its scientific discussions which now take place in common with the other bodies. Each body has its own candidates and its own methods of training them—although with certain exceptions, such as that the candidates of each body are admitted to the educational courses of every other body. What results these changes will have it is as yet too early to say.

The Indian Institute, founded in 1930, has from the beginning had an intimate connection with the University of Calcutta, in the person of its Director. It has, for instance, not made any special arrangements for a theoretical training of its candidates, because the University, in its curriculum for the faculty of Psychology, gives several lectures a week on the theory of Psycho-Analysis, and most of the candidates of the Institute are students of Psychology at the University. In addition to this, they are required to attend Dr. Bose's lectures on Psychiatry. The practical side of the training, however, is kept in the hands of the Society. The report

stresses the fact that at present, apart from the more general difficulties, the main handicap in this side of the work is the lack of properly trained control analysts.

The Sendai Institute, Japan, has similarly incorporated the lectures given by its Director at the University in its theoretical curriculum. In addition, lecture courses and seminars are held in various other places, but under the direct auspices of the Institute. So far, no report has been sent in about the practical training of candidates.

The Washington-Baltimore Psychoanalytic Society has also undergone extensive changes recently. The Society has no Institute of its own; but certain members have been especially designated to look after the theoretical side of training in analysis at the Washington School of Psychiatry. This educational institution, whose scope is much wider than that of psycho-analysis, is an independent organization, established by the William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation. But between its Executive and the Training Committee of the Washington-Baltimore Society there exists a close union, both as regards the staff and the work done; and this finds expression in an agreement that 'the local Society shall have authority over all psycho-analytic training in the school. The board of directors of the school has passed appropriate resolutions designating the members of the local society's Training Committee as the psycho-analytic faculty in the school'. In fact, therefore, the psycho-analytical teaching at the Washington School of Psychiatry is identical with the educational work of the Washington-Baltimore Society and may thus be included in the reports of the Society. No information has been sent regarding the practical training of candidates.

Next after the official Training Institutes come the Societies with Training Centres. These Centres are dependent upon certain individual members and are authorized, with the consent of the I.T.C., to give psycho-analytical training. They do not, however, exercise any other rights of the official Training Institutes. At present there are three Societies that are in this way entitled to train candidates—the Swedish-Finnish, the Danish-Norwegian and the Italian. In Stockholm, Dr. Jekels was in charge of the official Training Centre for over three years. But the Centre was dissolved in June, 1937, on account of a lack of suitable applicants, and Dr. Jekels went back to Vienna. Since then Frau Dr. Tamm, President-Secretary of the Swedish-Finnish Society, who is an authorized training analyst, has carried on the work of training single-handed.

Finally, there are those analysts in regular practice who, whether specifically authorized to train or not, very frequently give lectures or pursue some other educational activity. A summary of their work will be given at the end of the separate reports.

In conclusion, I should like to make a few remarks, of a rather random

kind, about some of the more noteworthy points in the reports. The programmes of work of the Training Institutes seem to be based upon two different principles. On the one hand the aim seems to be to map out a systematic course of study as is done in a faculty at a University. The Institutes which follow this line have elaborated an obligatory curriculum which covers most of what has to be learnt. It takes the form of courses of lectures and seminars which are more or less fixed and are completed every year or every two years. Besides this there are papers read and Study Circles formed at which attendance is voluntary. They are more particularly intended to meet the actual, day-to-day requirements of the student, who is also sometimes the reader of the paper. Other Institutes arrange their programme almost entirely with a view to such current requirements. In that case the lectures and seminars, etc., are not so strictly mapped out; and the reader of a paper is more often able to take as his topic whatever field of interest is occupying his mind at the moment. —All these questions which are connected with the building up of a systematic plan of psycho-analytical teaching in its various branches of knowledge deserve greater attention and ought one day to be made the subject of a thorough-going discussion.

As far as methods of instruction are concerned, conversations have recently been begun between the Institutes. A detailed report of them will shortly appear in the various analytic journals.

The introduction of one or two new features in the programmes of study may be noted in passing. (1) A seminar on the 'Origins and Treatment of Forms of Defence as Illustrated by Case-Material' has been set up in Prague. The aim of its members is to 'make a contribution, by work done in common, to our practical and theoretical knowledge of the mental defences, by the study of clinical material'. For this purpose, 'we endeavour, in suitable cases, to discover certain types of defensive behaviour, to understand their origin and to find out how to deal with them psycho-analytically'. A more detailed report of this undertaking will be given elsewhere. (2) The newly-introduced 'Conversation Groups' are being continued in Vienna. They were started two years ago, and consist of a small group of five or six candidates under the direction of a training analyst. The meetings take place once a week and last for one hour. No papers are read but any subject which happens to arise in the course of discussion is talked over in an informal way. These 'Conversation Groups' are a useful adjunct to the candidate's training, since each takes an active part in them and the analyst in charge of the group is able to gain a more intimate knowledge of the methods of work, needs and difficulties of each candidate. (3) During the past year a 'Scientific Study Group' has been formed. Its purpose is to educate candidates in the scientific side of their subject. Consequently it imposes a higher intel-

lectual standard and at the same time provides a suitable debating ground for any new ideas or new work that have appeared in the various fields of psycho-analysis. When more is known about how all these new ventures turn out in practice, the I.T.C. will give a full account of them in its communications.

II. REPORTS

A. TRAINING INSTITUTES

BOSTON PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE

1936-1937

The Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute has confined its activities this year solely to various kinds of seminars, and eliminated Society meetings. This policy was felt to be necessary because the organization of the group was of such a nature that a stronger emphasis had to be laid upon training work.

Seminars : Dr. Helene Deutsch, technical seminar. Dr. Hanns Sachs, clinical seminar. Dr. Isador H. Coriat, Freud's Clinical Papers. Drs. Helene Deutsch and Hanns Sachs, Theoretical Problems. Dr. John M. Murray, Problems of Adolescence.

Number of Candidates (in various stages of training) : 24. The majority of these are medical candidates, training as therapists. The others are being trained in order that they may apply psycho-analysis in their special fields.

Training Analysts for the Coming Year : Dr. Isador H. Coriat, Dr. Helene Deutsch, Dr. Ives Hendrick, Dr. M. Ralph Kaufman (Chairman of the Educational Committee), Dr. John M. Murray, Dr. Hanns Sachs.

Mrs. Beata Rank was appointed control analyst for candidates for child analysis.

Dr. John M. Murray was elected as representative to the Council on Professional Training of the American Psychoanalytic Association for a period of three years.

M. Ralph Kaufman.

CHICAGO INSTITUTE FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS

October 1, 1936-June 30, 1937

[No information has been received of the number of candidates, names of training and control analysts or membership of the training committee.]

Scientific Activities

The research work of the Institute has been mainly concerned this year with the problem of asthma. The material consists of three cases of hay-fever and sixteen of attacks of asthma, and twelve analysts were engaged in the treatment of them. Some of the cases have meanwhile been completed and are at present being discussed by the group as a whole. In

addition to these discussions an attempt is being made to verify the correctness of certain provisional hypotheses on a larger number of cases. For this purpose the Institute is employing the Murray Tests. In these a standard set of pictures is shown to the patient, and the phantasies which they stimulate in him help to give an idea of some of the characteristic mechanisms in his personality.—Work upon respiration-curves, hypertension and dream mechanisms is also being continued.

Lectures and Seminars

(1) For Members and Candidates :

Dr. Franz Alexander and Dr. Therese Benedek : Clinical Conferences.
 Dr. Thomas M. French : Quantitative and Comparative Dream Studies.
 Dr. Leon J. Saul : Seminar on Freud's Case-Histories.
 Dr. Thomas M. French : Mechanism of Individual Neuroses.
 Dr. Thomas M. French : Dream Seminar.
 Dr. Thomas M. French : Seminar on Review of Psychoanalytic Literature.

Dr. Therese Benedek : Seminar on Freud's Papers on Technique.

Dr. Franz Alexander : Technique of Dream Interpretation.

Dr. Franz Alexander : Theory and Technique of Psychoanalytic Therapy.

(2) For Professional Groups :

Dr. Franz Alexander and Dr. Thomas M. French : Psychoanalytic Interpretations of Psychotic Cases.

Dr. Helen V. McLean : Application of Psychoanalysis to Literature.

Dr. Leon J. Saul and Dr. Catherine Bacon : Case Seminar for Psychiatric Social Workers.

Dr. Franz Alexander : Psychological Problems in Social Case Work.

Dr. Gregory Zilboorg : History of Medical Psychology.

Dr. Gregory Zilboorg : Psychology and Sociology of Suicide.

Franz Alexander.

GERMAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Teaching and Training Activities, 1936-1937

Number of Candidates, 14. *Attendance*, 29 to 59.

Training Committee : C. Müller-Braunschweig (Chairman), Boehm, Kemper, Ada Müller-Braunschweig, Schultz-Hencke, Roellenbleck.

Training and Control Analysts : C. Müller-Braunschweig, Boehm, Kemper, Ada Müller-Braunschweig.

Lectures and Seminars

May-July, 1936. W. Kemper, Specialized Study of the Neuroses.
 H. Schultz-Hencke, Practical Exercises in Dream Interpretation. F. Boehm, Seminar on the Novel. C. Müller-Braunschweig, Study Circle for the Investigation of the Development of the Infant. Ada Müller-

Braunschweig, Pedagogic Seminar. E. Roellenbleck, Theoretical Literature. F. Boehm, Technical Seminar. F. Boehm, Polyclinic evenings.

October, 1936–April, 1937. C. Müller-Braunschweig, A Systematic Account of Psycho-Analysis: methods, discoveries and theories; the development of the child, the family, the theory of instincts. W. Kemper, A Systematic Account of Psycho-Analysis: Specialized study of neuroses. W. Kemper, Biology and Psychology of the Sexual Processes. F. Boehm, Strindberg in the Light of Psycho-Analysis. Schultz-Hencke, The Fundamental Rule of Psycho-Analysis as a Psychological Problem. Schultz-Hencke, Dream-Interpretation. F. Boehm and C. Müller-Braunschweig, Technical Seminar. Ada Müller-Braunschweig, Pedagogic Seminar. E. Roellenbleck, Theoretical Literature.

In addition, the following papers were read at the *German Institute for Psychological Research and Psycho-Therapy*: C. Müller-Braunschweig: 'The Theory of Psycho-Analysis'. F. Boehm: 'The Practice of Psycho-Analysis'. Schultz-Hencke: 'Destiny and Neurosis'.

April–June, 1937. C. Müller-Braunschweig, A Systematic Account of Psycho-Analysis: methods, discoveries and theories; Part III, the theory of dreams, general theory of the neuroses, anxiety, etc. F. Boehm, Seminar on the Literature of Case-Histories. W. Kemper, Seminar on the Technique of Analytic Therapy: transference, resistance, etc. Schultz-Hencke, Seminar on Dream-Interpretation. E. Roellenbleck, Seminar on Theoretical Literature. F. Boehm and C. Müller-Braunschweig, Technical Seminar. Ada Müller-Braunschweig, Pedagogic Seminar.

In addition, the following papers were read at the *German Institute for Psychological Research and Psycho-Therapy*: C. Müller-Braunschweig: 'The Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis'. H. Schultz-Hencke: 'Clinical Propædæutics: Removal of an Anamnesia'.

Carl Müller-Braunschweig.

INSTITUTE OF THE HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1936–1937

Candidates

September, 1936: Total Number, 31

Fresh entrants 10

Passed out 11

Elected Associate Members 2

July, 1937: Total Number, 30

Training and Control Analysts: As in preceding year.

Lectures and Seminars

(1) Lectures and Papers:

Dr. I. Hollós, Introduction to Psycho-Analysis.

Frau Dr. L. G. Hajdu, Schizophrenia.

Frau Dr. F. K. Hann, Ego-Psychology.

(2) Seminars :

Frau V. Kovács, Technical Seminar.

Frau Dr. M. Dubovitz, Seminar for Child-Analysis.

Dr. I. Herman, Theoretical Seminar : Dream-Interpretation.

Frau A. Bálint, Technical Pro-Seminar.

Frau K. Lévy, Introductory Seminar for Teachers.

Frau E. Gyömrői, Seminar for more Advanced Teachers.

Frau E. Gyömrői, Discussion Evenings for Mothers and Teachers.

Imre Hermann.

THE INDIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

[No statistics of candidates have been received.]

Lectures. At present, Candidates are required, for the purpose of instruction in psychiatry and psycho-analysis, to attend four times a week, for one year, the Psychological Clinic conducted by Dr. G. Bose at the Carmichael College; and once a week, for two years, the lectures on psycho-analysis given by him at the University College of Science.

Practical Training. Until a Psycho-Analytical Clinic is started by the Institute itself and sufficient accommodation is provided, control analysis by candidates cannot be efficiently carried out.

Training and Control Analysts : Dr. G. Bose, Lt.-Col. Berkeley-Hill, Mr. Haripada Maithi, Mr. Manmatha Nath Banerji, Dr. S. C. Mitra.

M. N. Banerji,

Secretary.

THE LONDON INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

Candidates

June 30, 1936

In training for Adult Analysis	19
In training for Child Analysis (one of whom is also in adult training)	2
Total Number	20
On Waiting List	2

Three candidates received permission to practise, one transferred to another Training Institute and one resigned.

June 30, 1937

In Training for Adult Analysis	16
In Training for Child Analysis	3
In Control Analysis (of these, two are doing Child Analysis)	9
On Waiting List	4

Control Analysts : Dr. Brierley, Miss Sharpe, Dr. Rickman, Mr. Strachey, Mrs. Riviere, Mrs. Klein, Dr. Payne, Dr. Schmideberg, Miss Sheehan-Dare, Dr. Isaacs, Miss Searl, Dr. Jones and Dr. Glover.

Lectures and Seminars

(1) Courses of Lectures :

Dr. Schmideberg, Child Analysis.

Dr. Carroll, Psychiatry.

Mr. Money-Kyrle, Anthropology.

A supplementary course on Anthropology was given by Dr. Róheim during his visit to this country.

(2) Practical Seminars : Mrs. Klein, Dr. Rickman, Dr. Jones, Dr. Glover, Miss Searl.

(3) Theoretical Seminars : Dr. Brierley.

(4) Child Seminars : Mrs. Klein.

(5) Public Lectures : Dr. Rickman, Dr. K. Stephen, Prof. Flugel, Miss B. Low : ' Special Problems of Every-Day Life '. (Five lectures, open to the public.)

Dr. D. W. Winnicott : ' Disturbances of Childhood '. (Five lectures for doctors and medical students.)

Dr. Géza Róheim : ' Psycho-Analysis of the Social Relations of Primitives '. (For Anthropologists and those interested in the subject.)

A Joint Meeting between Members of the Training Committee and other British Training Analysts and Control Analysts was held on March 10. Various matters concerning training were discussed, and a guiding resolution passed.

Edward Glover.

NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE

1936-1937

[No information has been received concerning the number of candidates, names of Training and Control Analysts or membership of the Training Committee.]

Division of Professional Training

Dr. S. Rado, Freud's Work on the Neuroses.

Dr. S. Rado, Outlines of Technique.

Dr. S. Rado, Clinical Conferences.

Dr. David M. Levy, Experimental Aspects of Child Psychology (Seminar).

Dr. Lawrence S. Kubie, Freud's Case Histories (Seminar).

Dr. Karen Horney, Clinical Conferences.

Dr. S. Lorand, Seminar on the Study of Freud's Papers on Technique.

Dr. F. Deutsch (by invitation), Psycho-Somatic Problems.

Dr. A. Kardiner, Dynamic Sociology (Seminar).

Dr. B. D. Lewin, Interpretation of Clinical Material (Conference).

Extension Division

Dr. I. T. Broadwin, Application of Psycho-Analysis to Social Work (Seminar for advanced Social Workers).

Drs. C. Binger, G. E. Daniels, H. F. Dunbar, A. Kardiner, P. R. Lehrman, S. Lorand, M. D. Mayor, C. P. Oberndorf, and T. P. Wolfe, The Psycho-analytic Approach to Practical Problems of General Medicine (Physician's Seminar).

Dr. Edward Liss, The Contribution of Psychoanalysis to Progressive Education (Teacher's Seminar).

PARIS INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

Candidates

Total number, no information received.

In Training Analysis	13
In Control Analysis	11

Lectures and Seminars

Ch. Odier, Introduction to Psycho-Analysis.

J. Leuba, The Concept of Sexuality and its Intermediate Stages.

R. Allendy, The Interpretation of Dreams.

M. Cenac, Compulsion.

R. Laforgue, Dream-Interpretation in Psycho-Analytical Treatment.

R. Spitz, Experimental Psychology of the Child in its First Year of Life.

Mme. M. Bonaparte, Theory of the Instincts.

P. Schiff, Criminology.

S. Nacht, Disturbances of Sexuality.

Mme. M. Bonaparte, Frigidity in Women.

R. Loewenstein, Sexual Impotence.

G. Parcheminey, Hysteria.

Mme. S. Morgenstern, The Significance and Clinical Importance of Phantasies in Children.

J. Leuba, The Family Neurosis.

A. Borel, Psycho-Analytic Psychiatry.

G. Parcheminey, Anxiety.

H. Codet, Psycho-Pathology of Every-Day Life.

J. Lacan, The Theory of the Ego in Psycho-Analysis.

E. Pichon, The Rôle of the Œdipus Complex in the Mental Development of the Child.

E. Pichon, The Sexual Character of Western Civilization.

Mme. O. Codet, The Aims of Child-Analysis.

E. Pichon, How Thoughts Acquire Form.

R. de Saussure, Making Aggressiveness Innocuous.

Th. Chentrier, The Lazy School-Child.

R. Laforgue, Psycho-Analytical Clinic (for Candidates only).

R. Loewenstein, Psycho-Analytic Technique (for Candidates only).

Mme. M. Bonaparte and C. Odier, Control-Analyses in Groups (for Candidates only).

SENDAI PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Report of the Training Committee for the years 1936 and 1937.

Lectures

1936 and 1937.—Dr. K. Marui: 'The Place of Psycho-Analysis within the Field of Psychiatry and Psychology', read before the medical and juristic-literary Faculty at the Imperial University of Tohoku.

Seminars

1936.—Dr. M. Yamamura, Study of Freud's 'Three Contributions', held at the Psychiatric Institute of the University of Tohoku in Sendai. (For medical students.)

1937.—Dr. H. Kosawa, Study of Freud's 'Three Contributions', with case-material, held at the Kosawa Psycho-Analytical Sanatorium at Tokyo. (For medical students.) Dr. M. Yamamura, Study of Freud's 'Three Contributions', held at the Psychiatric Institute of the Imperial University of Tohoku in Sendai.

Papers Read

1936.—At the 35th Plenary Meeting of the Japanese Society for Neurology and Psychiatry in Tokyo, Dr. R. Kimura: 'Illusions Considered from a Psycho-Analytic Point of View'. At the 21st Plenary Meeting of the Tohoku Society for Medicine in Sendai, Dr. M. Yamamura: 'Enuresis'.

1937.—At the Japanese Society for Mental Hygiene in Tokyo, Dr. R. Kimura: 'Psycho-Analytic Views on the Modern Phase of Life'. At the 36th Plenary Meeting of the Japanese Society for Neurology and Psychiatry in Okayama, Dr. H. Yamamura: 'Infantile Anxiety'. At the 22nd Plenary Meeting of the Tohoku Society for Medicine in Sendai, Dr. M. Yamamura: 'Gastro-Intestinal Complaints and Psycho-Analysis'.

Michio Yamamura,
Secretary.

SWISS PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

In view of the fact that our Society is spread over the whole of Switzerland and that consequently its Training Analysts are distributed in different towns, the work of training candidates cannot be concentrated in a single Institute. This apparent drawback is amply compensated for by a greater elasticity in regard to the provision of centres for Training Analysis. We are able to select a Training Analyst for each of the larger towns in Switzerland, and the candidates are able to arrange their Control

Analyses, Seminar Evenings, Conversation Groups, etc., according to their requirements. We also endeavour to provide for their further training as much as possible by getting them to attend courses of lectures at the foreign Institutes. Our experience, however, is that the most important considerations for the forming of future members of the Society are that the candidates shall receive a thorough-going Training Analysis and that they shall be carefully selected from the point of view of general suitability for the work.

At present there are seven candidates being trained, three of them at Institutes abroad. We are arranging to start Seminar Evenings at the beginning of next year.

E. Blum.

VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Candidates

	1935-6	1936-7
Total Number (at end of working year) .	39	37
In Training Analysis	25	28
In Control Analysis	15	15
Successfully passed out	4	4
Theoretical training completed	1	1
	(Psychologist)	(Children's doctor)
Given leave of absence.	1	3
Resigned	5	3
Exchanged to another Institute	4	4
New Candidates		11
Re-entering Candidates		2

Training and Control Analysts: E. Bibring, Grete Bibring-Lehner, Berta Bornstein-Pfaller, Ruth Brunswick, P. Federn, Anna Freud, H. Hartmann, E. Hitschmann, W. Hoffer, O. Isakower, L. Jekels, Jeanne Lampl-de Groot, R. Sterba, Jenny Wälder.

Curriculum for 1936-7 (I—III Quarter)

(1) For Candidates:

Obligatory Lecture Courses: O. Isakower, Theory of the Instincts. R. Sterba, Theory of Dreams (first and second quarter only). R. Wälder, Ego-Psychology (first and second quarter only). H. Hartmann, General Theory of the Neuroses. E. Hitschmann, Specialized Study of the Neuroses, I. O. Fenichel (by invitation), Problems of Technique (first and second quarter only).

Obligatory Seminars: E. Bibring, Study of Freud's Writings. Anna Freud, Seminar for Child-Analysis. Jeanne Lampl-de Groot, Control of Analyses in Groups.

Lectures: E. Hitschmann, Exercises in Diagnosis and Indications for

Treatment (first and second quarter only). E. P. Hoffmann, Introduction to Psycho-Analysis (first and second quarter only). H. Hartmann, The Secessions from Psycho-Analysis (third quarter only).

Study Groups : P. Federn and E. Stengel, Psycho-Analysis of Psychoses. H. Hartmann, W. Hoffer, Study of Freud's Writings (for Members of the Society for Medical Psychology).

Discussions : August Aichhorn, Analyses of Delinquents. Grete Bibring-Lehner, Clinical Questions ; (1) Hysteria. Berta Bornstein, Problems of Child-Analysis. Anna Freud, Problems of Technique. Editha Sterba, Problems of Puberty Analyses. Jenny Wälder, Discussion of typical Analytic Situations.

For Teachers

Lecture-Courses : A. Aichhorn, Introduction to Child Guidance Clinics. Anna Freud and W. Hoffer, Development of Psycho-Analytic Pedagogy. J. Lampl-de Groot, Principles of Psycho-analytical Psychology. J. Wälder, Psychology of Early Childhood (third quarter only).

Seminars : A. Aichhorn, Seminar for Workers at the Child's Guidance Clinic. G. Bibring-Lehner, H. Hoffer-Schaxel, W. Hoffer, M. Kris, J. Lampl-de Groot, R. Sterba, Readings from Freud's Writings (in Groups).

Study Groups : A. Angel, B. Bornstein, D. T. Burlingham, E. Buxbaum, W. Hoffer, E. Sterba,—The Psychology of Childhood and Puberty. Conducted by Anna Freud. Discussions in common between the Study Groups.

E. Bibring,

Secretary.

B. SOCIETIES WITH TRAINING CENTRES

SWEDISH-FINNISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Candidates : 2, both receiving practical training and still in Training Analysis.

Lectures and Seminars : Bi-weekly Seminar for the Study of Freud's Writings. Occasional technical Seminar.

Training and Control Analysts : Jekels, Tamm.

L. Jekels, A. Tamm.

ITALIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

The Society is still very young and has not so far been able to found a Psycho-Analytical Institute. The training of new analysts is done by means of training and control analysis, and through discussions in common of cases.

During the year 1936-7 Dr. E. Weiss gave some lectures on Psycho-Analytic technique, in which he paid special attention to current problems of Psycho-Analysis, e.g. the progress made in Ego-Analysis and the management of the Transference in special cases. One or two members of the Society gave an account of patients under treatment and a discussion followed.

Dr. Weiss also read some papers on the new discoveries that have been

made in early infantile development, in which he took into especial consideration, among other things, the English School of thought as represented by Dr. Jones, Mrs. Klein, Dr. Majorie Brierley, etc. Dr. Servadio also spoke on this subject.

Dr. Weiss also gave a course of lectures on the Theory and Therapy of the Neuroses to an audience of about thirty persons who had a general interest in Psycho-Analysis.

Publications consisted only of a few articles which appeared in certain Journals and newspapers.

Dr. E. Weiss.

C. INDEPENDENT INSTITUTES

THE BALTIMORE PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

The following lectures and seminars were held under the auspices of the Washington School of Psychiatry (cf. Introduction) :

Lectures on the Literature of Psycho-Analysis (held once a month, from October, 1936, to May, 1937) :

Dr. A. A. Brill (New York), The Developement of Psychoanalytic Literature.

Dr. Lucile Dooley (Washington), Manic-Depressive Psychoses.

Dr. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (Rockville), ' Organic ' Conditions.

Dr. Lionel Blitzsten (Chicago), The Rôle of Dreams.

Dr. Gregory Zilboorg (New York), Suicide.

Dr. Ralph Crowley (Washington), Addictions to Potent Drugs.

Dr. Karen Horney (New York), Masochism.

Seminars (October, 1936, to June, 1937) :

Dr. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Clinical Conference.

Dr. Ernest E. Hadley, An Introduction to Human Biology.

Dr. Lucile Dooley, Psychopathology.

Dr. Lewis B. Hill, The Psychopathology of Interpersonal Relations.

There are ten physicians whose qualifications and training are such as to merit the status of students in training in the Society.

Dr. Ernest E. Hadley,

Chairman.

D. STUDY GROUPS

CZECHO-SLOVAKIAN STUDY GROUP

Candidates

Total Number (6 medical, 4 lay)	.	.	.	.	10
Training Completed .	.	.	.	.	1
Transferred to other Institutes .	.	.	.	.	1
Resigned.	.	.	.	.	2
New Entrants .	.	.	.	.	2
In Control Analysis .	.	.	.	.	6

(Of these, newly admitted, 1)

Seminars and Study Groups

Steff Bornstein, Case-Material.

Bornstein, Fenichel, Reich, Genesis and Treatment of Defensive Forms as illustrated by Clinical Cases.

Bornstein, Problems of Child-Analysis and Pedagogy.

Fenichel, Exercises in the Technique of Interpretation.

Annie Reich, Seminar on Freud : the Case of Schreber.

Frank, Physiology of the Nervous System (for non-medical candidates).

Public Lectures, etc.

Fenichel : ' The Psycho-Analysis of Anti-Semitism ' (in aid of the Eder Memorial Fund).

Training and Control Analysts : Bornstein, Fenichel, Reich.

Otto Fenichel.

LOS ANGELES STUDY GROUP

Director : Dr. Ernst Simmel

Candidates

Since 1934	.	.	.	.	.	.	5 (3 have left).
Training completed	.	.	.	.	.	.	1
Training broken off	.	.	.	.	.	.	1
In Training Analysis	.	.	.	.	.	.	3

Educational Activities

E. Simmel, Technical Seminar for practising Analysts.

Frances Deri, Freud's Case-Histories.

E. Simmel, Seminar on Psycho-Analytic Literature. Early and recent writings.

David Brunswick and E. Simmel, Pedagogic Seminar.

E. Simmel, Introduction to Psycho-Analysis ; for Doctors and Teachers. (Obligatory for members of the Pedagogic Seminar and for permanent guests of the Study Group.)

Training and Control Analysts : E. Simmel, Frances Deri.

Ernst Simmel.

STUDY GROUP OF TOPEKA

Educational Activities

(1) Seminar for the Discussion of Freud's Writings.

(2) Lectures at the Washburn College :

Dr. Karl A. Menninger, Psycho-pathology and Criminology.

Dr. Robert Knight, Application of Psycho-Analysis to Pedagogy.

Dr. Charles Tidd, Mental Hygiene.

Dr. Charles Tidd.

E. INDIVIDUAL ANALYSTS

Analysts in Regular Practice (with or without authorization to train) :

Dr. Gerö in Copenhagen, Denmark ; Dr. Koch in Sao Paulo, Brazil ; Dr.

Kulovesi in Tampere, Finland ; Dr. Sugar in Subotica, Jugo-Slavia ; Dr. Weigert-Vowinckel in Ankara, Turkey ; Dr. Winnik in Bucharest, Roumania.

Dr. Gerö is carrying on practical training. Dr. Koch is doing training analysis and has given no papers or lectures during the past year of work. Dr. Kulovesi has not engaged in any training activities during the last year. Dr. Sugar took three candidates into analysis, one of whom, however, possessed only a theoretical interest in psycho-analysis, and another has been transferred to a Psycho-Analytical Institute. In Jugo-Slavia a Study Group is being formed which will do training work as well. Dr. Sugar has also given popular lectures on Psycho-Analysis in various towns and published popular articles in several Journals. In Ankara Dr. Weigert Vowinckel has given lectures and taken part in discussions on psycho-analysis in private circles ; and a psychiatrist, who is at present still in Training Analysis, has acquired a thorough theoretical knowledge of the subject and has translated a number of Freud's writings into Turkish. Dr. Winnik has read various papers ; and in addition he is carrying on a private seminar for study of Freud's writings. It consists of fifteen persons (medical men, teachers, etc.) who apply Psycho-Analysis in their own field of work, but do not intend to practise it for therapeutic purposes.

No report has been received from Dr. Wulff-Sachs, Johannesburg, and Dr. Clara Happel, Detroit.

III

MINUTES OF THE MARIENBAD MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COMMISSION

After the publication of the minutes of the General Meeting of the International Training Commission at the Marienbad Congress in 1936, the Executive of the New York Psychoanalytic Society wrote a letter to Dr. Ernest Jones, President of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, in which the actual facts were revealed. The contents of this letter are given here together with a resolution of the Executive of the I.T.C. The report on the General Meeting of the I.T.C. gave in a short summary the proceedings and speeches which took place at the General Meeting. The correct explanation which is given by the New York Society refers to the fact that certain suppositions on which the discussion of the so-called Rado resolution had been based arose from a misunderstanding. The Executive of the I.T.C. therefore wishes to put the matter right as follows :

With the exception of the first sentence, paragraphs Nos. 3 and 4 reporting the General Meeting of the International Training Commission (published in the *JOURNAL*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 346-347, and the *Zeitschrift*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 193-194) are concerned with a motion which was subse-

quently discovered to have been brought before the Meeting in error. The discussion and vote on it therefore become invalid. It follows that the record in the paragraphs in question should be taken as not constituting part of the official minutes.

At the request of the New York Psychoanalytic Society we publish the following letter :

‘ THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY
‘ 324 West Eighty-Sixth Street
New York City

‘ June 17, 1937.

‘ DR. ERNEST JONES, President

‘ International Psychoanalytic Association,

‘ 81 Harley Street,

‘ London, W.1,

‘ England.

‘ MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT :

‘ At the meeting of June 1, 1937, the New York Psychoanalytic Society voted its unanimous objection to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Proceedings of the International Training Commission (*Zeitschrift*, 1937, pages 193-194) and to chapter IV—in the German version, chapter III—of the Proceedings of the International Psychoanalytic Association (*JOURNAL*, 1937, page 100; *Zeitschrift*, 1937, page 188).

‘ What these objectionable passages variously call “ der von Dr. Rado formulierte Antrag ”, “ Antrag Rado ”, “ von Dr. Rado gestellter Antrag ”, and “ a proposal communicated by Dr. Rado ”, was in fact a proposal passed by a unanimous resolution of the New York Psychoanalytic Society as a whole. It was first voted upon by our Educational Committee on March 22, 1936, and then approved by the Society on March 31, 1936. Obviously, therefore, the statement in the report of the I.T.C. that the proposal “ could only be the expression of a personal opinion on Rado’s part, or at most a motion submitted by him alone ” is not true. The proposal is the opinion of our entire body. Moreover, this proposal was not submitted to the I.T.C. by Dr. Rado. In fact, Dr. Rado neither submitted nor communicated anything to the Marienbad meeting of the I.T.C. This is what actually occurred :

‘ At the same meeting of March 31, 1936, our Society delegated Drs. Lewin, Oberndorf and Rado as its official representatives to the Marienbad Congress. For personal reasons, Drs. Lewin and Rado could not go. Dr. Rado notified Dr. Oberndorf to this effect in a letter, in which he epitomized the decision of our Educational Committee in reference to the I.T.C.

‘ At the Marienbad meeting of the I.T.C. Dr. Oberndorf, though he submitted the essential features of our New York resolution, unfortunately

did not state that it was a formal resolution of our Society as a whole ; nor did he introduce it as a motion on our Society's behalf ; nor did he make a motion of his own. Nor could he, of course, make an authorized motion on behalf of Dr. Rado. Plainly, there was no motion on the floor. Hence the discussion published in this report was out of order, for it dealt with a motion which was never made. The formal resolution passed on a non-existent motion was also out of order. To call this non-existent motion " *der von Rado gestellte Antrag* " was even more out of order, if such a thing were possible. This alleged " motion by Rado " was born in Marienbad—not in New York—of irregularity in procedure and error in fact.

' Dr. Rado cabled Dr. Oberndorf on August 3, 1936, " There were no personal proposals of mine, only proposals by the New York Educational Committee." This cable was forwarded to the Chairman of the I.T.C. prior to the business session of the Congress. Nonetheless, in this business session as well as eight months later in the proceedings of the I.T.C. and the I.P.A. the misrepresentations continued.

' Furthermore, the report of the I.T.C. contains a few other misleading points :

' (1) By implication it indicts our Society for having failed to consult the other American societies. To be sure, due to oversight these societies were not consulted. But such consultation is in no way mandatory on the New York or any other branch society of the International before it may make a proposal.

' (2) The report expresses astonishment that the attitude of Dr. Rado and the New York Society towards centralization of power in the I.T.C. has changed since the Lucerne Congress. This astonishment is disingenuous. For at Lucerne this policy towards centralization, which then seemed desirable to us, " encountered the opposition of the Executive Council of the I.T.C." (cf. report). It was precisely this opposition which forced our Society to come out for unrestricted local autonomy in all matters of administration and education. The New York Society formulated this new policy and voted on it on December 12 and 18, 1934, and then embodied it in a resolution of the Educational Committee, a copy of which was sent by registered mail to the Chairman of the I.T.C. in June, 1935. The Executive Council of the I.T.C. ignored this official notification. In the winter of 1935-1936, it circularized plans for the reorganization of the I.T.C., which allowed this body to continue as a central legislative and executive agency. The New York Society stood then, and stands now, definitely committed to the principle of local autonomy. It was precisely in order to avoid any possible conflict on this issue that our Educational Committee at its meeting of March 22, 1936, prepared the proposal for the Marienbad Congress. The intent of this proposal was to

transform the International Training Commission into an informal Scientific Training Conference—into an assembly of teachers of psycho-analysis ; that is, into a body stripped of all governing attributes—such as an executive council, provisions for representation and proportional voting, etc. Not a single word was said on the merits of this proposal at the Marienbad meeting.

‘ The reports misrepresent, misstate, and damage the position of both the New York Society as a whole and of Dr. Rado personally. Therefore the New York Society respectfully requests that this letter of correction be published in the Bulletin of the I.P.A. and the objectionable passages be stricken from the records.

‘ Copies of this letter are being sent to the members of the Executive Council of the I.T.C.

‘ Very truly yours,

‘ *GEORGE E. DANIELS,*

‘ Secretary, The New York Psychoanalytic Society.’

M. EITINGON. E. BIBRING.

President and Secretary of the International Training Commission.

